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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
Abstract 
An Empirical Analysis of Islamic Microfinance Institutions’ Performance in 
Indonesia 
 
by 
Bayu Arie Fianto 
 
This study investigates the impact of Islamic microfinance institutions on rural household welfare in 
Indonesia. In particular, this study focuses on estimating the impact of financing, the level of shari’a 
compliance, the best financing mechanism, and the factors that impact on rural households that 
become clients of Islamic microfinance institutions. Islamic microfinance institutions play an 
important role in Indonesia because the country has the world’s largest Muslim population. Hence, 
the availability of financial products and services that parallel Muslim beliefs is crucial. This study 
estimates the impact of Islamic financing on rural household welfare using the difference-in-
difference method followed by the adjusted difference-in-difference method. Next, the study 
evaluates shari’a compliance and the Islamic values of clients of Islamic microfinance institutions. 
The double difference-in-difference and adjusted difference-in-difference methods are adopted to 
investigate the financing impact of two Islamic microfinance institutions’ financing mechanisms; 
profit and loss sharing and non-profit and loss sharing. The logit model is used to identify factors that 
influence rural households to become clients of Islamic microfinance institutions.     
This study produces several important findings. The difference-in-difference method results show 
Islamic microfinance institutions’ financing helps to increase the clients’ annual income. The fixed 
effects results confirmed that Islamic microfinance institutions’ financing improved clients’ income 
compared with non-clients. The evaluation of shari’a compliance found that Islamic microfinance 
institutions’ financing parallels the shari’a standards of the National Shari’a Board of Indonesia. The 
results of the double difference-in-difference method confirm that the profit and loss sharing 
mechanism has a greater impact on rural household welfare than the non-profit and loss sharing 
mechanism. Finally, age, gender, and income are factors that significantly influence rural households 
to become clients of Islamic microfinance institutions.  
 
Keywords: Islamic microfinance institution, difference-in-difference, shari’a compliance, profit and 
loss sharing mechanism. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are financial institutions that play an important role in providing 
financial access for the poor people in rural areas and help to reduce poverty. Vatta (2003) claims 
that MFIs can reach the rural poor to address the basic problems of rural development in which 
formal financial institutions (such as banks) have not been able to make significant advances. 
Providing financial services and helping people who have difficulty in meeting loan contract 
requirements (e.g., the legality of the business and collateral) are predominant features of MFIs 
compared with other financial institutions such as commercial banks. Formal financial service 
institutions generally demand specific requirements such as collateral, land and wealth, before 
granting credit (Hadi, Wahyudin, Ardiwinata, & Abdu, 2015; Li, Gan, & Hu, 2011a). These 
requirements are major obstacles for the rural poor in obtaining finance to support their activities. 
Access to finance is important and has tremendous economic and social impacts, especially on the 
rural poor. The impacts are not only economic, access to finance also contributes to better 
education, health and housing for the poor (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). 
1.1.1 Islamic MFIs and the Muslim economy 
In 2010, Muslims accounted for 1.6 billion people in the world and this number is expected to grow 
to about 2.8 billion people by 2050, equal to 23.2% and 29.7%, respectively, of the world’s 
population. The countries with the largest Muslim population are dominated by countries from the 
Asian region such as Indonesia, India and Pakistan (Pew Research Center, 2015). 
Table 1.1 The world’s top 10 countries with the largest Muslim population in 2010. 
No Country Share of the world’s Muslim 
population (percentage) 
Share of Muslims within 
the country (percentage) 
Muslim population  
(millions) 
1 Indonesia 13.1 87.2 209 
2 India 11.0 14.4 176 
3 Pakistan 10.5 96.4 167 
4 Bangladesh 8.4 90.4 134 
5 Nigeria 4.8 48.8 77 
6 Egypt 4.8 94.9 76 
7 Iran 4.6 99.5 73 
8 Turkey 4.5 98.0 71 
9 Algeria 2.2 97.9 34 
10 Morocco 2.0 99.9 31 
Source: Pew Research Center (2015). 
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Islamic social instruments such as waqf1 and zakah2 should be increased and promoted. With 
regard to financial access for Muslims, microcredit that parallels Muslim beliefs is important, 
especially because Muslims are restricted from participating in current conventional financial 
institutions because they use interest (riba) (Akhter, Akhtar, & Jaffri, 2009; Karim, Tarazi, & Reille, 
2008).  
Islamic MFIs are financial institutions that include particular Islamic values and could be a solution for 
poor people who are averse to borrowing, in part, because of their religious beliefs (Ahmad & 
Ahmad, 2009). The principles of Islamic MFIs are derived from Islamic law (shari’a) (Seibel & Dwi 
Agung, 2006). Islamic law governs financial schemes without charging interest (riba) (Rahman, 
2010a). Islamic MFIs provide products that differ from conventional MFIs such as profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) products and non-profit and loss sharing (non-PLS) products (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 
1999). In the upcoming paragraph, an exhaustive explanation of the Islamic business principles or 
Islamic law (shari’a) that govern Islamic MFI will be presented.   
1.1.2 Islamic MFIs and Indonesia 
Indonesia is an agricultural country with the world’s largest Muslim population. Islamic MFIs can play 
a significant role in addressing poverty alleviation in the rural sector predominantly dominated by 
agricultural activities. The principles attached to Islamic MFIs, i.e., avoiding the use of interest/riba 
are an advantage for such institutions to present to people in an Islamic majority country like 
Indonesia. Furthermore, Islamic MFIs operate cooperatively with a PLS mechanism that can be widely 
and easily adapted to rural poor households in Indonesia. Institutions that have shari’a compliant 
financial products can cater to the needs of traditional farmers in rural households. Islamic MFIs also 
have charity-based funds that allow them to raise Islamic charity funds such as zakah and sadaqat3 
(Kaleem & Ahmed, 2009). 
There are two types of formal Islamic MFIs registered in Indonesia under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and Small, and Medium Enterprise of the Republic of Indonesia 
(MoCMSMEs): Islamic Financial Services Cooperatives (KJKS) and Islamic Financial Services Units 
(UJKS). The KJKS are fully cooperative institutions that provide finance, investment and savings under 
Islamic business principles, whereas UJKS are business units under the management of cooperatives 
that provide finance, investment and savings following Islamic principles (Sugianto, 2012). In April 
                                                          
1 The waqf is created when somebody gives away an asset for the benefit of the society. There is also the 
concept of cash waqf that can be used in order to benefit the society (Ahmed, 2007).  
2 Compulsory charity for Muslims (if their wealth exceeds the condition (nisab), equal to 85 grams of gold and 
they have held it for a year (Haul)). 
3 Optional charity. 
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2012, there were approximately 4,117 KJKS and UJKS under the supervision of the MoCMSMEs of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Sugianto, 2012). 
Table 1.2 shows the outreach of Islamic MFIs in some selected countries. Lebanon has one Islamic 
MFI with 26,000 clients; Bangladesh with Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) and Social 
Investment Bank Ltd has 111,837 clients; Jordan has 1,481 clients; Saudi Arabia has 7,000 clients, 
whereas Sudan with three Islamic MFIs has 9,561 clients. The Syrian village bank institution has 2,298 
clients, the Pakistan and Afghanistan institutions have 6,069 and 53,011 clients, respectively, and 
Indonesia covers 762,000 clients with cooperative institutions (Karim et al., 2008; Nasdaq OMX, 
2012; Sugianto, 2012).  
Table 1.2 Outreach of Islamic MFIs by country. 
Year Country No of Institutions No of Clients 
2007 a Lebanon 1 26,000 
2007 a Bangladesh 2 111,837 
2007 a Jordan 1 1,481 
2007 a Saudi Arabia 1 7,000 
2007 a Sudan 3 9,561 
2007a Syria 1 2,298 
2007a Pakistan 1 6,069 
2007a Afghanistan 4 53,011 
2012b Indonesia 4,117 762,000 
aYear 2007, survey conducted by CGAP as cited in Nasdaq OMX (2012); 
bYear 2012, Sugianto (2012). 
 
Another country that offers Islamic microfinance products is Malaysia. Some products from 
Malaysian MFIs are shari’a compliant. For instance, Bank Rakyat provided the concept of rahn 
(pawning) whereas Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) offers qardh hasan (benevolent loan) as its 
microfinance product (Nasdaq OMX, 2012). In terms of shari’a compliance, financing by AIM meets 
the shari’a standard except that they charge 10% for operational costs and management fees with 
2% as compulsory savings. Another example is Yayasan Usaha Maju (YUM), which has interest-free 
loans based on Islamic principles, but it has a 10-18% charge for managerial and operational fees 
with 2% compulsory savings (Al-Shami, Majid, Rashid, & Hamid, 2013).  
1.2 Research problems and questions 
1.2.1 Research problems 
Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population that faces severe poverty problems. In 2014, 
over 28 million Indonesians were living below the poverty line, i.e., 11.3% of the population. The 
national poverty line in Indonesia is 292,951 rupiahs, equivalent to US$ 24.40 per month (The World 
Bank, 2015a). According to the Indonesian central agency on statistics, cited in the Ministry of 
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Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2013), Muslims comprise 87.21% of the Indonesian 
population. This equals 207 million of the 237 million Indonesian population. The gross national 
income (GNI) per capita in 2014 was US$ 3,650 and gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 5% 
(The World Bank, 2015b).        
Islamic MFIs can play a significant role in addressing poverty alleviation in the Indonesian rural 
sector. This is because most conventional financial institutions, particularly commercial banks’ and 
MFIs’ services and products, do not fulfil the religious needs of Muslim clients. Many Muslims prefer 
products from Islamic MFIs rather than conventional MFIs because conventional MFI products 
contravene their religious beliefs (Akhter et al., 2009).  
Islamic MFIs operate cooperatively on a PLS mechanism that can be widely and easily adapted to 
rural poor households in Indonesia. The institutions have financial products that cater to the needs of 
traditional Muslim farmers and rural households. PLS products promote partnership, equity financing 
and risk sharing, which can benefit farmers and rural households. Islamic MFIs and rural households 
share the results based on the real condition of the project. Since Islamic MFIs implement this 
mechanism, both share the profits and risks of the project. In conventional finance, the institution 
gets a predetermined return and the risk is borne by the farmers or rural households (Farooq, 2007).  
According to Chowdhry (2006), Islamic finance provides a good mechanism to empower the poor and 
can convert the potential capital into profit under the PLS mechanism. In addition, Karim et al. (2008) 
reported that 72% of Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries do not want to use conventional 
financial institutions. This is because conventional financial institutions go against their religious 
beliefs. Therefore, Islamic MFIs have a great opportunity to cover the needs of Muslims estimated at 
over 1.2 billion people globally (Akhter et al., 2009). The United Kingdom (UK) government also 
wishes to benefit from this opportunity through open access for financial services that are consistent 
with Muslim beliefs and declared Britain as the hub of Islamic finance in Europe. In 2007, the Bank of 
England and the Financial Service Authority (FSA) monitored the development of Islamic finance in 
the UK and published a paper on the regulatory perspective of Islamic finance in the UK 
(Ainley, Mashayekhi, Hicks, Rahman, & Ravalia, 2007a). 
In the Islamic finance concept, the term “client” is used instead of “borrower” because various 
schemes are used in the Islamic finance concept, such as trading, profit and loss sharing or services. 
The term “borrower” is used only in qard and qard al-hasanah schemes because these are the only 
loans allowed in Islamic finance. Islamic MFIs target the poor and use Islamic finance schemes such 
as cost plus mark-up (murabaha), profit sharing (mudarabah) and profit and loss sharing 
(musharakah) in their contracts (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999).  
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Furthermore, Islamic MFIs can combine their products with Islamic charity-based funds (zakah, and 
sadaqat), which can target the poorest and help free them from poverty (Ahmad, 2002). The 
combination of Islamic MFIs and Islamic charity based funds are great tools to help the poorest 
especially in Muslim majority countries. This is because zakah, for instance, is mandatory for every 
wealthy Muslim (Ahmad, 2002). Since zakah also gives to the poor4 people and Islamic MFIs can 
collect zakah funds, the poorest clients can spend these funds for their consumption while financing 
by Islamic MFIs can help them in productive activity.   
Islamic MFIs were introduced into Indonesia in 1990. Despite the fact that they lacked regulation, 
supervision and reliable reporting, they have become an alternative financing source for poor 
Muslims in rural areas because they have products parallel with Muslim beliefs (Seibel, 2008). Islamic 
MFIs such as KJKS BMT MMU Sidogiri in East Java, Indonesia, are an example of alternative sources of 
funds for people in rural areas. These Islamic MFIs already distribute finance to 17,372 clients; about 
70% of them (12,160 households) are poor clients in rural areas. 
However, there are limited empirical studies focusing on the impact of Islamic MFIs in reducing 
poverty, particularly in rural areas in Indonesia. Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006) and Seibel (2008) 
studies addressed the history, development, problems and challenges of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia; 
however, the studies do not provide empirical data on the impact of Islamic MFIs. The empirical 
study by Adnan and Ajija (2015) investigated the impact of financing from one Islamic MFI in East 
Java, Indonesia. Using a paired t-test and poverty index, the study showed financing by Islamic MFIs 
can help to increase the client’s income and empower the client’s business productivity. Hence, the 
study concluded that financing from Islamic MFIs is effective in reducing poverty in Indonesia. 
The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing on rural household 
welfare in Indonesia. There are two financing mechanisms in Indonesian Islamic MFIs: PLS and non-
PLS. This study also identifies which financing model provides a greater impact on rural households in 
Indonesia. There is no comprehensive study in Indonesia that measures the impact of Islamic MFIs, 
particularly the impact of the two financing mechanisms.  
This study also examines shari’a compliance by the Islamic MFI schemes based on the guidance and 
standards from Indonesia’s shari’a board. Maintaining shari’a compliance is important for Islamic 
financial institutions because it means the products and services from the institutions parallel Muslim 
                                                          
4 Based on verses in the holy Qur’an, there are eight groups that are eligible for zakah: fuqara (poor); masakeen 
(needy); ameleen-a-alaiha (those who are in charge thereof); muallafat-ul-quloob (those whose hearts are to 
be won over); fir-riqaab (the freeing of human beings from bondage); al-gharimun (those who are 
overburdened with debts); fi-sabeelillah (for every struggle) in Allah’s cause; and ibn as-sabil (for the wayfarer) 
(9:60) (Obaidullah, 2008).   
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beliefs based on Islam principles. The study will further investigate the factors that influence rural 
households to become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs. 
This study focuses on formal Islamic MFIs in Indonesia. As stated above, there are two types of 
formal Islamic MFIs under the supervision of the MoCMSMEs of the Republic of Indonesia: KJKS and 
UJKS. However, some of these Islamic MFIs are not governed and supervised by the financial 
authorities in Indonesia5. Formal Islamic MFIs such as KJKS and UJKS are subject to regulation and 
supervision because they have to register with the government through MoCMSMEs and they are 
under the law of cooperation in Indonesia.  
Indonesia has a wide range of MFIs and their concept in Indonesia is also ambiguous (Seibel & Dwi 
Agung, 2006). Based on financial authorities and international recognition, formal financial 
institutions that offer microfinance services include units of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Micro-
banking Division and the rural banks (BPR). Cooperatives and so-called village banks (bank desa) are 
under the semiformal financial sector and are not supervised by financial authorities. There are also 
informal microfinance-like channelling groups and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs, 
arisan), and self-help groups (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006).  
However, based on the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2015b), MFIs in Indonesia are 
classified under non-bank regulations. The government puts MFIs under this classification because 
there are many non-bank financial institutions operating in Indonesia. These do not include formal 
financial institutions that offer microfinance services such as BRI and rural banks (BPR). Some 
cooperatives, such as KJKS and UJKS, are under the supervision of the MoCMSMEs of the Republic of 
Indonesia (semi-formal), whereas others such as Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) and Baitul Tamwil 
Muhammadiyah (BTM) are only registered under the Centre for Micro Enterprise Incubation 
(PINBUK) or associated with Induk Koperasi Syariah BMT (Inkopsyah BMT) (Adnan & Ajija, 2015; 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2015b; Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). 
Table 1.3 MFIs in Indonesia in December 2014. 
Type of MFI No of 
units 
Act Total 
assets 
(billion 
IDR) 
No of 
clients 
(thousands) 
Type Supervised 
by 
BRI micro-banking 
division (Teras BRI, 
Teras BRI (mobile 
office)) 
8,360 Law No. 
10/ 1998 
778,020 7,300 Conventional OJK 
                                                          
5 Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) is a financial authority in Indonesia that promotes and organizes a 
system of regulations and supervises financial services sector activities (Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 
2013).   
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Bank Perkreditan 
Rakyat (BPR) rural 
banks 
4,895 Law No. 
10/ 1998 
89,000 13,476 Conventional OJK 
Bank Pembiayaan 
Rakyat Syariah 
(BPRS) Islamic rural 
banks 
439 Law No. 
10/ 1998 
13,003 1,249 Islamic OJK 
Pawnshop 850 a Law No. 
178/ 
1961 
32,240 b N/A Conventional/ 
Islamic 
OJK 
Koperasi Simpan 
Pinjam (KSP)/Unit 
Simpan Pinjam 
(USP) savings and 
loan cooperatives 
38,083 c Law No. 
25/ 1992 
Law No. 
17/ 2012 
8,900 c 16,871 c Conventional MoCMSMEs 
KJKS/UJKS 
Islamic financial 
services 
cooperatives 
4,117 d Law No. 
25/ 1992 
Kepmen 
No. 
91/2004 
5,000 762 d Islamic MoCMSMEs 
Sources: Gallardo (2001); Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a): Ministry of Cooperatives and 
Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia (2005); Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2015a); Central Bank of 
Indonesia (2015); Sugianto (2012). 
aYear 2004; bSeptember 2014; cYear 2005; dYear 2012. 
 
Table 1.3 presents some data about MFIs in Indonesia. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is a state-owned 
bank concerned with micro-financing; it started business in 1895. Around 31.25% of its lending is for 
micro and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through its micro-banking division. In December 
2014, BRI’s total assets were over 778 trillion rupiahs; there were over 8,000 units in the micro-
banking division with over 7 million clients. Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR), Indonesia’s rural bank, is 
a private/local government institution that, since 1988, has also focused its banking business on rural 
areas in Indonesia. In December 2014, there were 1,643 BPRs with 4,895 offices in Indonesia. Total 
assets were 89 trillion rupiahs and the bank served over 13 million clients. Both of these institutions 
(BRI and BPR) are supervised by Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Indonesia (OJK)/ Indonesia Financial Services 
Authority (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2015a; Central Bank of Indonesia, 2015; Gallardo, 2001; Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority, 2014a; PT BPR Indra Chandra, 2011). 
Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS), the Islamic rural bank, was first introduced to Indonesia in 
1990 and focused on rural areas and micro-financing but with Islamic principles (shari’a compliant 
products). In December 2014, BPRS’s total assets were over 13 trillion rupiahs and there were 163 
BPRSs with 439 offices that covered over 1.2 million clients. Pawnshop is a state-owned institution in 
Indonesia that started business in Indonesia in 1746. In September 2014, its total assets were over 34 
trillion rupiahs. There were 850 pawnshop offices in 2004. BPRSs and pawnshops are supervised by 
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OJK (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2015; Gallardo, 2001; Icanenede, 2010; Indonesia Financial Services 
Authority, 2014a; Pegadaian Indonesia, 2014). 
Koperasi Simpan Pinjam (KSP) and Unit Simpan Pinjam (USP) savings and loan cooperatives and 
savings and loan units are Indonesia’s cooperative institutions that are owned by members. The idea 
of cooperatives in Indonesia was first introduced in 1896 and, in December 2014, the total assets of 
KSP/USP were over 8 trillion rupiahs; they served over 16 million clients. Koperasi Jasa Keuangan 
Syariah (KJKS) and Unit Jasa Keuangan Syariah (UJKS) are cooperatives with Islamic principles in their 
business. In 2012, there were over 4,000 KJKSs and UJKSs and 700,000 clients in Indonesia. These 
cooperatives are regulated and supervised by the MoCMSMEs of the Republic of Indonesia (Gallardo, 
2001; Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia, 2005, 2015; Sugianto, 
2012).    
1.2.2 Research questions 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
1. How does financing by Islamic MFIs impact rural household welfare in Indonesia? 
2. Is Islamic MFIs financing compatible with the shari’a standards and do Islamic MFIs’ clients have 
to exhibit good Islamic values?  
3. What is the impact of the PLS and non-PLS financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs? Which is the 
better financing mechanism in terms of impact on rural household welfare in Indonesia? 
4. What factors influence rural households to become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs 
in Indonesia?   
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1.3 Research objectives 
This study aims to comprehensively investigate Islamic MFIs’ financing of rural households in 
Indonesia. To achieve this objective, the study will:  
1. Evaluate the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing on rural household welfare in Indonesia.  
2. Examine shari’a compliance and evaluate the Islamic values of Islamic MFIs’ clients. This 
examination is based on the standards set by Indonesia’s shari’a board. 
3. Assess the impact of PLS and non-PLS financing mechanisms on Islamic MFIs and identify which 
financing mechanism better impacts on rural household welfare in Indonesia.  
4. Identify the factors that determine how rural households become clients of and receive finance 
from Islamic MFIs in Indonesia.  
1.4 Contributions of the research  
There is limited literature on Islamic MFIs and only a few focus on financing activities and their 
impact on the society. For instance, Akhter et al. (2009) study investigated the operation of Akhuwat, 
Islamic MFIs in Pakistan and their impact on poverty alleviation in society. Other empirical studies 
measuring the impact of Islamic MFIs on poverty alleviation, such as that of Rahman and Ahmad 
(2010), focused on the impact of rural development schemes (RDS) on poverty alleviation in 
Bangladesh. The RDS (shari’a based microfinance) is under the Islamic Bank Bangladesh Limited 
(IBBL).  
However, in contrast there is ample literature on conventional MFIs. For instance Li, Gan, and Hu 
(2011b) tried to explain the welfare impact of conventional microcredit on rural households in China; 
Kondo, Orbeta, Dingcong, and Infantado (2008) assessed the impact of conventional MFIs on rural 
households in the Philippines. Hiatt and Woodworth (2006) measured the impact of village banks on 
indigenous families in central America and Imai, Arun, and Annim (2010) evaluated the impact of 
MFIs on poverty alleviation using national household data in India.       
There is limited empirical literature that has investigated the impact of the PLS and non-PLS financing 
mechanisms of Islamic MFIs, particularly the impact on rural household welfare in Indonesia. 
According to Dusuki and Abdullah (2006), the ideal mechanism adopted by Islamic financial 
institutions, including Islamic MFIs, is PLS. A PLS mechanism with an equity-based and risk-sharing 
contract represents the true spirit of Islamic finance more than the debt-based mechanism in non-
PLS contracts.  
However, based on studies by Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Dusuki and Abdullah (2006) and Asutay 
(2007), the more popular financing mechanism in Islamic financial institutions, including Islamic MFIs, 
is still the non-PLS financing mechanism, especially for debt-like schemes such as murabaha and 
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ijarah wa iqtina’. These schemes are popular because they are simple and convenient for the 
institution. A non-PLS mechanism is also relatively less risky than a PLS. This is because, in the PLS 
mechanism, the rate of return to the banks’ investment is greater than with the non PLS  mechanism; 
this is a consequence of the risk-sharing mechanism (Dusuki & Abdullah, 2006).    
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of microfinance in 
Indonesia. Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on the financing/lending impacts of 
microfinance, shari’a standards and Islamic values, the two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs 
(PLS and non-PLS) and the factors that determine whether rural households become Islamic MFIs’ 
clients. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology, data collection, empirical models and 
estimation techniques and Chapter 5 reports the empirical results. Chapter 6 concludes with a 
summary of the major research findings, policy implications, followed by the limitations of the 
research and recommendations for future research.        
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Microfinance in Indonesia 
This chapter provides an overview of microfinance in Indonesia and includes the history, regulations 
and types of institution. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 provides an overview of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Indonesia, including formal, semi-formal and informal MFIs. 
Section 2.2 discusses the development of Islamic finance in Indonesia. Several forms of Islamic 
financial institutions in Indonesia are discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia and finally, Section 2.5 summarises the chapter.  
2.1 MFIs in Indonesia  
Microfinance, in general, is a tool that can create financial inclusion for the poor, improve household 
welfare and reduce poverty (Berhane & Gardebroek, 2011; Li et al., 2011b; Littlefield, Morduch, & 
Hashemi, 2003; Widiarto & Emrouznejad, 2015). MFIs, both Islamic and conventional, are institutions 
that provide financial access for everyone because their main objective is to minimize financial 
exclusion (Lapenu & Pierret, 2006). MFIs originate in many forms such as projects, non-profit 
organizations (NGOs), cooperatives and private institutions. MFIs’ key stakeholders include 
employees, members/clients, founders, government, donors, banks, institutional investors, and 
private individuals (Lapenu & Pierret, 2006).  
An MFI is a flexible institution that can easily adjust to the needs of local people, especially the poor. 
For instance, group micro-lending proved to be an effective way to reach the rural poor in Asia, 
compared with individual lending in Brazil or Egypt (Ahmad & Ahmad, 2009). There are many types 
of microfinance institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), rural banks, village 
banks, and cooperatives (Karim et al., 2008). There are also MFIs that include religious values in their 
operations such as Islamic MFIs.  
Table 2.1 Forms of MFIs. 
Type of MFI Ownership Fund Source Example 
Project Private investors Donors Institutions are not formalized 
(development projects) e.g., 
Morocco and Russian 
microfinance development 
projects by The World Bank  
Non-profit 
organization/ 
foundation 
Private trustees Grants, donations The Sanduk in Comoros; 
Opportunity International in 
Australia 
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Cooperative Members Equity capital, 
deposits, 
commercial funds 
FACECAM in Benin, BMT MMU 
Sidogiri in Indonesia 
Private company Private capital, public 
capital 
Equity capital, 
deposits, 
commercial funds 
RDS Islami Bank Bangladesh 
Limited (IBBL) in Bangladesh, 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
Public Entity Central government, 
local government, 
company with public 
shareholders  
Government, 
public 
Cajas in Municipales Peru, Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) in 
Indonesia 
Sources: Lapenu and Pierret (2006); Gallardo (2001); Adnan and Ajija (2015); Rahman and Ahmad 
(2010); Grameen Bank (2015); Opportunity International (2015); Mukherjee (1997); The World Bank 
(2013). 
 
Table 2.1 presents most of the available existing forms of MFIs around the globe. A Project is a form 
of MFI that is mostly funded by donors. At its creation, there is no specific form or formalized 
structure, therefore it is often called a development project. Non-profit organizations (NGOs) are 
another form of MFI that mostly lack a legal framework. They cannot accept savings but, in certain 
cases, they can offer a savings product. A cooperative is another form of MFI where the ownership 
belongs to its members. It has savings and credit services for members (Lapenu & Pierret, 2006).  
A private company is a form of an MFI that consists of private and public capital. Private capital can 
be local (such as local banks, clients, and employees) and international (such as commercial banks, 
social investment funds, private commercial funds, etc.) A private company can also be structured 
with public capital from local or national government. A public entity is owned by the government or 
state and can be a shareholder company with shares owned by the public. This form of MFI is 
governed by special laws or banking laws (Lapenu & Pierret, 2006). The sustainability and 
effectiveness of an MFI not only depends on its form, but also depends on the culture of the country. 
Some types of MFI need special support to succeed, such as cooperatives or transformed NGOs 
(Seibel, 2005b). For instance, to solve an issue about the effectiveness of members’ control in 
cooperatives, this type of MFI needs special support in the form of effective regulation and 
supervision from an authorized party (Seibel, 2005b).         
Indonesian microfinance has a long history and started in the late 19th century, initially with banks in 
rural areas. On December 16, 1895, R. Bei Aria Wiraatmadja established the Hulp-en Spaar Bank der 
Indlandsche Bestuurs Ambtenaren or Bank for Civil Servants in Purwokerto, Central Java, Indonesia. 
This rural bank is known as Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2015b; Shodiq, 
2014).  
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Table 2.2 Indonesia’s conventional financial institutions in 2014.    
Types Total Institutions Total Offices Network 
Commercial Banks 119 19,948 
Rural Banks 1,643 4,895 
Cooperatives 38,083* NA 
Sources: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a); Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' 
of Republic of Indonesia (2005). 
*2005. 
Table 2.3 Indonesia’s Islamic financial institutions in 2014.    
Types Total Institutions Total Offices Network 
Islamic Commercial Banks 12 2,151 
Conventional Banks with 
Islamic Business Units 
22 320 
Islamic Rural Banks 163 439 
Islamic Cooperatives 4,117* NA 
Sources: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a); Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' 
of Republic of Indonesia (2005); Sugianto (2012). 
*2012. 
 
Indonesia has the most differentiated microfinance and banking sector of any developing country in 
the world (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). In December 2014, there were 119 commercial banks with 
19,948 offices and 1,643 rural banks with 4,895 offices (see Table 2.2). Based on data from The 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs of the Republic of Indonesia (MoCMSMEs), there were 
38,083 formal savings and loan cooperatives under its supervision in 2005 (Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority, 2014a; Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia, 
2005).  
Besides conventional financial institutions, Indonesia also has institutions that adopt Islamic 
principles in their operations. Islamic principles imply “guidance” derived from the Muslim holy book 
(The Qur’an) and the way of life of the prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. All Muslim 
activities, including economic activity, should follow these two pillars (Ahmad & Hassan, 2007). In 
2014, Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia comprised 12 Islamic commercial banks with 2,151 
offices; 163 Islamic rural banks with 439 offices (see Table 2.3) and based on 2012 data, there were 
4,117 formal Islamic financial cooperatives under the supervision of MoCMSMEs (Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority, 2014a; Sugianto, 2012). 
There are three categories of MFIs in Indonesia: formal, semi-formal, and informal. Based on the 
financial authorities and international recognition, formal financial institutions that offer 
microfinance services include units of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Micro-banking Division. MFIs 
not supervised by financial services authorities are categorized as semiformal institutions while 
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microfinance-like channelling groups and rotating savings and credit associations are under the 
informal category (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). The following sections explain each of these 
categories of MFIs. 
2.1.1 Formal MFIs in Indonesia 
Formal MFIs are institutions supervised by financial authorities (e.g., Indonesia Financial Services 
Authority (OJK)). According to Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006), formal MFIs in Indonesia include units of 
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) Micro-banking Division and the rural bank (BPR).  
(1)  Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI)  
BRI, which started operations in 1895, is a state-owned bank involved in micro lending. It has a large 
number of customers with 50 million deposit accounts in 2014. Approximately 31.25% of its lending 
caters for micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through its micro-banking division. As of 
December 2014, BRI’s total assets were over 800 trillion rupiahs; there were over 8,000 offices in the 
micro-banking division that served over 7 million micro-clients (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2014, 2015a; 
Gallardo, 2001; Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2014a). 
Table 2.4 History of Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
Year Milestones Description 
1895 Company founded under the name of 
De Poerwokertosche Hulp en 
Spaarbank der Inlandsche Hoofden 
• Initially it was an institution that managed 
mosque funds and distributed them to society 
• In 1912 it changed its name to Centrale Kas 
Voor Volksscredietwezen 
• Under Japanese colonisation, the name was 
changed to Syomin Ginko (1942-1945) 
1946 Nationalised by the Indonesian 
government and changed its name to 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 
• The government of Indonesia changed the 
bank’s name from Syomin Ginko to Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia through the government regulation 
no. 1/1946 
• The main objective of Bank Rakyat Indonesia at 
that time was to support Indonesia’s           
development  
1960 The Indonesian government changed 
its name to Bank Koperasi Tani 
Nelayan (BKTN) 
NA 
1968 The Indonesian government changed 
its name back to Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI)  
• Based on regulation no. 21/1968, the bank’s 
name was changed back to Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) 
• The government of Indonesia designated BRI as 
a state commercial bank 
1969 The Indonesian government 
appointed BRI to distribute credit to 
Indonesian society through 
“Bimbingan Massal (BIMAS)” 
• BIMAS is an agricultural diversification 
programme from the government that includes 
a rural credit component with the aim of 
providing small loans to farmers at below 
market rates  
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• BRI started to establish BRI units  
1984 BRI managed its own commercial 
micro business and channelled it 
through BRI units  
• This is after the Indonesian government 
stopped the BIMAS programme 
1992 The government of Indonesia changed 
the legal entity of BRI to a limited 
liability company or perusahaan 
perseroan (persero) 
• This was based on government regulation no. 
21/1992 
2003 BRI was listed on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange (now Indonesia Stock 
Exchange)  
• In November 10, 2003 BRI started to sell its 
shares through an IPO with the ticker “BBRI” 
• BBRI now incorporated in LQ-45 or blue chip 
shares on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI)  
2007 BRI established its subsidiary Bank BRI 
Syariah 
• BRI acquired Bank Jasa Artha and then 
converted into a PT. Bank BRI Syariah (BRI’s 
Islamic bank) 
2009 BRI started its real-time online 
interconnection for its whole network 
• BRI involved 6,480 work units in this event 
2013 BRI started its Hybrid Banking service • BRI’s Hybrid Banking is self-service banking 
• This service was the first in Indonesia 
2014 BRI is a bank that has the most 
automated teller machines (ATM) and 
has the biggest electronic data 
capture (EDC) network in Indonesia 
• ATM: 20,792 units 
• EDC: 131,204 units 
• BRI has 50 million customers 
• In April 28, 2014 BRI signed a contract with 
Space System/Loral (SSL) and Arianespace to 
launch its own satellite named Satelit BRI 
(BRIsat) 
Source: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2014); The World Bank (2012). 
 
Table 2.4 shows the history of the development of PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (persero) Tbk. The 
milestones for BRI began in 1895 under the name De Poerwokertosche Hulp en Spaarbank der 
Inlandsche Hoofden. The bank began by managing trust funds from society and was a mosque-based 
association. The funds were redistributed to society in a simple scheme.  
The bank changed its name over the years. In 1912, it changed to Centrale Kas Voor 
Volkscredietwezen; under Japanese colonisation in 1942 it was called Syomin Ginko; and in 1946 it 
was nationalised by the Indonesian government and changed its name to Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
(BRI). In 1968, the Indonesian government changed its name to Bank Koperasi Tani Nelayan (BKTN) 
and in 1968 changed its name back to BRI. Finally, in 1992, after the change in legal status to a 
limited liability company or perseroan terbatas (PT), the official name became PT. Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2016).  
In 1969, the Indonesian government appointed BRI to distribute credit to Indonesians through BIMAS 
(Bimbingan Massal), then, in 1984, BRI started to manage its own commercial micro business 
through its most successful division, the micro-banking division, which has BRI units, previously 
known as BRI Unit Desa. The BRI Unit Desa reached break-even point within 18 months and earned a 
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profit of over USD 25 million in 1989. During 1984 to 1990, BRI Unit Desa distributed 7.9 million 
loans, valued at USD 614.5 million with an average of USD 340 per loan (Boomgard & Angell, 1990; 
Seibel, 2005a).      
BRI wanted to expand its business and become a more successful state-owned company, therefore, 
in 2003, it listed on the Jakarta stock exchange (now the Indonesia stock exchange). The Indonesian 
government owned 56.75% and 43.25% of the shares were owned by the public. The bank’s 
performance after going public increased significantly with the value of its stock increasing 
approximately 30 times from 2003 to 2014 and profit reaching trillion rupiahs. 
In 2014, BRI served 50 million customers with a network of 10,413 offices and, in 2017, to upgrade its 
communication network and achieve integrated banking, it launched its own satellite. The satellite 
allows BRI to connect its office network from headquarters to Teras BRI (mobile) effectively (Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia, 2014; Fahlevi, 2015).        
Table 2.5 BRI’s office network. 
Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Headquarters 1 1 1 1 1 
Regional Offices 18 18 18 18 19 
Branch Offices 413 431 446 453 461 
Subsidiary Branch Offices 470 502 545 565 585 
Cash Offices 822 870 914 950 971 
BRI Units  4,649 4,849 5,000 5,144 5,293 
Teras BRI 617 1,304 1,778 2,212 2,457 
Teras BRI (mobile) - 100 350 465 610 
Inspection Offices 14 14 16 17 17 
Total 7,004 8,089 9,068 9,825 10,413 
Source: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2014). 
Table 2.6 BRI’s subsidiary companies. 
Company Name Type Dates of Shares 
Subscription from 
BRI 
BRI’s 
Shares 
(%) 
Commencement 
Date 
PT. Bank BRI Syariah Islamic 
Commercial 
Bank 
19 December 2007 99.99 16 October 2008 
PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Agroniaga Tbk. 
Commercial 
Bank (private) 
3 March 2011  80.43 8 February 1990 
BRIngin Remittance Co. Ltd.  Remittance 
Company 
16 December 2011 100 7 April 2005 
Source: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2014). 
 
 19 
BRI has various types of office networks across Indonesia. It has a headquarters office; regional 
offices; branch offices; subsidiary branch offices; cash offices; BRI units; Teras BRI; Teras BRI (mobile) 
and inspection offices. The BRI office network has increased gradually from 7,000 in 2010 to 10,000 
offices in 2013. In 2014, BRI had over 10,000 offices across the archipelago (see Table 2.5) which 
means it has the biggest office network in Indonesia. BRI believes that there is still a large 
opportunity in the micro banking business in Indonesia, especially in remote areas (Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, 2014).   
Three subsidiary companies are owned by BRI. They are PT. Bank BRISyariah; PT. Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia Agroniaga Tbk (BRIAGRO); and BRIngin Remittance Co. Ltd (BRC) (see Table 2.6). All three 
subsidiary companies are important and support BRI in some ways. As the third biggest Islamic bank 
in Indonesia, Bank BRISyariah is important for BRI to enter into the Islamic banking market. By 
utilizing BRI’s office network across Indonesia, BRISyariah can develop Islamic banking business easily 
and compete with other Islamic banks. In December 2013, BRISyariah was appointed by the 
Indonesian government as one of the Islamic banks that can receive and manage the Hajj fund or BPS 
BPIH (Bank Penerima Setoran Biaya Penyelenggaraan Ibadah Haji).  
BRIARGO is important for BRI because it focuses on the agribusiness sector. BRIAGRO has a 
collaborative agreement with BRI especially on funding products. All BRIAGRO customers can easily 
make transactions on all BRI’s ATMs across Indonesia. Finally, BRC is also important for BRI to provide 
a competitive advantage especially on remittance business for Indonesian labour in Hong Kong. BRC 
has implemented the BRIFAST online system with BRI; this system is integrated with BRI’s office 
network in Indonesia.          
Bank BRISyariah started its official operation on 16 October 2008. This company was initially Bank 
Jasa Artha acquired by BRI in 2000 and was converted to Bank BRISyariah to serve customers with 
shari’a banking preferences. BRISyariah also focusses on micro-business. In 2014, there were 311 
shari’a micro-units across Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah, 2014).  
BRIARGO started its operation on 8 February 1990 and was acquired by BRI on 3 March 2011. In 
2012, the bank changed its name to PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia Agroniaga Tbk or BRIARGO. In 2014, it 
had a total office network of 35 offices, 3 cash offices, 1 payment point, 42 ATMs and 785 officers 
that focussed on agriculture and the agribusiness sector in Indonesia. The shareholder composition 
consists of 80.42% of shares held by BRI, Dana Pensiun Perkebunan (pension fund) 14.03% and 5.55% 
held by the public (Bank BRI Agro, 2014). BRIAGRO exhibited good performance in 2014 with a 
significant increase in profit from IDR 52 billion in 2013 to IDR 62 billion (18.23%). The increase in 
profit was due to an increase in credit, 26.93% higher than in 2013 (Bank BRI Agro, 2014). 
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As a bank that focuses its business on supporting agribusiness, most credit from BRIAGRO is 
distributed in this sector. Since its first establishment, BRIAGRO has distributed 60-75% of total credit 
in the agribusiness sector. The clients of BRIAGRO include PT Perkebunan Nusantara, PT Shang Hyang 
Seri, PT Pertani, PT Pupuk Nusantara, and Perum Perhutani who are engaged in agribusiness. 
BRIAGRO’s financing focuses on off and on farm agribusiness and an example of on farm financing is 
financing to palm oil, coffee and cocoa plantations which are competitive commodities in the market. 
An example of off farm financing is working capital financing for agribusiness companies (Bank BRI 
Agro, 2014).                          
BRC operated as a subsidiary of BRI from 16 December 2011. In October 2012, the financial 
institution changed its name to BRI Remittance or BRC and is based in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong. In 
Hong Kong, BRC offers services to transfer money to Indonesia named BRIFast, which is linked to the 
BRI network in Indonesia; customers can withdraw from 9,000 BRI offices across Indonesia. BRC also 
sets up savings accounts in Hong Kong for its customers called  BRItAma (Bloomberg, 2015; BRI 
Remittance, 2013). 
The micro-banking division of BRI is called the BRI unit. Teras BRI and Teras BRI (mobile) are sub-
outlets of the BRI unit and part of the micro-banking division. In 2014, the total network of BRI’s 
micro-banking division was made up of 8,360 offices. In 2014, BRI’s micro-banking division office 
network was made up of 5,293 offices of the BRI unit, 2,457 offices of Teras BRI, and 610 units of 
mobile Teras BRI (see Table 2.5). 
Total loans distributed by the micro-banking division in 2014 totalled over 150 trillion rupiahs serving 
over 7.3 million micro-customers. The BRI’s micro credit in 2014 increased to 21.1 trillion rupiahs or 
15.99% over 2013. This increase was due to the strategies adopted by BRI in 2014, one of which was 
to expand the main unit of the micro-banking division, which is Teras BRI. In 2014, BRI added 251 
new Teras BRI and 145 new Teras BRI (mobile) generating Teras BRI 3,067 units. This expansion was 
followed by increases in productivity. The total productivity for each Teras BRI in 2014 increased 14% 
from 2013. This makes the BRI micro-banking division a leader in the micro-finance market in 
Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2014).    
Table 2.7 BRI’s financial summary (billion IDR). 
Description  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Assets 404,286 469,899 551,337 626,183 801,955 
Total Earning Assets  379,696 432,647 499,042 568,546 728,094 
Third Party Fund 333,652 384,264 450,166 504,281 622,322 
Net Income for the Year 11,472 15,088 18,687 21,354 24,254 
Source: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2014).  
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Table 2.8 BRI’s financial performance (percentage). 
Description  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ROA 4.64 4.93 5.15 5.03 4.74 
ROE 43.83 42.49 38.66 34.11 31.22 
NIM 10.77 9.58 8.42 8.55 8.51 
BOPO (Operational Cost to Revenue) 70.86 66.69 59.93 60.58 65.37 
LDR 75.17 76.20 79.85 88.54 81.86 
NPL (gross) 2.78 2.30 1.78 1.55 1.69 
Source: Bank Rakyat Indonesia (2014). 
 
Based on BRI’s financial summary from 2010 to 2014 (see Table 2.7), all financial indicators have 
experienced significant growth with total assets increasing from IDR 404 trillion in 2010 to IDR 801 
trillion (USD 59 billion) in 2014. Total earning assets increased from IDR 379 trillion in 2010 to IDR 
728 trillion (USD 53 billion) in 2014. The third party fund increased from IDR 333 trillion in 2010 to 
IDR 622 trillion (USD 45 billion) in 2014. Net income increased from IDR 11 trillion in 2010 to IDR 24 
trillion (USD 1.78 billion) in 2014 (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2014). 
Based on BRI’s financial performance data from 2010 to 2014 (see Table 2.8), financial indicators 
such as ROA, ROE, NIM, and BOPO fluctuated during the period. In 2014, BRI’s ROA decreased to 
4.74% from 5.03% in 2013. This is because of increased liquidity, especially in BRI’s securities. ROE is 
still positive, but decreased from 34.11% in 2013 to 31.22% in 2014, because of the increased cost of 
funds. The BOPO ratio, which reflects efficiency, increased from 60.58% in 2013 to 65.37% in 2014. 
This was because of the high inflation rate in 2014. NIM decreased marginally from 8.55% in 2013 to 
8.51% in 2014. LDR decreased from 88.54% in 2013 to 81.86% in 2014, whereas NPL increased from 
1.55 in 2013 to 1.69 in 2014. This was because of the macro conditions and political instability in 
Indonesia during 2014 (the year of general and presidential elections) (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 2014).        
(2) Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) 
BPR, the people’s credit bank, is Indonesia’s rural bank which started business in early 1990. BPR 
business focuses on providing financial services in rural areas. After the banking reform and 
implementation of the law Paket Kebijakan Oktober (PAKTO 27) in 1988, which was designed to 
promote new commercial banks in Indonesia, BPRs can be owned by individuals. This regulation led 
to an increase in the private banking sector in Indonesia especially for BPRs (Seibel, 2005a; Seibel & 
Ozaki, 2009; Tambunan, 2015). 
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Table 2.9 Growth of BPRs (rural bank). 
Description  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Rural Banks 1,706 1,669 1,653 1,635 1,643 
Total Bank Offices  3,910 4,172 4,425 4,678 4,895 
Source: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a).  
Table 2.10 BPRs’ financial performance (percentage). 
Description  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ROA 3.16 3.32 3.46 3.44 2.98 
ROE 26.71 29.46 32.63 32.41 27.89 
LDR 79.02 78.54 76.63 84.34 79.79 
NPL  6.12 5.22 4.75 4.41 4.75 
Source: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a).  
 
In December 2014, there were 1,643 BPRs with 4,895 offices in Indonesia (see Table 2.9).  BPRs’ total 
assets were 89 trillion rupiahs and the bank served over 13 million clients. Based on this figures, 62% 
of BPRs and 74% of its offices are concentrated in Java. The number of BPR rural banks decreased 
slightly during 2010 to 2014. However, the total bank offices experienced significant growth during 
the same period (see Table 2.9). This is because some BPRs have merged into bigger banks, for 
instance, in East Java there were 66 units of BPR which merged with BPR Jatim (Bank BPR Jatim, 
2015). A small number of other BPRs have had their licences revoked by the central bank of 
Indonesia because of poor performance. However, there is no significant impact on the whole 
industry (Praditya, 2013).   
Based on BPRs’ financial performance data from 2010 to 2013, ROA and ROE increased. However, in 
2014 ROA and ROE of BPRs decreased to 2.98 and 27.89, respectively (see Table 2.10). The decrease 
in ROA and ROE in 2014 was because of the instability of the macro conditions and the political 
situation that impacted the banking industry in Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah, 2014). 
Other indicators such as LDR and NPL fluctuated during 2010 to 2014; in 2014, the LDR decreased 
from 83.34% in 2013 to 79.79% and the NPL increased from 4.41% in 2013 to 4.75% in 2014. The 
decrease in LDR means there is excess liquidity and a need to disburse more finance while an 
increase in NPL means that banks must allocate more funds to cover non-performing loans 
(Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2014a).  
Starting from 31 December 2013, the regulatory and monitoring function for the bank was 
undertaken by OJK from the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI). BI focuses only on managing inflation and 
is responsible for monetary stability. OJK is responsible for monitoring all financial institutions in 
Indonesia including BPRs (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2015; Gallardo, 2001; Gera, 2013; Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority, 2014a).  
 23 
2.1.2 Semi-formal MFIs in Indonesia 
According to Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006), semi-formal MFIs in Indonesia include various types of 
cooperatives and so-called village banks (bank desa). Semi-formal MFIs in Indonesia are outside the 
regulations and supervision of the financial authorities. Some financial cooperatives in Indonesia may 
be registered and supervised under the MoCMSMEs and some may be unregistered. Financial 
cooperatives registered under the MoCMSMEs are considered more “formal” than unregistered 
ones. This is because they still receive assistance from and are supervised by the government.    
Table 2.11 Financial cooperatives registered under MoCMSMEs.     
Types Total Institutions No of Clients 
Koperasi Simpan Pinjam (KSP)/Unit Simpan 
Pinjam (USP) savings and loan cooperatives 
38,083 a 16,871,000 a 
KJKS/UJKS 
Islamic financial services cooperatives 
4,117 b 762,000 b 
Source: Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia (2005); Sugianto 
(2012).  
aYear 2005; bYear 2012. 
 
There are two types of financial cooperatives that registered under the MoCMSMEs. The first types 
are Koperasi Simpan Pinjam (KSP) and Unit Simpan Pinjam (USP) that operate within the 
conventional system (non-Islamic). In 2005, there were 38,083 units of KSP and USP in Indonesia 
serving over 16 million clients (see Table 2.11). The second type are Koperasi Jasa Keuangan Syariah 
(KJKS) and Unit Jasa Keuangan Syariah (UJKS) that operate within the shari’a system (Islamic). In 
2012, there were 4,117 units of KJKS and UJKS in Indonesia serving over 700,000 clients (see Table 
2.11).     
These two types of financial cooperatives are regularly monitored and supervised by the 
MoCMSMEs. At the end of every year, all cooperatives have to arrange an annual members meeting 
to report on all activities as well as distribute the cooperative’s profit to members. Financial and 
activities reports have to be submitted to the MoCMSMEs after the annual meeting. The purposes of 
MoCMSMEs’ reports are to obtain cooperative information in order to classify them based on their 
size as it will easier for MoCMSMEs to monitor and support the cooperative (Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority, 2015b; Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs of Republic of Indonesia, 
2007).   
The Indonesian government through OJK, issued some regulations for MFIs in Indonesia. First, there 
are only two legal statuses of “formal” MFIs in Indonesia, cooperative or limited liability company. 
This means that only registered MFIs under the supervision of the government are eligible for official 
assistance. Second, all MFIs under government supervision should receive their business licences 
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from OJK or a deed of incorporation of the cooperative from the MoCMSMEs (Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority, 2015b).     
2.1.3 Informal MFIs in Indonesia 
Informal MFIs in Indonesia have a long history and include Self-Help Groups (SHGs), Channelling 
Groups, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT), Baitul 
Tamwil Muhammadiyah (BTM), and Baitul Qirad (BQ) (Adnan & Ajija, 2015; Imady & Seibel, 2006; 
Seibel, 2005a). SHGs in Indonesia may be those established and managed by the government, 
community organisations that are connected with government programs, or NGOs. For example, the 
government program in 1993 which was called INPRES Desa Tertinggal (IDT), provided $600 million 
to 28,000 rural villages and involved SHGs and NGOs (Robinson, 2002). Some other SHGs operate 
with shari’a principles, such as BMT with SHG legal status (Conroy, 2003). 
Meanwhile, arisans are a traditional group, an Indonesian version of ROSCA and include a social 
gathering as well, whereby arisans generally have a fixed interval meeting (every month or year) that 
is held in a member’s house. Each member in the group is paid a certain amount of money agreed 
within the group. Members that get a rota (drawn by lot) will received all the money. However, 
he/she is then responsible for holding the next arisan meeting and providing food for the meeting 
(Conroy, 2003). As an informal group, arisans provide flexible rules for members. These rules are 
decided and managed based on consensus. The main products of this type of microfinance services 
are savings and credit for members (Conroy, 2003).    
Informal Islamic MFIs comprise BMTs, which follow the regulations of cooperatives or SHGs. If a BMT 
follows cooperative rules, it will be regulated under the cooperative law (Cooperative Act 
No.25/1992), supervised by MoCMSMEs and considered to be semi-formal Islamic MFIs. However, if 
a BMT is established as an SHG there will be no rules regulating it; it is formed by a group of people 
and considered to be an informal Islamic MFI. The products and services offered by BMT are similar 
to KJKS and UJKS, it is only the legal entity that is different.   
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Table 2.12 Informal MFIs in Indonesia.    
Types Description 
Self-Help Groups (SHG)/ 
Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat 
(KSM) 
Some BMTs are in the form of SHGs or KSMs and others such as 
KJKS and UJKS are under the MoCMSMEs 
Channelling Groups  In 2003 there were about 800,000 channelling groups in 
Indonesia  
Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs, Arisans) 
There are millions of ROSCAs in Indonesia known as Arisans 
from indigenous origins 
Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) Most BMTs are under the guidance of the Centre for Micro 
Enterprise Incubation (PINBUK) or associated with Induk 
Koperasi Syariah BMT (Inkopsyah BMT) 
Baitul Tamwil Muhammadiyah 
(BTM) 
These comprise 5% of Islamic cooperatives, guided by 
Muhammadiyah since 1999 
Baitul Qirad (BQ) Term used in the Aceh province to denote Islamic cooperatives 
or BMTs 
Source: Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006); Imady and Seibel (2006); Adnan and Ajija (2015). 
 
In Indonesia, there is a wide variety of SHGs called KSM. An example of an SHG is PHBK under the 
Bank Indonesia’s Program Linking Banks and SHGs. PHBK is a financing scheme from a regional/local 
bank for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In the PHBK scheme, SMEs also receive assistance 
from the local government after obtaining finance from the bank. The aim of the PHBK is to give 
financial access to local SMEs in order to develop their businesses (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006; Zain et 
al., 2006).    
In the context of Islamic MFI terms, they are known by other names. First is Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil 
(BMT), which may have a semi-formal or informal legal status. Semi-formal Islamic MFIs follow the 
form of a cooperative and are registered under MoCMSMEs (known as KJKS and UJKS), whereas 
informal Islamic MFIs are established as SHGs. If the legal status of Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) is 
a SHG, they will receive guidance from PINBUK or can be associated with Induk Koperasi Syariah BMT 
(Inkopsyah BMT) (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006; Zain et al., 2006). The second is Baitul Tamwil 
Muhammadiyah (BTM), an Islamic MFI guided by Muhammadiyah, the second-largest Islamic mass 
organization in Indonesia (Adnan & Ajija, 2015; Imady & Seibel, 2006). Finally, Baitul Qirad (BQ) is a 
term for Islamic cooperatives in Aceh province (see Table 2.12). Further BMTs, BTMs, and BQs that 
follow a cooperative form, receive formal assistance from and monitoring by the government.  
However, BMTs, BTMs and BQs that follow the SHG form will not receive formal assistance from and 
monitoring by the government but receive assistance only from PINBUK or Inkopsyah BMT. This is 
because they are not registered under the government (Adnan & Ajija, 2015; Imady & Seibel, 2006).  
BMTs are an Islamic MFI that mix commercial and social attributes in their business products, for 
example, BMTs can generate profit from profit and loss sharing (PLS) or get a margin/fee from a non-
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PLS mechanism and can also collect zakah6, infaq7 and sadaqat8 or waqf9 and distribute it for social 
purposes (Imady & Seibel, 2006). According to Hassan (2010), the integration of social dimensions 
such as zakah and waqf with commercial products such as mudarabah and musharakah in Islamic 
MFIs will benefit the poorest better. This is because Islamic MFIs can use zakah funds to fulfil the 
basic consumption of its clients and waqf funds may be used as working capital for micro-businesses 
(Hassan, 2010). Islamic MFIs can use mudarabah or murabahah schemes to develop their clients’ 
businesses. 
2.2 Development of Islamic finance in Indonesia 
Islamic finance has experienced rapid and significant growth over the past four decades. This is 
because Muslims comprise over 21% of the world’s population with USD 1 trillion of assets to invest. 
Islamic finance is a promising financial industry and the industry’s assets are forecast to reach USD 3 
trillion in 2020. With this estimate, the compounded asset growth rate will be 17.3% (Azmat, Skully, 
& Brown, 2014, 2015; Chong & Liu, 2009; El-Komi & Croson, 2013; Ibrahim, 2015; Sumarti, Fitriyani, 
& Damayanti, 2014). The global Islamic resurrection was the main cause of significant growth in 
Islamic finance, and at the moment the Islamic finance industries not only fulfil Muslim needs, but 
have also become an option for non-Muslims (Chong & Liu, 2009; Ibrahim, 2015).  
According to Ainley, Mashayekhi, Hicks, Rahman, and Ravalia (2007b) and Huda (2012), the 
development of Islamic finance institutions in the modern era started with the establishment of an 
Islamic bank in the Middle East in the 1960s. The combination of Islamic finance and microfinance 
was first elaborated by Rahul and Sapcanin in 1998 (Akhter et al., 2009).  
Indonesia has a population of over 250 million with 56 million households and 87.21% of the 
population are Muslim (approximately 218 million people) (Masyita & Ahmed, 2011; Ministry of 
Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013; Statistics Indonesia, 2014). Based on those 
statistics, the availability of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia is crucial. This is because 
Muslims have some restrictions in conventional finance; in particular, they are prohibited from 
involvement in transactions that contain riba (interest).  
                                                          
6 Compulsory charity for Muslims (if their wealth exceeds the condition (nisab)), equal to 85 grams of gold 
which they must hold for a year (Haul)). It is for consumption purposes and there are certain zakah rules in 
Islam such as from whom zakah is collected, at what rate, and who can benefit from zakah (Ahmed, 2007; 
Obaidullah, 2008).  
7 Charitable spending (Obaidullah, 2008).  
8 Optional charity which can be used for productive activities (Ahmed, 2007). 
9 Sadaqah jariyah or continous sadaqah. The waqf is created when somebody gives away an asset for the 
benefit of the society. There is also the concept of cash waqf that can be used in order to benefit society 
(Ahmed, 2007).  
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An Islamic financial institution was first established in Indonesia in 1990. This was primarily in 
response to a request from Islamic scholars and organizations. Islamic cooperatives were established 
in 1990, Islamic rural banks in 1991 and the Islamic commercial bank in 1992 (Seibel, 2008). There 
was no specific legal foundation for Islamic financial institutions, especially Islamic banks at that time 
and they were just accommodated in law No. 7/ 1992 in one sentence “bank with a profit and loss 
sharing system”.  
In 1998, the Indonesian government and parliament implemented a law with more specific details 
for Islamic banks in law No. 10/1998 that recognizes a dual banking system in Indonesia, namely 
conventional and Islamic banking systems. More specific legal foundations for Islamic banks in 
Indonesia are regulated by law No. 21/2008. This law led to a boost in the number of full Islamic 
banks in Indonesia from 5 to 11 in less than 2 years (2009-2010) (Indonesia Financial Services 
Authority, 2015a; Seibel, 2008).       
Table 2.13 Highlights of Islamic finance development in Indonesia. 
Year Milestones Description 
1990 Islamic finance started to 
develop in Indonesia 
• Owing to the initiatives from Islamic scholars and 
organizations 
• Initially started with Islamic cooperatives  
1991 Islamic rural bank/ Bank 
Pembiayaan Syariah (BPRS) 
initial growth  
• Experienced 12% average growth per year 
• The four BPRSs were licensed, three in Bandung (West 
Java) and one in Aceh  
• Until 1996 there was a gradual expansion of BPRSs 
1992 The establishment of the first 
Islamic commercial bank in 
Indonesia 
• Approval of the first Islamic commercial bank in 
Indonesia, named Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) 
• Establishment of Indonesia Islamic bank association/ 
Asosiasi Bank Islam Indonesia (Asbisindo)  
1999 Second Islamic commercial 
bank established 
• Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM) was the second Islamic 
commercial bank in Indonesia 
• The first sharia unit of a conventional commercial bank 
was also established in this year 
• This year was a stagnating period for BPRSs, however, 
the Islamic bank started its gradual expansion until 
2003 
2010 Indonesian government issued 
regular sukuk (Islamic bonds) 
• Regular rupiah sukuk were issued once every two 
weeks 
• Most of Indonesia’s sukuk are short term (less than a 
year)  
2014 Indonesia ranked 7th in the 
Global Islamic Finance Report 
for the Islamic Finance Country 
Index (IFCI)   
• 12 Islamic commercial banks 
• 22 Islamic business units in conventional banks 
• 163 Islamic rural banks 
• 4,117a units of Islamic cooperatives or KJKS and UJKS 
under MoCMSMEs 
•  Indonesia is a member of Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB), Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), and the 
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International Islamic Liquidity Management 
Corporation IILM 
• Indonesia adopted the regulations of IFSB and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
Source: Lawrence (2014); Seibel (2008); Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006); Global Islamic Finance Report 
(2014); Sugianto (2012). 
aYear 2012. 
 
Table 2.13 shows the Islamic finance development in Indonesia. The first Islamic financial institutions 
in Indonesia were Islamic cooperatives followed by an Islamic rural bank and an Islamic commercial 
bank. The Indonesian government started to issue regular sukuk (Islamic bonds) in 2010 (Lawrence, 
2014; Seibel, 2008; Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). According to the Global Islamic Finance Report 
(2014), Indonesia achieved 7th rank in 2014 in the Islamic Finance Country Index (IFCI). 
Besides the development of institutions, there were also many associations concerned with Islamic 
economic development in Indonesia. Some of the associations are: Pusat Komunikasi Ekonomi 
Syariah (PKES); Dewan Syariah Nasional – Majelis Ulama Indonesia (DSN-MUI); Masyarakat Ekonomi 
Syariah (MES); Ikatan Ahli Ekonomi Islam Indonesia (IAEI); Asosiasi Bank Syariah Indonesia 
(Asbisindo); Asosiasi Asuransi Syariah Indonesia (AASI); Asosiasi Perusahaan Penjaminan Indonesia 
(Asippindo); Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (Baznas); Badan Wakaf Indonesia (BWI); Forum Zakat; Ikatan 
Saudagar Muslim Indonesia (ISMI); and Himpunan Ilmuwan dan Sarjana Syariah Indonesia (HISSI). In 
August 2013, all 12 associations signed a mutual agreement named the Sharia Economic Movement 
or Gerakan Ekonomi Syariah (GRES).  
The aim of this movement is to increase the awareness of Indonesians about shari’a economics 
(Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013). Some of these associations or 
organisations also have important roles in and contributions to Islamic economic development in 
Indonesia. Majelis Ulama Indonesia or the Council of Indonesian Ulema (DSN-MUI), for example, is 
responsible for the shari’a compliance of all Islamic financial institutions’ products and services in 
Indonesia. Meanwhile, IAEI and MES were established in Indonesia in order to accommodate Islamic 
economics scholars and to accelerate Islamic economic development, respectively. The aim of PKES is 
to provide socialization and education about Islamic economics to Indonesians. Baznas is a 
government organisation with the objective to collect and distribute zakah, infaq, and sadaqat at the 
national level. BWI is also a government organisation; its aim is to manage waqf in Indonesia (Badan 
Amil Zakat Nasional, 2016; Badan Wakaf Indonesia, 2012; Ikatan Ahli Ekonomi Islam Indonesia, 2013; 
Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah, 2008; Pusat komunikasi Ekonomi Syariah, 2013; The Council of 
Indonesian Ulama, 2013).    
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2.3 Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia 
Indonesia has several types of Islamic financial institutions, such as Islamic banks, Islamic rural banks, 
Islamic insurance, Islamic MFIs, etc. Education and awareness of Islamic finance in Indonesia are 
conducted regularly either by the government or by the associations.   
Table 2.14 Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia (December 2014). 
Types No of units No of offices 
Islamic Commercial Bank 12 2,151 
Islamic Business Unit (from Conventional Bank) 22 320 
Islamic Rural Bank (BPRS) 163 439 
Islamic Insurance 5 N/A 
Islamic Insurance Unit 44 N/A 
Islamic Financing Institution  3 N/A 
Islamic Financing Unit 41 N/A 
Islamic Venture Capital 4 N/A 
Islamic Credit Insurance  2 N/A 
Islamic Credit Insurance Unit 1 N/A 
Islamic financial services cooperatives (KJKS/UJKS) 4,117
 a N/A 
Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) 5,000
 a 22,000 a 
Baitul Tamwil Muhammadiyah (BTM) 330
 b N/A 
Baitul Qirad (BQ) 32
 a N/A 
Source: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014a); Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2014b); 
Sugianto (2012); Fauzia (2013); Marhiansyah (2012). 
aYear 2012; bYear 2013. 
 
In December 2014, there were 12 full Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia. In addition, there are 
22 Islamic business units of conventional banks (see Table 2.14). The market share of Islamic banks in 
August 2014 was 5.5% or equal to 198.98 trillion rupiahs. There is still a huge opportunity for Islamic 
banks to expand in Indonesia. There are Islamic rural banks, Islamic insurance companies, Islamic 
financing institutions, Islamic venture capital, and Islamic credit insurance to support the Islamic 
banking sector. In the micro sector, KJKS and UJKS are supervised by the MoCMSMEs and in the 
informal sector these are BMTs, BTMs, and BQs (Dwiantika, 2014; Indonesia Financial Services 
Authority, 2014a, 2014b). 
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2.4 Islamic MFIs in Indonesia 
Islamic MFIs follow Islamic law that parallels Muslim beliefs. Islamic MFIs’ products and services must 
be free from certain elements10 forbidden in Islam (Obaidullah, 2008). Based on a global survey 
conducted by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) in 2008 and 2009 cited in El-Komi and 
Croson (2013), 40% of the world’s poor Muslims reject loans from conventional MFIs for religious 
reasons. The global success of Islamic finance has influenced the establishment of other financial 
industries including Islamic MFIs (Nasdaq OMX, 2012). The popularity and rapid development of MFIs 
has led to the combination of this financing vehicle with Islamic finance (Karim et al., 2008).   
Based on a study by Abdouli (1991) cited in Dhumale and Sapcanin (1999), there are three basic 
Islamic finance schemes that could combine with MFIs to build a successful microfinance 
programme: mudarabah (trustee financing), musharakah (equity participation), and murabahah 
(cost plus mark-up). The CGAP survey cited in Nasdaq OMX (2012) on Islamic MFIs worldwide 
revealed that there is still a gap between the demand and supply of this institution. Based on the 
CGAP (2008) survey, Islamic MFIs comprise 0.005% of global MFIs and are mainly concentrated in 
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Islamic MFIs operate globally in about 32 countries across six 
continents, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast 
Asia (Nasdaq OMX, 2012).   
The establishment of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia was initiated by Islamic MFIs. The 
concept of an Islamic bank in Indonesia was trialled first on a limited scale through Islamic MFIs 
named Bait At-Tamwil Salman ITB in Bandung and the Ridho Gusti cooperative. For Indonesians, 
these institutions are important because they provide financial access for poor people in rural areas 
based on shari’a principles (Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2015a; Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006).    
The first Islamic cooperative in Indonesia, Ridho Gusti, was established in 1990 in Bandung. In 1995, 
PINBUK started promoting Islamic cooperatives under the new name Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil (BMT) 
(Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). There are different types of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia with several kinds of 
legal entity. Most Islamic MFIs in Indonesia follow the cooperative form to run their business.  
                                                          
10 It must be free from riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty/lack of information disclosure), qimar (gambling), 
and mysir (games of chance involving deception) (Obaidullah, 2008; Sumarti et al., 2014). 
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Table 2.15 Islamic MFIs in Indonesia. 
Type  Status Description 
KJKS/UJKS 
Islamic financial 
services cooperatives 
Semi-formal They receive guidance and supervision from the Ministry 
of Cooperatives and Micro and Small, and Medium 
Enterprise (MoCMSMEs) 
Baitul Maal Wat 
Tamwil (BMT)  
Informal Most of the BMTs are not registered under MoCMSMEs. 
They only receive guidance from the Centre for Micro 
Enterprise Incubation (PINBUK) or are associated with 
Induk Koperasi Syariah BMT (Inkopsyah BMT) 
Baitul Tamwil 
Muhammadiyah (BTM) 
Informal They are guided by Muhammadiyah, the second-largest 
Islamic mass organization in Indonesia, and receive 
informal supervision from Muhammadiyah economic 
development centre or Pusat Pengembangan Ekonomi 
Muhamamdiyah  (PPEM)    
Baitul Qirad (BQ) Informal A uniquely Acehnese term for Islamic MFIs  
  Source: Seibel (2008); Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006). 
 
Table 2.15 provides some examples of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia such as KJKS/UJKS, BMTs, BTMs, and 
BQs. KJKS and UJKS are Islamic cooperatives registered under the MoCMSMEs and regulated under 
the Cooperative Law (Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs of Republic of Indonesia, 2007). 
Some BMTs registered under MoCMSMEs are labelled as KJKS and UJKS (Riwajanti & Asutay, 2015). 
KJKS are full cooperative institutions that provide finance, investment and savings under Islamic 
principles, whereas UJKS are business units under the management of cooperatives that provide 
finance, investment and savings based on Islamic principles. In 2012, there were 4,117 formal Islamic 
MFIs registered as cooperatives under MoCMSMEs (Sugianto, 2012).  
Since the requirements to become a member or obtain financing from Islamic MFIs are less 
complicated than other financial institutions (e.g. banks), they enable people in the rural areas to 
access financing. Islamic MFIs’ major advantage is they operate with shari’a principles. This gives 
more options for sourcing financing to Indonesians, especially to those who are concerned with their 
religion. Moreover, most Muslims prefer using financial products which do not contravene their 
beliefs (Ahmad & Ahmad, 2009; Akhter et al., 2009; Karim et al., 2008; Seibel, 2008). A study by 
Honohan (2008) cited in Karim et al. (2008) found that 72 percent of people in Muslim majority 
countries do not use formal financial services even if they are available in their area, because they 
believe that conventional financial institutions do not follow Islamic principles that contravene their 
religious beliefs.             
According to Adnan and Ajija (2015), the legal entity of a BMT follows the regulations of 
cooperatives, which are regulated under the Cooperative Law or follow SHG/KSM. In addition, Amin 
(2004), cited in Adnan and Ajija (2015) reported that BMT can be associated with Induk Koperasi 
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Syariah BMT (Inkopsyah BMT) or with religious organisations (e.g., Dompet Dhuafa). BMTs can 
become member of Inkopsyah BMT and may use the facilities such as savings and financing from 
Inkopsyah BMT (Inkopsyah BMT, 2016). Meanwhile, BMTs associated with religious organisations 
may benefit from the parent organization, for instance, religious organizations such as Dompet 
Dhuafa which supported the establishment of 60 Islamic MFIs including BMTs and initiated BMT 
association in Indonesia, known as the BMT Centre (Dompet Dhuafa, 2016). BMTs can also be 
independent.  
Establishment of a BMT is usually certified by a notary and the BMT can also request a business 
certificate from PINBUK. A BMT’s source of funds can be from founding members, compulsory and 
voluntary contributions, donations and loans (Adnan & Ajija, 2015). BMTs must have their own 
shari’a supervisory board and ensure that their products and services follow guidance by DSN-MUI. 
Conceptually, there are two roles of BMTs, the first is for social purposes, Baitul Maal, i.e., for 
collecting and distributing charitable funds such as zakah, infaq, and sadaqat. The second is for 
economic purposes, Baitul Tamwil, which focusses on economic activities such as saving and 
financing based on sharia principles (Hasbi, 2015; Nasution, 2015). 
BMTs have a unique characteristic and are one of the most important types of Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia. Unlike banks, BMTs can provide a flexible, rapid financing approval process and shari’a-
compliant financial access for poor people. This is because most BMTs are formed by community-
initiated projects such as from mosques, Islamic boarding schools or Islamic organisations (Riwajanti 
& Asutay, 2015). The number of BMTs in Indonesia is quite significant; in 2014 there were over 5,000 
BMTs with IDR 4.7 trillion in total assets and IDR 4.4 trillion in financing to cover over 3 million clients 
(Hasbi, 2015; Riwajanti & Asutay, 2015). Figure 2.1 summarises the development of Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia.    
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Source: Indonesia Financial Services Authority (2015b); Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006). 
Figure 2.1 Summary of the development of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia. 
 
Islamic MFIs in Indonesia still face several challenges. There is still a lack of prudential regulation and 
effective supervision of Islamic financial cooperatives, as a consequence, some Islamic cooperatives 
are technically bankrupt or dormant (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). They need support from the 
government in order to create healthy Islamic financial cooperatives. Studies on government 
intervention in Islamic MFIs by Seibel (2008), Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006), Karim et al. (2008), 
Dusuki (2008), Obaidullah (2008) and Obaidullah and Khan (2008) show that a supporting financial 
system (soft loans from donors), clear regulation, funding and monitoring are important for the 
sustainability of Islamic MFIs. Obaidullah and Khan (2008) argue that the government’s best support 
is to provide a good policy environment that allows financial service providers to compete and 
coexist in order to offer high-quality, low-cost services and products especially to poor clients. 
However, some programmes are ineffective. This challenge is not only for the Islamic financial 
cooperatives but also for all financial cooperatives in Indonesia. 
In order to overcome these challenges, the Indonesian government through OJK has taken some 
steps. First, creating a proper database of MFIs in Indonesia by issuing a business licence as, based on 
Law No. 1 of 2013, all MFIs in Indonesia have to gain a business licence from OJK. Second, every four 
months, all MFIs are required to submit a financial report to OJK. Third, the legal entity of MFIs in 
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Indonesia is limited to only either a cooperative or limited liability company. Fourth, regular 
monitoring and supervision are undertaken by MoCMSMEs or OJK. In March 2016 OJK established 
the Centre for Microfinance and Financial Inclusion or Pusat Pengembangan Keuangan Mikro dan 
Inklusi (OJK-Proksi) (Aditiasari, 2016; Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2015b, 2016). The 
purpose of this centre is to improve the MFIs’ database, to obtain financial inclusion, and finally to 
help alleviate poverty in Indonesia (Indonesia Financial Services Authority, 2016).        
Indonesia has the most differentiated MFIs in the world with three categories of MFIs: formal, semi-
formal and informal. There are over 55 million micro, small and medium enterprises in Indonesia. 
About 98% are micro enterprises and most need support from financial institutions, especially MFIs. 
Further Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim country with over 5,000 MFIs that adopt 
Islamic principles in their operation. In 2015, Indonesia was listed as an emerging leader in the global 
Islamic financial services industry based on the global Islamic finance report.   
2.5 Chapter summary 
Microfinance in Indonesia has a long history which started in the late 19th century, initially with banks 
in rural areas (known as BRIs). In addition, Indonesia has the most differentiated microfinance of any 
developing country and is also known as the largest Muslim majority country in the world. Out of a 
population of 250 million, around 87% are Muslim which equals approximately 218 million people. 
Since Muslims have some restrictions regarding conventional finance (interest is not allowed), the 
role of Islamic financial institutions is important. Islamic MFIs even have a strategic role because 
most Indonesians live in rural areas and only MFIs can cover these areas.  
An Islamic MFI was first established in Indonesia in 1990 through Bait At-Tamwil Salman ITB in 
Bandung and the Ridho Gusti cooperative. In general, there are two types of legal status for Islamic 
MFIs in Indonesia, either as a cooperative or as a limited liability company. If the Islamic MFI status is 
cooperative, their supervision is under the Ministry of Cooperative or MoCMSMEs; however, if the 
Islamic MFI status is as a limited liability company, their supervision will under the Indonesia 
Financial Service Authority or OJK.      
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the empirical models used in examining the impact of Islamic microfinance 
institutions’ (MFIs) financing, shari’a compliance and evaluation of Islamic values and factors that 
influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFIs. The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 3.1 reviews the empirical studies on the impact of Islamic and conventional MFIs’ financing. 
Section 3.2 discusses Islamic MFIs’ values and schemes and empirical studies on shari’a compliance 
evaluation. Section 3.3 reviews the two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs and Section 3.4 
reviews the factors that influence rural households receiving finance/loans from MFIs. Finally, 
Section 3.5 summarises the review. 
3.1 Impact of Islamic MFI financing on rural households 
3.1.1 Methodologies of impact assesment 
The methodologies for impact assessment are important because they will determine the validity of 
the impact evaluation. As Hulme (2000) describes it, the main objective of impact assessment studies 
is to identify the impact (proving) and develop the programme intervention (improving).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (Hulme, 1997); Hulme (2000). 
Figure 3.1 Impact chain model. 
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All impact assessment has a conceptual framework and, based on Hulme (2000) study, there are 
three main components of the conceptual framework: (1) a model of the impact chain that examines 
the study; (2) the specification of levels of impact that are assessed; and (3) the specification of the 
types of impact that will assessed.  
Hulme (2000) also proposed an impact chain model (see Figure 3.1) in which all microfinance 
programmes assume that interventions may change human behaviour and practices and lead to 
achieving the desired outcome. Hulme’s model explains that the difference between the outcomes of 
“agents” (individuals, enterprises, households, populations, policy makers, etc.) that intervene as 
opposed to the outcomes that would have occurred without intervention is the impact of the 
programme.  
The typical methods adopted in an impact assessment study are sample surveys, rapid appraisal, 
participation observation, case studies, and participatory learning and action (PLA). A sample survey 
is a common, popular method in impact assessment (Hulme, 2000). In impact assessment 
methodology, determining the counterfactual is important whereby we can measure the true impact 
of the treatment or programme.     
Table 3.1 Summary of quantitative methods for impact evaluation. 
Categories Description 
Experimental designs 
(randomized) 
Randomization means selection into treatment and control groups is 
random. There is supposed to be no difference between the treatment and 
control group (in expectation).   
Quasi-experimental 
designs (non-
randomized) 
• Matching methods 
The most extensive use of matching methods is propensity score 
matching (PSM). PSM tries to match the comparison group with the 
treatment group. The closer the propensity score, the better the match.   
• Difference in difference 
A method that compares the treatment and comparison group, before 
and after the programme. Some studies combine the matching method.     
• Instrumental variables  
It is possible to predict programme participation at the beginning; next 
one sees how the outcome indicator varies with respect to the predicted 
values.  
• Reflexive comparisons 
Baseline survey of participants before and after the intervention. This 
provides the comparison group and the impact is assessed by the change 
in outcome (before and after the intervention). 
Source: Baker (2000).  
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the quantitative methods of impact assessment including experimental and 
quasi-experimental designs. The latter consist of matching methods, difference in difference, 
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instrumental variables, and reflexive comparison (Baker, 2000). In addition, participatory and 
qualitative methods can be used to provide a broader interpretation of the quantitative results 
(Baker, 2000). However, the popular identification strategy to determine the impact of treatments or 
programmes where there is lack of experimental data is the difference in difference method (Athey 
& Imbens, 2006; Li et al., 2011b). 
According to Ezemenari, Rudqvist, and Subbarao (1999), the critical factors in impact evaluation are: 
1. Counterfactual identification in an impact evaluation study is important and will imply a good 
impact evaluation study. 
2. Identifying the counterfactual is essential to clearly define control groups and possible variables 
that will impact programme outcomes.  
3. Quantitative and qualitative methods provide good results for impact evaluation. 
3.1.2 Previous studies of Islamic MFIs’ impact on rural households 
However, very few studies have attempted to measure the impact of Islamic MFIs on rural 
households. For example, Rahman (2010b) measured the impact of an Islamic micro-finance 
programme in Bangladesh on rural poverty alleviation. Rahman’s study shows that, after joining the 
Rural Development Scheme (a shari’a micro-finance programme in Bangladesh), the family income of 
Islamic MFIs’ clients increased over 33%; the clients’ religious activities increased by around 21%; and 
the clients’ business knowledge and communication skills increased by 72% and 79%, respectively. 
This implies that Islamic MFIs’ financing has a positive impact on the clients’ socio-economic status 
and helps to reduce poverty in rural areas (Rahman & Ahmad, 2010).     
Rahman (2010b) used ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit regression to estimate the impact of the 
Islamic microfinance programme on various economic outcomes in Bangladesh. The logit model was 
used to predict the probability of increasing the welfare level of Islamic MFIs’ clients. The study 
measured the improvement in economic welfare as well as moral and ethical principles. The author 
revealed that the Islamic microfinance programme improves clients’ religious behaviour such as 
praying and fasting, and it increases household income, the productivity of crops and livestock, and 
expenditure.   
Rahman (2010a) believed that moral and Islamic values in Islamic MFI schemes can effectively boost 
the motivation of micro-entrepreneurs to develop their business. The profit and loss sharing 
mechanism in Islamic MFIs is expected to remove the inequitable distribution of profits in business 
between the financial institution and its clients. Therefore, this mechanism ensures justice for the 
parties involved because the return to the financial institution is based on the profit generated by the 
entrepreneur (Rahman & Rahim, 2007). Islamic MFIs also use ethical processes to encourage clients 
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to keep up to date with their payments. Before implementing the Islamic MFI scheme and values in 
practice, Islamic MFIs have to ensure that their products agree with Islamic ethical principles. There 
are four basic tenets in Islamic finance ethical systems: (1) unity (tawhid11); (2) equilibrium (al-adl 
wa’l ihsan12); (3) free will (Ikhtiyar13); and (4) responsibility (Fard14) (Naqvi & Qadir, 1997) as cited in 
(Rahman, 2010a)). 
Samer, Majid, Rizal, Muhamad, and Rashid (2015) study measures the impact of Malaysian 
microfinance, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM), on urban and rural household income. Their 
multinomial logit analysis reveals a positive impact of microfinance on household income, especially 
for women and older members. Financing from AIM also has a positive impact on poverty reduction, 
especially in rural areas. The authors’ surveyed 780 women in two Malaysian states, Selangor and 
Melaka (rural and urban areas). There were four groups in their study, older members from urban 
Selangor and Melaka, new clients from urban areas, older members from rural Selangor and Melaka, 
and new clients from rural areas. The authors concluded that AIM financing has a positive impact on 
income, especially for women clients who spent three years in the financing scheme.                 
Finally, a study by Adnan and Ajija (2015) investigated the impact of Islamic MFIs on rural households 
in Indonesia (see Table 3.2). The authors focused on the effectiveness of Islamic MFIs in reducing 
poverty and their sample comprised clients from one Islamic MFI, namely BMT MMU Sidogiri, in East 
Java, Indonesia. Poverty measurement indicators such as the Headcount Index, the Gini Index, the 
Sen Index, and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index were used to measure the impact of Islamic MFIs’ 
financing. Their study concluded that most clients can increase their income after receiving financing 
from Islamic MFIs as income increased around 50% from IDR 1,097,700 to IDR 1,669,100. BMT MMU 
Sidogiri’s financing in 2015 was able to reduce the number of respondents below the poverty line by 
22.5 per cent, reduce the poverty gap ratio from 24 to 11.3 percent and reduced the severity of 
poverty from 0.187 to 0.079 (Adnan & Ajija, 2015; Riwajanti & Asutay, 2015).      
 
 
  
                                                          
11 This axiom means that behaviour should be guided by ethical principles; it is a vertical dimension and a 
unifier for every individual as an integral part of all aspects of life.  
12 It means a horizontal dimension which requires balance and fairness in society. Every individual should 
maintain this ethical principle. 
13 It is the opportunity to make maximum efforts in all aspects of life. Every person also has the freedom to 
change himself/herself with changing times.  
14Every person is required to be responsible, especially when it comes to public goods. It is also about the 
responsibility towards society. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of studies on the impact of Islamic MFIs. 
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Rahman 
and 
Ahmad 
(2010) 
Assessing the impact of 
rural development 
schemes (sharia-based 
microfinance program) 
on rural poor’s livelihood 
in Bangladesh  
• Descriptive statistics  
• OLS 
• Weighted least square 
• Linear programming  
• Simultaneous equation 
systems  
• Household income, 
expenditure, 
productivity (crops and 
livestock), and 
employment had 
increased significantly   
• Clients’ socio-economic 
factor had a positive 
and significant influence 
on household income 
Adnan 
and Ajija 
(2015) 
Investigating the impact 
of BMTs (Islamic MFIs) 
on rural households in 
Indonesia. Especially the 
role of Islamic MFIs in 
reducing poverty in 
Indonesia  
• Poverty measurement 
indicators such as the 
Headcount Index, the Gini 
Index, the Sen Index and 
the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke Index, were 
used to measure the 
impact of Islamic MFIs’ 
financing.  
• Revealed that Islamic 
MFIs’ financing is 
effective in reducing 
poverty 
• Most of the 
respondents were able 
increase their income 
after receiving financing  
 
Samer et 
al. (2015) 
Examining the role of 
Malaysian Microfinance, 
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia 
(AIM) on household 
income. AIM’s loan is  
interest-free based on 
Islamic principles   
• Multinomial logistic, survey 
780 respondents in 
Selangor and Melaka, 
Malaysia 
• AIM has a positive 
impact on household 
income especially on 
women borrowers who 
spent three years in the 
scheme as compared to 
the new borrowers  
 
3.1.3 Previous studies of conventional MFIs’ impact on rural households 
There are ample studies that measure the impact of conventional MFIs on rural households. Pitt and 
Khandker (1998) estimated the impact of credit programmes in Bangladesh, such as the Grameen 
Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Bangladesh Rural Development 
Board’s RD-12 program (BRDB), on changes in households behaviours (e.g., household expenditure, 
assets, schooling and labour supply). The study used a quasi-experimental design, with weighted 
exogenous sampling maximum likelihood - limited information maximum likelihood-fixed effects 
(WESML-LIML-FE) to minimize the bias from a non-random programme placement and self-selected 
participation. Using data from 87 rural villages in Bangladesh during 1991-1992, the study found that 
the credit programme in Bangladesh exhibited a positive and significant impact on women compared 
with men. The credit programme significantly influenced six households’ behaviour (i.e., girls’ 
schooling, boys’ schooling, women’s labour supply, men’s labour supply, annual expenditure, and 
women’s non-land assets).       
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Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson (2001) found that microcredit had a positive impact on business 
profit and household income. Borrowers experienced growth in their business profit and household 
income after receiving a second loan from the urban credit programme in Zambia. Microcredit also 
has an impact on the borrowers’ quality of life and improved business performance; those who 
received a loan experienced more rapid diversification of their business than non-borrowers. 
However, Copestake et al. (2001) study showed that borrowers who left the programme after 
receiving their first loan were worse off in their quality of life.  
The popular technique to measure the causal effect of programmes or treatments of conventional 
MFIs is called the difference-in-difference (DID) method and this technique was used by Li et al. 
(2011b) and Kondo et al. (2008). Li et al. (2011b) used household outcomes (annual income and 
consumption) as a welfare indicator to identify the impact of microcredit on rural households in 
China. The authors’ study compared households’ outcomes between participant and non-participant 
households to measure the true impact of the programme. The programme impact, denoted by i , 
can be measured by 1 0i iY Y  (Li et al., 2011b):   
1 0i i iY Y              (3.1) 
Li et al. (2011b) employed adjusted DID and a fixed effect technique to enhance their result 
estimates. Observable household characteristics were included as control variables while the fixed 
effect technique was adopted to control unmeasured household and village characteristics. Kondo et 
al. (2008) used several outcome variables such as: (1) household welfare (per capita income, 
expenditure, saving and food); (2) household employment and enterprises; (3) household assets such 
as farm equipment, land and livestock; (4) household education and health; and (5) household 
savings, to measure the impact of a microfinance programme on rural households in the Philippines. 
The impact of the microfinance programme based on the DID method is given as follows (Kondo et 
al., 2008): 
Impact = (A-B) - (C-D)         (3.2) 
The term (A-B) demonstrates the microfinance impact and effects of unobserved characteristics 
affecting participation, (C-D) demonstrates the net effect of the unobserved characteristics affecting 
participation. Hence, (A-B) - (C-D) generates the net impact of the microfinance programme (Kondo 
et al., 2008).     
The Li et al. (2011b) study revealed that a microcredit programme helps improve households’ welfare 
especially income and consumption. Kondo et al. (2008) study revealed a positive impact of 
programme loans on households’ income and expenditure. However, the authors also reported a 
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negative and insignificant impact of the loan programme for poorer households. The impact for 
poorer households was lower or negative is because: (1) the clients were concentrated among the 
poorer households and (2) the average size of loans for poorer households was smaller (see Table 
3.3). 
MFIs also significantly improve the health of children. DeLoach and Lamanna (2011) described how 
the health of children in Indonesia can be improved through the presence of MFIs in societies. First, 
they empower parents with social capital that leads them to access the knowledge related to health. 
Second, MFIs enable women’s bargaining power in the family that leads to increased expenditure for 
children. Third, the presence of MFIs in society may lead to improvement in a society’s facilities such 
as sanitation and healthcare which impact the health of children. Finally, MFIs help to smooth 
households’ consumption in the case of a shock to their income or wealth (DeLoach & Lamanna, 
2011).     
Phan, Gan, Nartea, and Cohen (2014) used a propensity score matching (PSM) method to evaluate 
the impact of microcredit on rural households in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam. The PSM results 
showed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies’ (VBSP) microcredit programme has a significant and 
positive impact on rural households’ consumption. The authors’ study also showed that the poorest 
group benefits more if the poor groups are included in the estimation, which implies that earlier 
groups receive more benefit from the programme than later groups (see Table 3.3). In addition, Phan 
et al. (2014) argued that the PSM method is an appropriate technique in microfinance impact 
assessment to control for bias due to observed factors. However, unmeasured characteristics and 
bias that occur from cross-sectional matching estimators could not be controlled in their study. 
Therefore, they recommend employing the fixed effect model with panel data if the data is 
accessible (Phan et al., 2014).       
  
 42 
Table 3.3 Summary of studies on the impact of conventional MFIs. 
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) 
Evaluating the impact 
of participation in 
three credit 
programmes 
(Grameen Bank, BRAC, 
and BRDB) on 
household 
expenditure, assets, 
schooling and labour 
supply in Bangladesh  
• Quasi-experimental 
design; 
• WESML-LIML-FE; 
• Instrumental 
variables 
 
• The credit 
programme in 
Bangladesh exhibits 
a positive and 
significant impact on 
poor households’ 
behaviour, 
especially for 
women  
Copestake et al. 
(2001) 
Assessing the impact 
of the Peri-Urban 
Lusaka Small 
Enterprise Project 
(PULSE) a group based 
microcredit 
programme in Lusaka, 
Zambia   
• Survey;  
• Focus group 
discussions;  
• Interview; 
• Regression analysis; 
• Multiple regression  
• Positive and 
significant impacts 
on household 
income and business  
• Improved 
borrowers’ quality 
of life and business 
performance 
• Borrowers 
experienced rapid 
diversification of 
their business 
Kondo et al. (2008) Investigating the 
impact of 
microfinance on rural 
households in the 
Philippines  
• DID • Positive and 
significant impacts 
of microfinance on 
households’ income 
and expenditure 
• Negative and 
insignificant impacts 
for poorer 
households 
Li et al. (2011b) Empirically evaluating 
the impact of 
microcredit on 
household welfare 
(income and 
consumption) in rural 
China 
• DID; 
• Fixed effect 
regression 
• Microcredit 
programme helps to 
increase household 
income and 
consumption 
• Borrowers involved 
more in the 
microcredit 
programme gain 
more benefits   
DeLoach and Lamanna 
(2011) 
Investigating the 
impact of 
microfinance on child 
health in Indonesia 
using data from an 
Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) 
• Generalized method 
of moments  
• The presence of 
MFIs in communities 
helps to improve the 
health of children 
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Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Phan et al. (2014) Evaluating the impact 
of microcredit on rural 
households in the 
Mekong River Delta of 
Vietnam  
• Propensity score 
matching method 
• Microcredit 
programmes have a 
positive and 
significant effect on 
rural household 
consumption. 
• The poorest group 
received more 
benefits from the 
microcredit 
programme 
 
3.2 The values and schemes of Islamic MFIs 
3.2.1 Theory of Islamic MFIs’ schemes 
The important value of Islamic finance is the commitment to avoid the practice of usury or riba15 in 
transactions (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999). Riba is prohibited in Islam and taking profit from lending 
money is considered as haram (forbidden) (Chapra, 2006; Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; El-Komi & 
Croson, 2013). In the first stage of Islamic finance development there was some debate whether riba 
relates to interest or to excessive interest. However, Islamic scholars reached a consensus that all 
forms of interest are prohibited (Hassan & Lewis, 2004).   
In shari’a, riba refers to the excess that is obliged to be paid as a condition of a loan or for a 
postponement from its maturity from the borrower to the lender (Chapra, 2006). Explained 
differently, riba is the prearranged return for the use of money. There are two forms of riba in Islam. 
They are riba al-fadl and riba al-nasi’ah. Riba al-fadl is associated with unequal qualities or quantities 
that occur from the exchange of the ribawi16 goods concurrently. Riba al-nasi’ah is associated with a 
postponement; it occurs when two ribawi goods are exchanged in different ways (one promptly and 
the other postponed). Riba al-nasi’ah can be also associated with usury on a loan arising from the 
component of time or, namely, a loan with interest. It occurs where a borrower enters a loan 
contract in which he/she has to repay a predetermined amount of money based on the principal 
(Aichbichler, 2009; Chapra, 2006; Paldi, 2014). 
Most conventional MFIs’ products do not fulfil the needs of Muslim clients. Many Muslims prefer 
products from Islamic MFIs rather than conventional MFIs because conventional MFIs’ products 
contravene their religious beliefs (Akhter et al., 2009). The practice of Islamic finance emphasises a 
                                                          
15Riba is translated as any excess which is aDIDed into the loan. It is also known as interest and can be found in 
conventional financing or lending schemes. The aDIDitional amount, predetermined before the transaction, is 
called riba (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999).   
16 The ribawi goods are dates, wheat, barley, salt, gold, and silver (Paldi, 2014)  
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profit and risk sharing mechanism. For instance, Islamic MFIs’ products such as mudarabah17, 
musharakah18, muzara’ah19, and muzaqat20 are more concerned with cooperation between funders 
and entrepreneurs.  
The profit and loss sharing (PLS) mechanism is a contractual agreement between two or more parties 
where the parties share their resources in a project and generate their return based on a pre-agreed 
ratio (Abdul-Rahman, Latif, Muda, & Abdullah, 2014; Akhter et al., 2009; Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999). 
Abdul-Rahman et al. (2014) investigated why a non-PLS mechanism is favoured in Islamic banks in 
Malaysia. The data showed that PLS financing comprises less than 3% of the total financing of 
Malaysian Islamic banks. Using New Institutional Economic Theory, Abdul-Rahman et al. (2014) found 
that the PLS mechanism suits Islamic banks that play the role of genuine entrepreneurs rather than 
financial intermediaries.   
According to Chowdhry (2006), Islamic finance may be able to provide a good mechanism to 
empower the poor and can convert potential capital into profit with the PLS mechanism. This is 
because under the PLS mechanism, such as mudarabah and musharakah, every client (entrepreneur) 
will not experience an interest burden at the beginning of the project. Both parties will have an 
agreement on the profit and loss sharing ratio and the return will be based on the business outcome 
(Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014). 
 
   
                                                          
17 Under a mudarabah contract, one party provides all the capital needed while the entrepreneurs give their 
effort and time to the project. The profits are shared in a fixed ratio and losses are borne by the financial 
institution (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999).    
18 Under a musharakah contract, two or more parties contribute their equity to a project and profits are shared 
based on an agreement, whereas losses are shared based on equity participation. It is similar to a joint venture 
agreement (Chong & Liu, 2009; Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999).   
19Muzara’ah is a mudarabah contract in the agricultural sector; one party provides the land or funds and the 
other party contributes his/her effort. Both parties share the harvest based on the agreement (Dhumale & 
Sapcanin, 1999).  
20Muzaqat is a musharakah contract in the orchard sector where the harvest is shared based on equity 
participation (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999). 
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Source: Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987); Kazarian (1993) as cited in (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999); (Obaidullah 
& Khan, 2008). 
Figure 3.2 Types of Islamic finance contracts. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows two main contracts under Islamic finance: profit and loss sharing (PLS) and non 
profit and loss sharing (non-PLS). PLS contracts are riskier than non-PLS contracts because of the 
possibility of asymmetric information that may occur in these contracts (e.g., musharakah and 
mudarabah). However, there are opportunities to implement the PLS mechanism in rural areas 
because of the honesty of rural communities (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Shahinpoor, 2009). Based 
on Shahinpoor (2009), there are several reasons why PLS can be more successful in rural areas: (1) 
measuring the profit of agricultural projects is relatively easy; (2) in rural areas, the problem of moral 
hazard is highly unlikely because it is community based and the degree of privacy is very limited; and 
(3) to some extent, people in rural areas are less likely to cheat because everybody in the village 
knows what others are doing and usually monitor each other.   
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Non-PLS contracts include murabaha21, bai’ salam22, ijarah wa iqtina’23 and qard al-hasanah24. 
Murabaha, for instance, can be used to purchase and resell commodities in rural areas (Wilson, 
2007). Ijarah wa iqtina’ can be applied to the lease of equipment or fields to a rural client. Bai’ salam 
is appropriate for farmers and traders in agricultural areas. Finally, qard al-hasanah is suitable for 
new entrepreneurs to start their business (Obaidullah, 2008; Rahman & Rahim, 2007; Wilson, 2007). 
3.2.2 Indonesia National Shari’a Board 
The National Shari’a Board or Dewan Syariah Nasional (DSN) is an institution founded in February 
1999 by the Indonesian Ulema Council or Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) with the main aim of 
managing issues relating to the development of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) in Indonesia. The 
three main duties of the DSN are (DSN MUI, 2013): 
1. Issuing a fatwa25 of the Islamic economy to be a reference or guidance for practitioners and 
regulators. 
2. Providing recommendations, certification and shari’a approval for IFIs. 
3. Performing monitoring and evaluation of shari’a compliance implementation in IFIs through a 
shari’a supervisory board (SSB) attached to each IFI.  
 
DSN-MUI is an independent institution and fatwas issued by DSN are not binding on IFIs (Hadi, 2011). 
However, based on Indonesian Constitution No. 21, 2008 about Islamic banking regulations, the 
fatwas could be implement by the central bank of Indonesia and become a regulation or Peraturan 
Bank Indonesia (PBI) which will legally bind IFIs (Hadi, 2011). From 2000 to March 2017, DSN has 
issued about 107 fatwas on Islamic financial products in Indonesia (DSN MUI, 2013). There are four 
focus area in DSN which are: (1) Islamic banks; (2) Islamic capital markets; (3) Islamic financial 
institution non-banks and (4) Islamic businesses and tourism. IFIs have to follow certain mechanisms 
                                                          
21Murabahah is a scheme usually used for short-term financing. Under this scheme, the seller discloses the real 
cost and profit of the products to the buyer. Negotiation of a profit margin is possible and instalment payments 
are common (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Obaidullah, 2008).     
22Bai’ salam is a scheme similar to forward contracts. Under this scheme, the seller and the buyer agree to the 
future transaction where the buyer pays the full amount of the price and the seller promises to deliver the 
goods. Quality, quantity, price, and time of delivery are determined at the time of the contract (Dhumale & 
Sapcanin, 1999).     
23Ijarah wa iqtina’ is a lease transaction consisting of ijarah (pure leasing) and Ijarah wa iqtina’ (lease and 
purchase). In a lease and purchase scheme, a portion of each regular payment is applied to the purchase of the 
goods where the goods are transferred to the buyer at the end of a period (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; 
Obaidullah, 2008).    
24Qard al hasanah is the only loan permissible under Islamic finance concepts. This scheme is a zero return 
loan. However, administration and transaction costs are permissible (so long as there is no relationship with 
the maturity and amount of the loan) (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999).   
25 Fatwa is an Islamic legal statement, issued by an expert in religious law (mufti) referring to a specific issue 
(Kabbani, 2017).   
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institutions to the DSN in other countries. For instance, Malaysia has the Shariah Advisory Council 
(SAC), which was established in May 1997 and acts as the highest shari’a authority on Islamic finance 
in Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2016). Pakistan has a shari’a board that is attached to the State 
Bank of Pakistan (central bank of Pakistan); the board has five members consisting of two Islamic 
scholars, an accountant, banker and jurist (Hadi, 2011; State Bank of Pakistan, 2016).    
3.2.3 Previous studies of shari’a compliance and Islamic values 
Previous studies on shari’a compliance and evaluation of Islamic values are limited. Vinnicombe 
(2010) evaluated the shari’a compliance of several Islamic banks in Bahrain (nine wholesale banks 
and six retail banks) from 2004 to 2007 based on the shari’a standard from AAOIFI. The study 
constructed an index based on a survey from relevant literature (e.g., annual reports) to identify the 
level of shari’a compliance of some schemes in Islamic banks (e.g., murabahah, mudarabah, and 
zakah) plus the shari’a supervisory board’s report. The study revealed that murabahah exhibited a 
higher degree of shari’a compliance than the two other schemes (mudarabah and zakah) (see Table 
3.4). One reason is because the murabahah scheme is less complicated than the mudarabah scheme 
(Vinnicombe, 2010).      
Rahman and Ahmad (2010) study attempted to identify the relationship between clients’ moral and 
Islamic values and changes in their income. Using a Likert-scale and OLS regression, the authors 
found that morals and Islamic values make a positive and significant contribution to clients’ income 
(see Table 3.4). This implies that clients with good morals experience a higher probability of an 
increase in income. The authors’ sample covered over 1,000 clients of Islamic microfinance 
programmes in Bangladesh (Rahman & Ahmad, 2010).       
Mollaha and Zaman (2015) investigated the impact of the shari’a supervision board on Islamic banks’ 
performance. The authors’ study included 86 Islamic banks and covered 25 countries over seven 
years (2005-2011). Adopting a random-effect GLS estimation, the study found that a shari’a 
supervision board that applies its supervisory role contributes a positive and significant impact to 
Islamic banks’ performance (see Table 3.4). The banks’ performance indicators26 include ROIAE, 
ROIAA, ROAE, and ROAA (Mollaha & Zaman, 2015).          
                                                          
26 ROIAE = operating profit divided by average equity; ROIAA = operating profit divided by total assets; ROAE = 
net income divided by average total assets; ROAA = net income divided by average total assets. ROIE, ROIAA, 
and ROAE measure operating efficiency while ROAA measures return on average assets (Mollaha & Zaman, 
2015).  
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Table 3.4 Summary of studies on shari’a compliance and Islamic values. 
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Vinnicombe 
(2010) 
Examining shari’a 
compliance of an Islamic 
bank in Bahrain based on 
AAOIFI standards    
• Benchmark 
index 
• Survey of 
literature  
• Murabahah encounters a high 
degree of shari’a compliance   
• Mudarabah and Zakah have low 
degrees of shari’a compliance  
Rahman and 
Ahmad (2010) 
Evaluating the link 
between clients’ moral 
and Islamic values and 
changes in income  
• Likert-scale 
• OLS  
• Moral and Islamic values exhibit 
a positive and significant 
relationship with clients’ income 
 
Mollaha and 
Zaman (2015) 
Investigating the impact 
of the shari’a supervision 
board on Islamic banks’ 
performance 
• Random-
effect GLS 
• A shari’a supervision board that 
implements its supervisory role 
exhibits a positive and significant 
impact on bank performance 
 
Maintaining shari’a compliance is important for any Islamic financial institution (IFI), including Islamic 
MFIs. Besides the shari’a standard, there are also standards from international organisations such as 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI)27 and, in 
Indonesia, there is a shari’a board for each IFI. The board’s function is to monitor and evaluate the 
shari’a compliance of the institution. This board is evaluated and monitored by the National Shari’a 
Board of Indonesia28. This current study examines the shari’a compliance of Islamic MFIs’ schemes in 
Indonesia based on the standards from the National Shari’a Board of Indonesia. 
Investigating clients’ Islamic values is also important to have better knowledge about clients’ 
understanding of Islamic finance. Moreover, a study of clients’ Islamic values will also identify the 
clients’ perceptions about the financing that they receive. This current study investigates the Islamic 
values of Islamic MFIs’ clients based on 10 statements, including the relationship of clients’ spiritual 
beliefs and financial decisions; the implementation of their religious beliefs; opinions on shari’a 
compliance; and the clients’ financing experience.        
3.3 Measuring the impact of Islamic financing mechanism 
3.3.1 Overview of financing mechanisms available in Islamic finance 
Based on the literature, there are two main mechanisms/models of contract in Islamic finance, PLS 
and non-PLS mechanisms. However, there are few studies that discuss these two models in Islamic 
MFs with regard to the impact on rural households’ welfare.  
According to Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Dusuki and Abdullah (2006) and Asutay (2007), the 
common model of financing in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) is the non-PLS model, especially 
                                                          
27http://aaoifi.com/en/about-aaoifi/about-aaoifi.html 
28http://mui.or.id/mui/category/tentang-mui/lembaga/dewan-syariah-nasional 
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debt-like instruments (e.g., murabaha and ijarah wa iqtina’). There is a debate among scholars about 
which is the better model, PLS or non-PLS. According to Dusuki and Abdullah (2006), the ideal model 
for an IFI is a PLS mechanism. This is because PLS represents the true spirit of the Islamic finance 
concept, which differs significantly from the conventional or interest based system (Dusuki & 
Abdullah, 2006).  Dusuki and Abdullah (2006) argue that if a PLS mechanism is implemented in the 
asset and liabilities sides of IFIs (e.g., the Islamic banking system), this implies that the depositors are 
sharing the risk with the IFI. Therefore, depositors will absorb any outcome from the asset side of the 
IFI. The depositors’ funds will reflect the real asset value of the IFI.  
Asutay (2007) argues that PLS mechanisms are the solution to achieve justice and equality and meet 
not only the maqasid al-shari’a (objective of shari’a), but also the objectives of Islam.  PLS 
mechanisms are also important in distinguishing Islamic from conventional financial institutions 
because in these mechanisms both parties share the profit and loss based on a pre-agreed ratio 
instead of a fixed return; it is a unique feature of and the attractiveness of Islamic finance (Azmat et 
al., 2015; Chong & Liu, 2009; Ibrahim & Mirakhor, 2014).    
However, Farooq (2007) listed some reasons why IFIs tend to avoid PLS and use non-PLS mechanisms 
overwhelmingly. Farooq’s study reveals that: (1) PLS mechanisms are vulnerable to the agency 
problem because clients have disincentives to put in effort and incentives to report less profit; (2) IFIs 
have to offer a relatively less risky mode of financing, such as the non-PLS mechanism, because they 
have to compete with conventional financial institutions that are already established and hence 
competitive; and (3) PLS mechanisms are not appropriate to fund short-term projects because of 
their high degree of risk, hence IFIs rely heavily on non-PLS mechanisms.     
There are several reasons why PLS mechanisms are less popular with or more difficult to adopt by 
IFIs. Based on a study by Paul and Presley (1999) as cited in Chong and Liu (2009), the first reason is 
the moral hazard problem associated with the ex-post information asymmetry, which is more likely 
to occur in this mechanism. The entrepreneur (the one who receives the financing) has an incentive 
to manipulate adversely the reported profit that may adverse investor. Second, the moral hazard 
problem can also occur in a mudarabah (profit sharing) contract because the entrepreneur can 
potentially aggressively undertake high-risk projects whereby they gain relatively higher profit and 
bear no losses (Chong & Liu, 2009).  
3.3.2 Studies on Islamic financing mechanisms 
According to a study by Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), most Islamic banks adopt a non-PLS financing 
mechanism in their operations. The study evaluated financing data from three Islamic banks (Egypt’s 
Faisal Islamic Bank, Jordan’s Islamic bank and Bank Islam Malaysia) and one country, Iran (the 
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banking system is Islamic). The study indicated that non-PLS financing is dominant (murabahah and 
ijarah). Using the model of capital structure and investment placed in incomplete contracts, the 
authors found that it is normal for Islamic banks to avoid the PLS financing mechanism (see Table 
3.5). This is because Islamic banks could encounter agency problems and adverse selection that lead 
to moral hazard behaviour. Therefore, given the current economic situation, it is customary for 
Islamic banks to combine PLS and non-PLS mechanisms in their financing portfolios, even if they 
should emphasise the PLS financing mechanism (Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000).                   
Dusuki and Abdullah (2006) study emphasised the perspectives of Islamic banks’ stakeholders 
towards the practice of Islamic banks in Malaysia. The study conducted a survey of 1,500 
respondents including depositors, customers, regulators, managers, shari’a advisors, employees, and 
local communities. The study covered four areas in Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Johor, and 
Kelantan. Using descriptive statistics from the survey data, the results show that most respondents 
highly appreciate Islamic banks’ unique characteristics compared with conventional banks. Secondly, 
as a bank with unique products and services, Islamic banks should promote the PLS financing 
mechanism to differentiate them from conventional banks (Dusuki & Abdullah, 2006).  
Farooq (2007) study provides several reasons why IFIs tend to avoid PLS mechanisms in their 
business. By analysing arguments from Islamic scholars, the author concluded that the agency 
problem, high business risk, unavailability of a secondary market, and taxation issues are some 
reasons why IFIs avoid PLS systems. These reasons encourage IFIs to mimic conventional financial 
institutions’ products in their operations (Farooq, 2007). 
Chong and Liu (2009) showed that products and services from Islamic bank are not much different 
from conventional banks, especially for deposit products. Islamic banks rely heavily on non-PLS 
mechanisms. Data for the authors’ study included a series of Islamic banks’ investment rates and 
conventional bank deposit rates (monthly data) in Malaysia, published by Bank Negara Malaysia from 
1995 to 2004. Using the Engle-Granger error correction method, the authors discovered that a shift 
in conventional bank deposit rates will lead to a shift in Islamic banks’ investment rates (PLS) and, in 
the long term, Islamic rates are highly correlated with conventional rates (see Table 3.5). Hence, the 
authors concluded that Islamic bank deposit rates follow the conventional deposit rates (Chong & 
Liu, 2009).    
Sumarti et al. (2014) developed a mathematical model of the PLS mechanism. The authors’ study 
used a model based on simulation data from low income traders in Indonesia. The results showed 
that the PLS mechanism combined with microcredit benefits not only the traders (borrowers) but 
also the investors. The rate of return for investors ranged from 17.7% to 23.1% per month and for 
borrowers it ranged from 54.98% to 91.98% per loan period. The borrowers obtain a better return if 
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they borrow money with a PLS mechanism than if they borrow money with interest (Sumarti et al., 
2014).    
Azmat et al. (2015) argued that financing contracts with Islamic banks are supposed to be dominated 
by the PLS mechanism which is considered to be more “Islamic”. The study constructed models such 
as the asymmetric information and moral hazard model to explain why the PLS financing mechanism 
is not popular. The models include asymmetric information, long-term contracts and legal 
punishment, and risk averse bank depositors that affect and are related to the PLS financing 
mechanism. The authors proposed that the PLS financing mechanism is more suitable for venture 
capital or private equity than for Islamic banks (Azmat et al., 2015).    
Table 3.5 Summary of Islamic financing mechanism studies. 
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Aggarwal and Yousef 
(2000) 
Financial instruments 
used by Islamic banks 
(between PLS and 
non-PLS) 
• Descriptive statistics 
(data from 
International 
Association of 
Islamic Banks and 
annual reports) 
• Investment and 
capital structure 
model based on 
incomplete 
contracts (this 
model is modified 
from Hart and 
Moore (1997) 
Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990)) 
• Most IBs rely heavily 
on non-profit and 
loss sharing (non-
PLS) financing 
mechanisms 
• The agency problem 
in PLS decreases the 
optimality of this 
mechanism followed 
by domination of 
debt-based 
contracts (non-PLS);  
• The moral hazard 
problem leads to 
non-PLS financing 
(debt-like 
instrument) in IBs  
Dusuki and Abdullah 
(2006) 
Perceptions of Islamic 
banks’ stakeholders 
on Islamic banks’ 
practice in Malaysia 
including 
implementation of 
financing mechanisms 
• Likert-scale 
• Survey  
• Islamic banks (IBs) 
should balance 
profit-orientation 
and social-welfare 
commitment  
• Financial products 
and services should 
be shari’a compliant 
and IBs should 
emphasise the PLS 
financing 
mechanism more  
Farooq (2007) Arguments and 
rationale for why IFIs 
avoid PLS mechanisms 
• Theoretical study 
(describing 
arguments from 
Islamic scholars 
about PLS 
mechanisms) 
• Avoiding PLS 
financing 
mechanisms is 
normal and rational 
behaviour of 
individuals or 
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Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
business 
organizations  
Chong and Liu (2009) 
 
 
Comparative study 
between Islamic and 
conventional banks 
especially on deposit 
rates issues 
• The Engle-Granger 
error correction 
method was used to 
study the long-term 
and short-term 
dynamics between 
Islamic investment 
rates and 
conventional 
deposit rates   
 
 
• Rapid growth in IBs 
is more likely 
because of Islam 
rejuvenation 
worldwide rather 
than the uniqueness 
of PLS mechanisms 
in IBs 
• Changes in 
conventional 
deposit rates cause 
Islamic investment 
(PLS mechanism) 
rates to change, but 
not vice versa  
• Islamic deposits, in 
practice, are not 
very different from 
conventional 
deposits  
Sumarti et al. (2014) Mathematical model 
to find an optimal 
portion of profit share 
from PLS mechanisms 
in microcredit based 
on real financing data 
• Mathematical model 
for PLS schemes 
• Moral hazard model 
in PLS financing 
 
 
• Average rate of 
return for the PLS 
investments is 
around 17.7%-23.1% 
• Borrowers and 
lenders benefit from 
PLS schemes  
Azmat et al. (2015) Attempted to explain 
why debt-based 
contract (non-PLS) is 
dominant in IBs. 
Focused on 
asymmetric 
information, moral 
hazard, and adverse 
selection issues   
• Asymmetric 
information model 
for PLS financing 
• Moral hazard model 
in PLS financing; 
• Long-term 
relationships and 
legal punishment 
model 
• Risk averse bank 
depositors model 
• Borrowers can get 
higher profit 
through non-PLS 
mechanisms, this is 
why non-PLS 
dominates in IBs 
• Presence of 
asymmetric 
information alone 
cannot explain the 
absence of PLS 
mechanisms in IBs  
• Changes in 
depositors’ attitudes 
might influence the 
increase of PLS 
financing schemes in 
IBs 
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In summary, based on the above studies, no study has specifically evaluated the impact of the two 
financing mechanisms. To date no empirical study has investigated which financing mechanism has 
the greater impact on the clients’ (borrowers’) welfare. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature 
with an empirical assessment of the impact of the two Islamic MFIs financing mechanisms (PLS and 
non-PLS) on rural household welfare in Indonesia.    
3.4 Determinants factors influencing rural households to become clients of 
Islamic MFIs 
3.4.1 Discrete choice theory 
Discrete choice theory is used to evaluate the factors that influence access to microcredit. Discrete 
choice models are formulated under the utility-maximizing assumption made by the decision maker 
(Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Train, 2009). There are three characteristics of the choice set that can be 
categorized under the discrete choice framework (Train, 2009): 
1. The options, or alternatives, must be mutually exclusive, which means that the decision maker 
decides to select one choice while the other options are not selected. 
2. The choice set should be extensive, which means it includes all available options. 
3. The options should be limited or finite 
 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) argued that it is almost impossible to calculate a discrete choice model 
that consistently succeeds in predicting the chosen options, thus the concept adopted is random 
utility, which means the true utilities of the options are considered random variables. Therefore, the 
probability that an option is chosen is defined as the probability that it has the greatest utility among 
the available options (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).     
According to Train (2009), the commonly used discrete choice model is logit. This is because logit has 
a similar formula to the choice probabilities and is easily explainable (Train, 2009). According to Train 
(2009), the power and limitation of logit are defined as:  
1. The systematic taste variation can be defined by logit, especially taste variation associated with 
the decision maker’s observed characteristics. 
2. Logit models give proportional substitution over options. However, other models are needed to 
capture more flexible forms of substitution. 
3. Logit can capture the dynamic of repeated choice; this includes state dependence. However, the 
logit model cannot control conditions when unobserved factors are correlated over time.    
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The logit formula was initially derived by Luce (1959) from the adoption of choice probabilities (Train, 
2009). The most commonly used models for identifying the accessibility of credit are the binary logit 
and probit (Dzadze, Aidoo, & Nurah, 2012; Li et al., 2011a). The two models give efficient, consistent 
and asymptotically normal estimates as well as similar results in empirical work (Li et al., 2011a). 
According to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the binary logit model is more convenient analytically 
than the binary probit. Moreover, the binary logit model develops from the assumption that 
n jn in   
29 is logistically distributed compared with the binary probit model which assumes a 
normal distribution (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010).         
3.4.2 Previous studies on factors that influence access to microfinance 
Vaessen (2001) examined factors that influenced rural households to receive credit from the Fondo 
de Desarrollo Local, a rural bank in Northern Nicaragua. The author used logistic regression and the 
findings showed that a network of information and the recommendations of bank staff are the main 
factors that influence access to credit. Education, household size, and engaging in agriculture and 
livestock are also factors that determine households’ likelihood to become clients and receive credit 
from the bank. However, engagement in wage labour activity reduces the chance of receiving a loan. 
In addition, the availability of informal credit decreases rural households’ demand for credit 
(Vaessen, 2001).    
Okurut (2006) divides the accessibility to finance for poor and black people into three types of 
financial institution: formal, semi-formal, and informal. Using a multinomial logit and Heckman’s 
probit model, the study used household survey data (1995 and 2000) to ascertain that household 
age, gender (male), size, education, expenditure, and race are factors that significantly influence 
rural households’ access to formal financial institutions. Household size, expenditure, location and 
race are factors that affect the accessibility to semi-formal financial institutions. For informal 
financial institutions, only location influences the accessibility to credit for poor and black people 
(Okurut, 2006). 
Umoh (2006) investigated the factors that influence microenterprises to participate in microcredit in 
Nigeria. Probit and regression analysis were used to analyse factors that influenced the demand for 
microcredit. Company type and total sales were two factors that increased demand for microcredit 
(see Table 3.6). Meanwhile, the businessman’s income level and the initial capital of the enterprises 
are factors that decrease the demand for microcredit. Interest rate and certain requirements such as 
                                                          
29 in  and jn are the random parts from the utility of i  and j , and are called the disturbances (Ben-Akiva & 
Lerman, 1985). Li (2010) study considered it as the probability of credit access.   
 56 
collateral and minimum balance, are factors that decrease the amount of loans disbursed by 
microcredit institutions (Umoh, 2006).     
Li et al. (2011a) argued that income, official status and self-employment of rural households are the 
main factors that influence access to microcredit. However, assets, savings and size of household 
reduce the possibility of accessing microcredit. The authors used logistic regression based on 424 
respondents comprising 328 borrowers and 96 non-borrowers. The aim of the study was to evaluate 
the accessibility of microcredit to rural households in China (Li et al., 2011a).        
Dzadze et al. (2012) evaluated factors that influenced farmers’ access to credit in Ghana. The study 
used primary and secondary data from 100 farmers and five lending institutions. It evaluated 11 
variables using logistic regression and found that three variables had a positive and significant 
influence on farmers’ accessibility to formal credit institutions in Ghana. Farmers’ savings accounts, 
extension contacts, and education influenced farmers’ credit accessibility. Thus, the authors suggest 
that to enhance credit accessibility for farmers, the government should improve the farmers’ 
extension contacts through regular visits, improve farmers’ education levels, and assist farmers to 
save with banks (Dzadze et al., 2012). 
Khoi, Gan, Nartea, and Cohen (2013) identified factors that determined the accessibility of 
microcredit in rural areas in Vietnam. Using the logit and probit models, the authors’ study 
interviewed 928 rural households comprising 619 borrowers and 309 non-borrowers. Their results 
show that rural households with local government employees, members of a credit group, and those 
having a poor certificate have a high probability of receiving credit from formal microcredit 
programmes (see Table 3.6). Land holding status, loan purposes, interest, duration, and road access 
are factors that influence rural households in obtaining credit from informal microcredit 
programmes. Rural households that participate in informal credit have a higher chance of obtaining 
formal credit (Khoi et al., 2013).   
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Table 3.6 Summary of studies on the determining factors in accessing microfinance.  
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Vaessen 
(2001) 
Analyses factors that 
influence rural households to 
become clients and access  
credit from a rural bank in 
Northern Nicaragua 
• Logistic 
regression 
• Network and recommendations 
are important factors that 
influence rural households to 
access credit from the rural bank 
• Education, household size, and 
participating in agriculture and 
livestock farming are also 
important factors influencing rural 
households to become clients  
• Participation in wage labour 
activities reduces households’ 
qualifications to receive a loan 
from the rural bank  
• The availability of informal credit 
decreases rural households’ 
demand for credit from the rural 
bank  
Okurut 
(2006) 
Investigates factors that 
influence poor and black 
people’s access to financial 
institutions (formal, semi-
formal, and informal) in 
South Africa 
• Multinomial 
logit model 
• Heckman’s 
probit model 
 
• Age, gender (male), household 
size, education, expenditure, and 
race significantly influence access 
to formal financial institutions 
• Household size, expenditure, 
location and race (being coloured) 
significantly influence access to 
semi-formal financial institutions 
• Location significantly influences 
access to informal financial 
institutions 
Umoh 
(2006) 
Examines factors that 
influence microenterprises to 
engage with microcredit in 
Nigeria   
• Probit and 
regression 
analyses 
• Type of firm and total sales 
increase the demand for 
microcredit 
• Level of income and the initial 
capital of enterprises are factors 
that decrease the demand for 
microcredit 
• Interest rate and requirements 
(collateral and minimum balance) 
by the microcredit institutions 
decrease the amount of loans 
disbursed by microcredit 
institutions  
Li et al. 
(2011a) 
Evaluates factors that affect 
rural households’ 
accessibility to microcredit in 
China   
• Logit model • Income, official status, and self-
employment are three main 
factors that influence households 
access to microcredit  
• Assets, savings and household size 
decrease the possibility to access 
microcredit  
 58 
Sources Focus of Studies Methods Results 
Dzadze 
et al. 
(2012) 
Identify factors that 
determine farmers’ access to 
formal credit in Ghana  
• Binary logistic 
regression 
  
• Education, extension contacts, 
and savings accounts significantly 
influence the access to formal 
credit  
Khoi et 
al. (2013) 
Evaluates factors that 
determine rural households’ 
access to microcredit in 
Vietnam 
• Logit and 
probit model 
• Local government staff, credit 
group membership, and having a 
poor certificate influence rural 
households in obtaining formal 
credit  
• Land holding status, loan 
purposes, interest, duration and 
road access to the rural 
households’ village influence rural 
households in obtaining informal 
credit  
• Rural households involved in 
informal credit have a higher 
probability of obtaining formal 
credit  
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
Identifying the impact of financing from Islamic MFIs on rural household welfare helps to improve 
the quality of poverty eradication programs, especially for a developing country like Indonesia. In 
addition, micro financing with shari’a compliance which can cover rural areas is important to reach 
financial inclusion in Indonesia. Further, the investigation of the impact of the two financing 
mechanisms in Islamic MFIs will help to determine which type of financing has a better impact on 
rural households’ welfare. Identifying factors that determine how rural households in Indonesia 
become clients of Islamic MFIs will help to enhance their accessibility.  
Previous empirical studies have shown positive and significant impacts of microfinance on rural 
household welfare, especially changes in income and consumption. However, very few empirical 
studies have focused on investigating the impact of Islamic MFIs. Further, limited empirical studies 
provide evidence to identify the two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs. There are two main 
contributions from our study to the existing Islamic finance literature. First, it empirically estimates 
the impact of financing from Islamic MFIs in Indonesia with econometric evaluation (i.e. the 
difference in difference and fixed effect models). Second, our study will investigate the impact of the 
two financing mechanisms on Islamic MFIs (PLS and non-PLS) and identify which financing has a 
better impact on rural household welfare in Indonesia.                 
 
 
 59 
Chapter 4 
Research Data and Methodology 
This chapter discusses the empirical models used to investigate the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing 
on Indonesian rural households’ welfare; evaluates shari’a compliance financing by Islamic MFIs 
servicing Indonesian rural households; investigates the impact of two financing mechanisms on 
Indonesian rural households’ welfare; and identifies the determinants that influence rural 
households to become clients of Islamic MFs. In addition, a discussion of sample and data collection 
in this study and chapter summary are presented at the end of the chapter.      
4.1 Research framework 
Figure 1 shows the research framework used in this study. The study investigates Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia and focuses on: (1) evaluating the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing; (2) assessing shari’a 
compliance; (3) investigating the best practices of Islamic MFIs’ financing mechanisms; and (4) 
identifying the determining factors that influence Indonesian rural households to become clients of 
Islamic MFs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Rahman and Ahmad (2010), Dusuki (2006), Shahinpoor (2009), Obaidullah and Khan (2008), 
Seibel and Dwi Agung (2006). 
Figure 4.1 Research framework for the investigation of Islamic MFIs. 
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4.2 Evaluating the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing 
4.2.1 Conceptual framework 
The perception of financing in Islamic MFIs is different from conventional MFIs. This is because 
products and services from Islamic MFIs must be free from interest (riba) and should follow the 
shari’a standard of Islamic scholars (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008). In Indonesia, Islamic financial 
institutions such as Islamic banks, Islamic insurance, and including Islamic MFIs, must have a shari’a 
supervisory board in their institution, and their financing procedures have to comply with the shari’a 
standards that are set by the national shari’a board of Indonesia (Hasbi, 2015; Nasution, 2015).   
Previous studies on the impact assessment of Islamic MFIs have used some methods. Rahman and 
Ahmad (2010) used ordinary least squares to estimate the effect of Islamic microfinance programmes 
in Bangladesh. Adnan and Ajija (2015) used poverty indexes (e.g., the Headcount Index, the Poverty 
Gap, the Sen Index, and the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke Index) to measure the impact of Islamic 
MFIs on rural households in Indonesia. In conventional MFIs, various complicated methods have 
been used to identify the impact of microfinance. The popular method to identify the true effect of 
programmes or treatments for conventional MFIs is the difference-in-difference (DID) method (Li et 
al., 2011b). 
Income and expenditure are two economic indicators that are frequently used in measuring the 
welfare impact of microfinance. Many studies have used the changes in income and expenditure of 
rural households to identify the impact of loans or financing from microfinance programmes or 
institutions (see, for example, for conventional microfinance, Li et al., 2011; Islam and Harris, 2008; 
and Pitt and Khandker 1998; for Islamic microfinance see Adnan and Ajija, 2015; Rahman and Ahmad, 
2010).  
Our study follows previous studies, uses changes in annual income and expenditure to measure the 
impact of Islamic MFI financing on rural household welfare. Let us assume iD  is a binary symbol for a 
treatment or programme, which in this study is Islamic MFI financing; 1D   when financing is 
received from an Islamic MFI by subject i  and 0iD   for a non-client subject i . Next, 1iY   and 0iY
are two outcomes (income and expenditure) that are correlated with iD . The aim of the assessment 
is to find the impact of Islamic MFI financing, which is expressed by  i  for subject i ; the true impact 
of the financing will be (Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007): 
1 0i i iY Y               (4.1) 
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The issue in evaluating the true impact is basically a missing data problem because the same subject 
cannot be observed in both client and non-client states at the same time. In other words, it is not 
possible to examine 1iY  and 0iY for the same subject (Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007). This problem 
occurs in both experimental and non-experimental assessment methods (Heckman & Smith, 1995). 
The observed outcome for each subject i  can be described as follows: 
1 0(1 )i i i iY DY D Y                                    (4.2) 
Where iY  is either 1iY  or 0iY  and the observed outcome is called ‘counterfactual’ (Li, 2010; Perry & 
Maloney, 2007). 
A statistical technique is used in impact evaluation studies to substitute for the missing data. The use 
of group means or other group statistics in the substitution can alternate for the missing data for 
individual subjects (Li, 2010). The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) framework is the 
most popular framework in impact evaluation (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Firpo, 2007; Hirano, Imbens, & 
Ridder, 2003; Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007). The ATT framework is about the expected gain (or 
loss) by individuals who received the treatment compared with individuals who did not receive the 
treatment (in a counterfactual situation) (Heckman & Smith, 1995; Perry & Maloney, 2007).  
In this case, the true effect of the Islamic MFI financing impact is (Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007): 
1 0( 1) ( 1) ( 1)i i i i i iE D E Y D E Y D                                                                                   (4.3) 
As it is not feasible to examine 0iY  for those who become clients of Islamic MFIs, we can use it from 
the non-clients of Islamic MFI and the assumption is (Perry & Maloney, 2007): 
1 0( 1) ( 0)i i i iE Y D E Y D           (4.4) 
The estimate of ATT is then (Perry & Maloney, 2007): 
1 0( 1) ( 1) ( 0)i i i i i iE D E Y D E Y D            (4.5) 
Following the framework of the treatment and control groups, our study evaluates the impact of 
Islamic MFI financing by comparing the average net rural household outcome (annual income and 
expenditure) between rural households that join and receive financing from Islamic MFIs 
(client/treatment group) and rural households that did not join nor receive financing from Islamic 
MFIs (non-client/control group).   
 62 
4.2.2 Selection bias issues 
Selection bias can occur in impact assessment. This would influence the reliability of the impact 
estimation (Li et al., 2011b). The selection bias problem arises when there are unobserved factors 
that influence the participation of both groups of individuals (clients and non-clients) (Li, 2010; Perry 
& Maloney, 2007). The ATT framework depends heavily on the assumption that non-client and client 
outcomes are the same (Perry & Maloney, 2007). If we use the non-client outcome to represent the 
outcome of non-participating clients, it can be expressed by the following equation (Heckman, 1997; 
Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007): 
1 0( 1) ( 0)i i i iE Y D E Y D    
     1 0 0 0( 1) [ ( 1) ( 0)]i i i i i i iE Y Y D E Y D E Y D        
     0 0( 1) [ ( 1) ( 0)]i i i i i iE D E Y D E Y D            (4.6) 
Based on equation (4.6), if 0 0[ ( 1) ( 0)]i i i iE Y D E Y D    is zero then ( 1)i iE D   will be an 
unbiased estimator for the impact of ATT; if otherwise, then ATT is biased and selection bias will 
occur (Heckman & Smith, 1995; Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007). A correctly formed control group is 
essential and this is a major challenge in the study with a treatment/control framework (Heckman & 
Smith, 1995; Li, 2010; Perry & Maloney, 2007).     
To evaluate the potential bias, we can use the following equation (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010):  
ij M ij M j ijM X V             (4.7) 
ij Y ij Y j Y ij ijY X V M                                                                                                           (4.8) 
Where ijM  is rural household i  receiving finance from an Islamic MFI (client) in village j ; ijX  is the 
rural household characteristics (vector); V  is the village attributes (vector) and the investigated rural 
household outcome is denoted by ijY (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010). The errors representing unmeasured 
rural household and village characteristics for clients that received finance from Islamic MFIs and the 
outcomes are denoted by ij  and ij , respectively (Coleman, 1999). The correlation between ij  
and ij  will lead to selection bias; the impact estimate Y  will be biased if the correlation between 
the two errors is not taken into account (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010).   
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Selection bias can occur because: of (1) non-random programme placement, and (2) rural 
households’ self-selection into the programme (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010). Non-random programme 
placement refers to the non-random programme placement of Islamic MFIs based on the observed 
and unobserved characteristics of the areas (Li, 2010). Selection bias may arise when comparing rural 
households (clients) from existing Islamic MFI villages and rural households (non-clients) (Li, 2010). 
For instance, if one village is observed as better organized, having more leaders (unmeasured village 
characteristics) and these criteria are used to determine programme placement, then a correlation 
between ij  and ij will occur (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010). 
The rural households’ self-selection means that rural households decided whether they will join and 
receive finance from an Islamic MFI (Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010). The “self-selection” to join the 
institution is based on people’s perceptions of Islamic MFIs (Li, 2010). This condition will lead to a 
correlation between ij  and ij  because the household characteristics that led them to join an 
Islamic MFI may not be perfectly controlled (Li, 2010).       
Table 4.1 Methods to address the problem of error correlation. 
Method Description Weaknesses 
Instrumental 
variables 
Identifying instruments that will be 
variables to include as regressors in 
the programme equation  
Difficult to determine the correct variables 
Panel data Using data from the two periods (at 
least), to get reliable estimates by 
differencing the impact of 
“unobserved factors” 
Time-consuming and costly 
Error 
distribution 
Assuming normal error distribution, 
impact of treatment or programme 
determined by calculating the 
deviation from normality of 
outcome in the treatment group 
Generally, no good basis to make 
assumptions, highly sensitive results 
(related with error distribution), the 
treatment impact identification sometimes 
is impossible (in the case of censored 
dependent variables) 
Sources: Li (2010); Coleman (1999). 
 
There are three method used in order to address the correlation of ij  and ij . They are: (1) 
instrumental variables; (2) panel data; and (3) assuming a normal error distribution (see Table 4.1) 
(Coleman, 1999). The first method to mitigate selection bias is to use instrumental variables as this 
method uses exogenous variables to be incorporated in equation (4.7) as regressors but not in 
equation (4.8). The problem is that it is difficult to determine the variables to include in the equation 
(Coleman, 1999; Li, 2010). The second method to mitigate selection bias is to use a panel data model 
(a minimum of two periods) observation of the same set of household characteristics. The problem 
with this method is that it is time-consuming and costly (Coleman, 1999; Li et al., 2011b). The third 
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method is to assume an error distribution of the outcome variable without treatment is always the 
normal distribution. The problem with this method is that it is highly sensitive to results, which is not 
a good basis on which to make assumptions and it is sometimes impossible to identify the treatment 
effect (Coleman, 1999). We use the second method because of the problems with the first and third 
methods as given in Table 4.1. 
4.2.3 Empirical framework 
In our study, the difference-in-difference (DID) technique is used to measure the impact of Islamic 
MFIs financing. This is a popular panel data method in economics to identify the impact of 
treatments in the absence of pure experimental data (Athey & Imbens, 2006; Lee, 2016; Li et al., 
2011b). The method requires two periods, one before treatment and one after treatment (Lee, 
2016). The first group in this study is the clients’ group that consists of rural households that become 
clients and receive financing from Islamic MFIs. The second group is rural households (non-clients) 
that did not receive financing from Islamic MFIs (Athey & Imbens, 2006; Li et al., 2011b).      
The standard DID model is illustrated by the following regression equation: 
iititit MPdY   100 2              (4.9) 
Where itY  is a rural household outcome in natural logarithm form for rural household i  at period t . 
Rural household annual income and expenditure are examples of household outcomes. The time 
dummy variable is represented by td2  which equals 1 if 2t  means the post-financing period (1) 
and equals 0 if 1t  means the pre-financing period (0). iP  is a group dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the rural household i  is a client and obtained finance from Islamic MFIs and 0 otherwise. itM  is an 
interaction between td2  and iP , which is equal to 1 if the rural household i obtains finance, is a 
client of an Islamic MFI and the observation takes place in the post financing period, 0 otherwise (Li 
et al., 2011b).  
This study follows the framework in Kondo et al. (2008) and Li et al. (2011b) with an adjusted 
standard DID model adding the area/village attributes, and observable rural household 
characteristics with fixed effect estimation. Fixed effect is used in this study because the household 
specific effect is more than the individual effect. Fixed effect is also used to control for unmeasured 
household and village attributes, which can resolve selection bias at the household and village levels 
(Islam & Harris, 2008; Li et al., 2011b).    
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The adjusted DID model is: 
itititittit uhMXdY   200                 (4.10)  
Where itX   is the rural household characteristic, in this study, we used major loss over (ML) that is, 
the loss experienced by rural households during the financing period that affected their income and 
expenditure (e.g., a natural disaster or crop failure). itM  is the treatment variable that refers to 
financing from Islamic MFIs, ith  is rural households’ fixed effects, that is, unobserved individual or 
specific effects, itu  is idiosyncratic error, 0  is time suffered for both groups (treatment and 
control),   is the main parameter that explains Islamic MFIs’ financing impact on rural households’ 
welfare, itY  is the same as in equation (4.9) (Abadie, 2005; Athey & Imbens, 2006; Li et al., 2011b). 
4.3 Evaluating shari’a compliance and Islamic values 
Research objective 2 examines shari’a compliance and the implementation of values by Islamic MFIs. 
To answer this objective, this study investigated the procedures and mechanisms of the schemes 
based on the literature and standards from national shari’a board of Indonesia and compared them 
with the existing implementation of the schemes. Table 4.2 lists the common schemes in Islamic MFIs 
and highlights the procedures and mechanisms in the literature and standards. 
The shari’a compliance investigation is based on the two main financing schemes, PLS and non-PLS. 
This study asked respondents about the shari’a compliance of Islamic MFIs’ schemes based on the 
eight schemes displayed in Table 4.2. The shari’a compliance is crucial in Islamic MFIs and, at the 
micro level, the probability of violation of shari’a standards is higher (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008). 
Evaluation of shari’a compliance in Islamic MFIs’ schemes was conducted through a survey 
questionnaire with a five point Likert Scale. The survey asked the clients their experience of the 
financing they received. The purpose of the assessment was to identify whether Islamic MFIs comply 
with the schemes’ guidance based on the literature and the standards set by the National Shari’a 
Board of Indonesia.   
Shari’a standards are divided into two financing groups: PLS and non-PLS schemes. Respondents 
answered the statement based on the financing scheme that they received. The shari’a standards 
derived from the literature and the National Shari’a Board of Indonesia are given below.   
 
  
 66 
Table 4.2 Schemes in Islamic MFIs. 
No Types Schemes Procedure and Mechanism 
1 
Profit and Loss 
Sharing (PLS) 
contracts 
Mudharabah  • Funding 100% from Islamic MFIs 
• Clients provide the skill 
• Profits are shared at a fixed ratio; losses 
are borne by IMFIs 
2 Musharakah • Both parties contribute to the equity 
• Profits are shared in an agreed ratio 
• Losses are shared based on equity 
participation 
3 Muzara’ah • Islamic MFIs provide the land 
• Clients provide the labour 
• Crops are divided between Islamic MFIs 
and clients based on an agreed portion 
• Distribution of income at the end of the 
season 
4 Muzaqat • Both parties contribute to the equity  
• The harvest is shared based on equity 
participation 
5 
 
Non-Profit and Loss 
Sharing (non-PLS) 
contracts 
 
Murabahah • Islamic MFIs sell goods to the clients after 
they mark-up the price 
• Payment is based on instalments 
• Real costs of the goods and profit are 
disclosed 
6 Bai’ salam • Islamic MFIs act as a seller and buyer for 
agricultural goods 
• Quality, quantity, price, and time of 
delivery are determined at the beginning 
of the contract 
• This scheme can be combined with other 
possible schemes, e.g., murabahah 
7 Ijarah wa itiqna’ • Islamic MFIs lease the goods with a 
purchase option at the end of the 
contract  
• A portion of the regular payment is 
applied to purchase the goods 
• The goods are transferred to the clients 
at the end of the period 
8 Qard al-hasanah • Zero return on loan  
• Administration and transaction costs are 
permissible 
Sources: (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Shahinpoor, 2009); (Obaidullah, 2008). 
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The shari’a standard for PLS schemes (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Shahinpoor, 2009; The Council of 
Indonesian Ulama, 2013): 
Mudharabah 
1. Islamic MFIs contribute 100% of the capital and clients contribute the effort. 
2. Losses are borne by the Islamic MFI as long as there is no fraud or negligence by the client. 
Musharakah 
1. A guarantee is not compulsory in this scheme. 
2. Any loss is borne by both parties (Islamic MFI and client) based on the capital contribution. 
Muzaqat 
1. The Islamic MFI and client contribute equity in the orchard sector. 
2. The harvest is shared based on the equity participation. 
Muzara’ah 
1. The Islamic MFI and client contribute equity in the orchard sector. 
2. The harvest is shared based on the equity participation. 
 
The shari’a standard for non-PLS schemes (Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Shahinpoor, 2009; The 
Council of Indonesian Ulama, 2013): 
Murabahah 
1. Ownership of the goods or assets belongs to the Islamic MFI before the transaction (before goods 
are sold to the clients). 
2. Islamic MFIs always disclose the cost of goods and their margin before proceeding to a sale and 
purchase agreement. 
Salam 
1. Before the transaction, Islamic MFIs and clients always discuss and agree on the quality, quantity, 
and delivery time of the goods. 
2. Payment from Islamic MFIs is made at the time the contract was agreed, delivery of the goods 
from clients is at a later date. 
Ijarah 
1. Clients of Islamic MFIs have to take an Ijarah (leasing) contract first before proceeding to an Ijarah 
wa iqtina’ contract. 
2. There is no requirement from Islamic MFIs to buy the goods at the end of the Ijarah (leasing) 
period.   
Qard 
1. Islamic MFIs do not ask for any benefit from the loan/financing. 
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2. Islamic MFIs always consider rescheduling or writing off the loan/financing if clients have difficulty 
in repaying the loan/financing. 
 
For the Islamic values’ assessment, this study developed a survey questionnaire based on the study 
by Rahman and Ahmad (2010). The Islamic values’ evaluation in this study is divided into four parts: 
(1) the influence of clients’ beliefs in their financial decision; (2) the implementation of clients’ beliefs 
in their daily lives; (3) clients’ opinions on shari’a compliance; and (4) clients’ financing experiences 
(see Appendix D). 
The Islamic values assessment was conducted only for Islamic MFIs clients and was based on the 
clients’ opinions and their financing mechanism experiences. The aim of this assessment was to 
identify the Islamic MFI clients’ level of Islamic values and which type of client (PLS or non-PLS) has 
better Islamic values.  
4.4 Assessing and comparing the impact of PLS and non-PLS financing on 
rural household welfare  
4.4.1 Conceptual framework 
There are very few empirical studies that have investigated the two financing groups in Islamic MFIs: 
PLS and non-PLS financing, especially their impacts on rural household welfare. It is difficult to 
identify which financing mechanism is better and with more benefits for the recipients. There is still 
debate among Islamic finance scholars about which financing mechanism is better, PLS or non-PLS, 
and there is limited study with evidence about which is better. Therefore, it is important to conduct 
an empirical study to identify which of the two financing mechanism has more advantages for the 
recipients.  
Previous studies, such as those of Dusuki (2006), Asutay (2007), Azmat et al. (2015), Ibrahim and 
Mirakhor (2014),  believe that PLS schemes represent the true spirit of Islamic finance and an ideal 
financing scheme. PLS financing also distinguishes Islamic finance from conventional financing. 
However, the studies did not provide sufficient evidence that PLS is better than non-PLS. An 
empirical study based on an impact measurement used in this study can identify which of the two 
financing schemes has a better impact on rural household welfare. Changes in income and 
expenditure are used as the indicator of impact measurement.    
4.4.2 Empirical framework 
The double DID method is used to estimate the impact of PLS and non-PLS financing in order to 
distinguish which financing method has the greater impact on rural household welfare.   
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The standard and adjusted DID model equations are similar to equations (4.9) and (4.10). The 
standard DID model for PLS financing is:  
iititit MPdY   100 2                                                                                           (4.11)  
The standard DID model for non-PLS financing is:  
iititit MPdY   100 2        (4.12) 
Where itY  is rural household outcome in natural logarithm form for rural household i  at period t . 
The rural household annual income and expenditure are examples of household outcomes. The time 
dummy variable is represented by td2  which equals 1 if 2t  means the post-PLS financing period 
and equals 0 if 1t  means the pre-PLS financing period. iP  is a group dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the rural household i  is a client and obtained PLS finance from an Islamic MFI and 0 otherwise. itM  
is an interaction between td2  and iP , which is equal to 1 if the rural household i  obtains PLS 
financing, is a client of an Islamic MFI and the observation takes place in the post PLS financing 
period, 0 otherwise (Li et al., 2011b). Equation (4.12) is similar to equation (4.11) except that non-PLS 
financing is used instead of PLS financing.   
The adjusted DID model for PLS financing is:  
itititittit uhMXdY   200       (4.13) 
The adjusted DID model for non-PLS financing is:  
itititittit uhMXdY   200       (4.14) 
Where itX  is the rural household’s characteristics, in this study, we used major loss (ML), which is 
the loss experienced by rural households during the PLS financing period that affected their incomes 
and expenditures (e.g., natural disaster or crop failure). itM  is the treatment variable that refers to 
PLS financing from Islamic MFIs, ith  is rural households’ fixed effects, that is, unobserved households’ 
individual or specific effects, itu  is idiosyncratic error, 0  is time suffered for both groups (treatment 
and control),   is the main parameter that explains Islamic MFIs’ PLS financing impact on rural 
households’ welfare, itY  is the same as in equations (4.11) and (4.12) (Abadie, 2005; Athey & 
Imbens, 2006; Li et al., 2011b). Equation (4.14) is similar to equation (4.13) except that non-PLS 
financing is used instead of PLS financing.   
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4.5 Factors that influence rural household to become client of Islamic MFI  
4.5.1 Conceptual framework 
Factors that determine if rural households become clients of Islamic MFIs can be defined in terms of 
the rural households’ characteristics. The desire to become a client and access Islamic MFIs’ financing 
can be derived from the rural households’ characteristics and the attributes that influence their 
choice (Phan, 2012). Diagne and Zeller (2001) indicate that rural households are characterised as 
resource-poor, or only require borrowing small loans, and prefer to access informal or semi-formal 
methods rather than formal credit institutions. While rural households with good economic 
circumstances may access formal credit more easily because they can meet the formal lending 
requirements, such as providing collateral and minimum regular income to pay the instalments 
(Diagne & Zeller, 2001; Li, 2010).   
Rural household characteristics such as income, gender, age, and education, are forecast to influence 
rural households in becoming MFI clients (Li, 2010). In addition, another factor that influences rural 
households to become clients is from the supply side, i.e., from the Islamic MFI, e.g., Umoh (2006) 
argues that financing or lending policies (e.g., financing requirements, financing procedures) of the 
institution (Islamic MFI) can generally influence the desire of a rural household to become a client. 
Furthermore, some unique features of the institutions can restrict rural households from becoming 
Islamic MFI clients; these features include membership requirements, self-selected financing groups, 
and group financing. Other factors, including achieving repayment targets and ensuring institutional 
financial viability, may induce MFIs to refuse to finance rural households who appear to be riskier 
clients (Li, 2010).  
4.5.2 Empirical framework 
The discrete choice model (DCM) is used to analyse the factors that influence Indonesian rural 
households to become Islamic MFI clients. The basic idea of DCM is modelling the choice from a set 
of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternatives (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman (1985) claim that DCM is about utility maximization, which means the selection of an 
alternative by the decision maker that has the highest utility at the time the choice is made. In other 
words, DCM explains the choices made by the decision makers among the alternatives (Train, 2009). 
This brings us to the concept of random utility models where the probability of an alternative i  being 
selected from a set of choices nC  by individual n  is explained by the following equation (Ben-Akiva 
& Lerman, 1985):     
( ) ( , , )n in jn nP i C Pr U U j C                                                                                                                                    (4.15) 
 71 
Where inU  and jnU  denote the utilities that individual n  obtains from alternatives i  and j  (Li, 
2010). In the equation (4.15), we neglect the probability of in jnU U  for any i  and j  in the set of 
choice, especially if the distributions of inU  and jnU  can be defined by a probability density 
function, ( ) 0in jnPr U U   (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). The probability of individual n  selecting 
alternative i  is (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985):       
( ) ( )n in jnP i Pr U U                               (4.16) 
whereas for alternative j  it is (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985): 
( ) 1 ( )n nP j P i                               (4.17) 
Because inU  and jnU  are random variables, we can then divide them into two equations (Ben-Akiva 
& Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010):  
,ininin VU                               (4.18) 
and, 
jnjnjn VU                               (4.19) 
Where inV  and jnV  are the systematic or representative elements of the utility i  and j , while in  
and jn  are the disturbances or random elements (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985). 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) argue that the derivation of any binary choice model is generally clear, 
it assumes different distributions of the two disturbances ( )jn in   and its density function ( )nf   
(Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010).  
The simplest and extensively used discrete choice model is logit because logit is similar to the 
formula of choice probability (Train, 2009). The basic assumption of the logit model is 
)( injnn    which means the difference of the two random components of utility is logistically 
distributed (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010):   
ne
F n  

1
1
)( ,   ,0  -  n          (4.20) 
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Where   is a positive scale parameter; apart from adequately approximating the normal distribution 
it also is analytically convenient in using the logistic distribution (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).   
Under the assumption that n  is logistically distributed, the choice probability for alternative i  is 
(Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010; Train, 2009):  
( ) ( )n in jnP i Pr U U   
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          (4.22) 
Equation (4.22) is a binary logit model, inV  and jnV  are linear parameters (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 
1985): 
inin XV             (4.23) 
jn jnV X                (4.24) 
Where inX  is an observed variable (vector) for alternative i  and for decision maker n ;   is an 
unknown parameter (vector) related to the variables. The logit probability then is given as (Ben-Akiva 
& Lerman, 1985; Li, 2010; Train, 2009): 
jnin
in
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e
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                       (4.25) 
According to Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the parameter   cannot be differentiated from the 
overall scale of s  (in the case of linear-in-parameter utilities). Usually, the assumption is 1 
(Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).  
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Rural households in Indonesia may choose to become Islamic MFI clients or not depending on the 
utilities of the two choices based on the binary choice model (Li, 2010; Umoh, 2006). Therefore, the 
logit model to forecast the probability of rural household n  becoming an Islamic  client is (Li, 2010):  
1 0
1
( 1) ( ) ( 0)
1 nn n n n n X
P Y Pr U U Pr Z
e 
     

                                                           (4.26) 
Where: nY  equals 1 if the rural household is a client of an Islamic MFI and 0 otherwise; and 
nP  is the estimated probability of a rural household becoming a client of an Islamic MFI.  
The analysis in this study focuses on rural households that choose to become clients and receive 
financing from Islamic MFIs. This study uses the reduced form equation (4.27) to identify the 
determinants that influence Indonesian rural households to become clients of Islamic MFIs: 
 CLN = f (AGE, AGE2, GND, HOS, EDU, OFS, ADI, INC, EXP, MRD)           (4.27) 
Table 4.3 Definition of variables used in equation (4.27). 
 
Table 4.3 shows the variables that influence rural households to become Islamic MFI clients using the 
logit model. The dependent variable is client (CLN), which represents the choice of a rural household 
Variable Name Definition 
CLN Dummy variable equal to 1 if a rural household is a client and received 
financing from an Islamic MFI; 0 otherwise  
AGE Age of the head of the rural household (six age groups) 
AGE2 Age squared of the head of the rural household  
GND Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rural householder is male; 0 otherwise 
HOS Size of the rural household (number) 
EDU Dummy variable equal to 1 if a rural household member has middle school 
level education or above; 0 otherwise 
OFS Dummy variable equal to 1 if a rural household member is a government 
officer; 0 otherwise 
ADI Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rural household has additional income; 0 
otherwise 
INC Rural household income (six income groups) 
EXP Rural household expenditure (six expenditure groups) 
MRD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the rural householder is married; 0 otherwise 
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to become an Islamic MFI client. It is a dummy variable with the value ‘1’ if a rural household is a 
client and received finance from an Islamic MFI and ‘0’ otherwise. There are 10 explanatory or 
independent variables in equation (4.31). The first variable is age (AGE); the age of rural households 
were grouped into six categories, because this study wants to identify any relationship between rural 
household age and the choice to become an Islamic MFI client. Previous studies such as Li et al. 
(2011a) and Okurut (2006), used age as an independent variable to identify the accessibility of 
microfinance programmes. The second variable is age squared (AGE2); the aim of this variable is to 
confirm the result of the variable (AGE) because it is possible that Islamic MFIs have certain financing 
requirements in terms of age. This study wanted to identify the influence of age squared on the 
probability of becoming an Islamic MFI client. A previous study by Okurut (2006) found an 
inconclusive relationship of AGE and AGE2 on the accessibility of credit in South Africa. For instance, 
for credit accessibility in a bank, age has a positive and significant impact and age squared is negative 
and significant while for informal credit, the impact of age is negative and age squared is positive, 
with both significant (Okurut, 2006).     
The third variable is gender (GND), which is a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the rural householder is 
male and ‘0’ otherwise. Previous studies on accessibility to microfinance that employed gender in 
their independent variables are Okurut (2006) and Li et al. (2011a). Based on the study by Okurut 
(2006) being male has a negative but insignificant relationship with the access to informal credit, 
implying that there is no discrimination against woman in South Africa. The next variable is rural 
household size (HOS) (a number) to identify whether the size of the rural household influences a 
rural household’s decision to become an Islamic MFI client. A previous study that included household 
size in the explanatory variable is that of Vaessen (2001), who found that household size has a 
positive relationship, implying that a larger household size is more likely to become a client of rural 
credit in Northern Nicaragua. The fifth variable is rural household education (EDU) which is a dummy 
variable equal to ‘1’ if the rural householder has middle school education level or above and equal to 
‘0’ otherwise. Some previous studies, such as those of Vaessen (2001), Okurut (2006), Dzadze et al. 
(2012), and Li et al. (2011a), included education as an independent variable to explain the 
accessibility of microfinance. Studies by Vaessen (2001) and Dzadze et al. (2012) showed that 
education level has a positive and significant relationship with the accessibility of credit.       
The sixth variable is whether a rural household member is a government officer (OFS), which is a 
dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if a rural household member is a government officer and ‘0’ if otherwise. 
Previous studies that identify a relationship of official status to accessibility of microfinance include 
Khoi et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2011a). The study by Khoi et al. (2013) found that being a government 
officer had a positive and significant relationship with accessing formal microcredit in the Mekong 
River Delta of Vietnam. Variable seven is the household which has additional income (ADI), which is a 
 75 
dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if the household has additional income in their family and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. Next is rural household annual income (INC) and expenditure (EXP), this variable is used 
to identify if rural household income and expenditure influence the decision to join an Islamic MFI. 
Some previous studies that used income and expenditure in their independent variables are those of 
Umoh (2006), Khoi et al. (2013), Okurut (2006), and Li et al. (2011a). A study by Li et al. (2011a) found 
that income had a positive and significant relationship with the accessibility of microcredit in China, 
while a study by Okurut (2006) found that household expenditure had a positive relationship with 
bank accessibility in South Africa.   The final explanatory variable is rural household marital status 
(MRD), which is equal to ‘1’ if the rural household has married members and ‘0’ otherwise.         
4.6 Factors that influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFIs  
4.6.1 Sampling method 
This study investigates formal Islamic MFIs that are under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs of the Republic of Indonesia (MoCMSMEs). Formal Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia include the Islamic Financial Services Cooperatives (KJKS) and the Islamic Financial Services 
Units (UJKS). These institutions are directly supervised by the Indonesian government.  
The target population was clients of formal Islamic MFIs in Indonesia and there are approximately 
762,000 clients (Sugianto, 2012). This study focused on rural households that are clients and non-
clients30 of formal Islamic MFIs in East Java. Based on statistics from the Ministry of Cooperation and 
SMEs of the Republic of Indonesia, 48% of formal MFIs in Indonesia are in Java, with 29.59% in East 
Java (Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia, 2013).    
This study used the Yamane Taro sample formula to determine the study sample size (Israel (1992). 
The sample size formula for an unknown population is n0 = Z2pq/ e2 and for a finite population is n = 
n0/ (1 + ((n0 - 1) / N)). For the two formulas, n0 is the sample size before considering the population; Z 
is the confidence interval of the normal distribution; p is the variation of variable interest; e is the 
margin of error; and N is the size of the population. This study used a 95% confidence interval (Z = 
1.96), p = 0.5, e = 0.05 and N = 762,000. Based on these assumptions and population, we obtained a 
sample size of 384. However, 548 respondents were interviewed to allow for incomplete responses. 
This study interviewed rural households using the convenience sampling method. Convenience 
sampling was used in this study because it is difficult to obtain a complete mailing list of Islamic MFIs’ 
clients and non-clients. The method is also suited to identifying respondents appropriate for the 
study (Quinlan, 2011). 
                                                          
30 This study includes non-clients (the rural households that are not clients and did not get financing from 
Islamic MFIs) to form a control group for the difference in difference (DID) method. 
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The data on the income and expenditure of rural households before and after joining an Islamic MFI 
were obtained through an interview (primary data). There were 548 interviewees from four Islamic 
MFIs in East Java, Indonesia. The respondents were personally interviewed; the usable data 
comprised 429 responses (78.28% response rate). These data were used to answer objectives one, 
two, and four but for objective three, which assesses and compares the impact of the PLS and non-
PLS financing mechanisms, the data came from 414 usable responses (75.54% response rate).  
This study interviewed rural household members using convenience sampling because it is difficult to 
obtain a complete mailing list of Islamic MFIs’ clients. There is no reliable database of Islamic MFIs 
and their clients are either from the government or financial authorities of Indonesia. The technique 
is also suited to finding respondents who are suitable for the research (Quinlan, 2011). The samples 
were selected from four Islamic MFIs in East Java, Indonesia. East Java comprises 29 regencies and 9 
cities; the samples in this study were from three regencies in East Java.  
This study used data on Islamic MFIs’ clients who started their financing at the end of 2013 and this 
timing is to address the issue of Ashenfelter’s dip. Ashenfelter’s dip, sometimes called a ‘pre-
programme dip’ is defined as a drop or decline in earnings of individuals or households before a 
programme started which compromises the DID  results (Heckman & Smith, 1999). It is suggested 
that the existence of Ashenfelter’s dip should be addressed when employing a DID model. To solve 
the problem of Ashenfelter’s dip, Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2005) suggest not using 
individual or household earnings data that are close to the start of the programme or treatment. 
Therefore, this study used data of the income and expenditure of respondents from a year before 
the treatment started, which was in 2012 (pre-treatment period). The income and expenditure data 
in 2014 are from the post-treatment period.         
4.6.2 Survey instruments 
This study used a structured survey questionnaire to answer the four research objectives. The 
structured questionnaire consisted of eight sections with the first section investigating rural 
household accessibility and the characteristics of microfinance in general. The second section 
focused on general information about Islamic MFIs; client financing (PLS and non-PLS). Section three 
gathered data about non-clients. Section four focused on questions of rural household wealth 
(clients and non-clients). The fifth section focused on shari’a compliance and Islamic values questions 
for the clients. Section six gathered data about clients with PLS and non-PLS financing. Section seven 
explored the programmes and assistance provided by the government and finally, the eighth section 
contained information on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of rural households. 
The questionnaire was submitted to the Human Ethics Committee (Lincoln University) before being 
administered to the respondents.   
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A random pilot test with a sample of 15 rural households in East Java was conducted before 
administering the survey. This pilot test was carried out to obtain feedback to improve the content of 
the questionnaire. This included testing the constructs, measures and reliability. The survey was 
personally administered between December 2014 and February 2015. The total population in East 
Java was about 38.36 million in 2013 (Jawa Timur Population, 2013; Ministry of Forestry of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 2011). East Java was chosen for the study site because about 48% of formal 
MFIs are in the area (Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia, 2013). 
4.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the research framework and literature of the research methodology used in 
this study. The research framework shows the focus in this study which is to cover four objectives: 
the impact of financing; shari’a compliance; best financing mechanisms; and the determinant factors 
that influence rural households to receive financing from Islamic MFI. The chapter then provided a 
conceptual and empirical framework of an impact assessment method especially on an ATT 
framework which is the popular framework for impact evaluation. The popular panel data methods 
in economics to identify the impact of treatment i.e., DID and the fixed effect regression were also 
discussed in this chapter.  
Next, this chapter also provided the shari’a standards, especially the standards set by the National 
shari’a board of Indonesia which include four schemes under PLS financing mechanisms and four 
schemes under non-PLS. in regard to identifying the ideal financing mechanism (between PLS and 
non-PLS) which has the more positive impact on rural households’ welfare, this chapter discussed 
some previous studies that have been done in comparing these two financing mechanisms. This 
chapter then elaborated the double DID and double fixed effect regression to investigate the impact 
of the two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs on rural households’ welfare.   
To identify factors that influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFI, this chapter 
discussed the DCM and logit models used in this study in order to investigate determinant factors in 
accessing financing from Islamic MFI. The dataset and survey instruments were also discussed in this 
chapter.         
            
 
 
 78 
Chapter 5 
Research Results and Findings 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings of the impact of financing by Islamic MFIs on the 
Indonesian rural households’ welfare; the evaluation of shari’a compliance; the investigation of the 
impact of two financing mechanisms by Islamic MFIs and their impact on Indonesia’s rural 
households’ welfare; and the determining factors that influence Indonesia’s rural households’ 
decisions to become clients of the Islamic MFIs. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 
describes the characteristics of the respondents and clients of Islamic MFIs. The characteristics of the 
respondents include clients and non-clients of Islamic MFIs and the characteristics of clients cover 
the clients with profit and loss sharing (PLS), non-PLS and mixed schemes. Section 5.2 discusses the 
estimated results of the welfare impact model. Section 5.3 evaluates shari’a compliance and 
discusses the Islamic values of Islamic MFIs’ clients. Section 5.4 explains, compares, and contrasts the 
estimated welfare impact results on the clients of PLS and non-PLS finance schemes. Section 5.5 
discusses the estimated results of the factors that influence Indonesia’s rural households to become 
Islamic MFI clients. Section 5.6 presents the chapter summary.  
5.1 Characteristics of respondents and clients of Islamic MFIs  
5.1.1 Characteristics of respondents  
This section discusses the characteristics of the surveyed respondents, both clients and non-clients of 
Islamic MFIs (PLS and non-PLS). The characteristics includes demographic and socio-economic 
attributes of the respondents. The descriptive analysis includes Chi-square and t-tests with a total of 
429 respondents, consisting of 140 non-clients and 289 clients.  
Table 5.1 summarises the general characteristics of the surveyed respondents. The sample comprises 
185 females (43.1%) and 244 males (56.9%). Most of the rural household heads in the clients group 
are men (184 respondents (63.7%)); women heads of households comprise 105 respondents (36.3%). 
The result shows a significant difference in gender between the client and non-client groups of 
Islamic MFIs (χ2 = 16.653, significant at the 1% level). This means the distribution of clients and non-
clients is strongly associated with gender.   
The respondents were grouped into six age categories; the dominant respondents’ age group is 36-
45 years (32.9%); only a few respondents were aged over 66 (3%). In the clients’ group, a substantial 
proportion of clients were in the 36-45 years of age category (37.7%); the dominant non-client 
respondents were in the 26-35 years of age category (36.4%). The average age of clients and non-
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clients of Islamic MFIs was significantly different at the 1% level. With regard to marital status, most 
respondents were married (93%), 4.7% were single, 2.1% divorced and 0.2% in a de facto 
relationship. In the client and non-client groups, most respondents were married, 95.5% and 87.9%, 
respectively. 
In terms of the religion, Muslims dominated in both the client (98.6%) and non-client groups (97.9%). 
This is because Indonesia is the largest Muslim country with 87% of its population Muslim. However, 
there was small portion of non-Muslim respondents in the client group; there were three Protestants 
(1%) and one Roman Catholic (0.3%). The Chi-square test shows no significant difference in religion 
between the client and non-client groups, which means that the distribution of clients and non-
clients was not associated with religion. Table 5.1 shows the great majority of the respondents had 
obtained some form of education (about 97%). The client group with high school level (40.5%) is 
slightly higher than that of the non-client group (39.3%). Conversely, the client group with primary 
school (19.7%) is slightly smaller than the non-client group (23.6%). The Chi-square test shows there 
is no significant difference in education level between clients and non-clients.  
With regard to occupation, the occupation category in the client group is ‘small entrepreneur’ 
(37.7%), followed by crop farming (27.3%) and ‘other’ occupation (12.1%). In the non-client group, 
‘other’ is dominant (32.1%) followed by small entrepreneur (30%) and crop farming (20.7%). When 
the respondents were asked to specify the other occupation, most of them answered, an employee 
in a private company. The Chi-square test shows there is a significant difference in occupation 
category between the client and non-client groups (χ2 = 33.824, significant at the 1% level). This 
means that the distribution of clients and non-clients is highly associated with their occupation. In 
addition, based on the work experience of the surveyed respondents, the results show that the 
majority of the respondents have been working in their current job/activity for over 10 years (clients, 
49.8%, non-clients, 51.4%). The difference between the means is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This means that work experience also influenced the distribution of clients and non-clients.   
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Table 5.1 Demographic profile of the surveyed respondents. 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Coun
t 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Demographic        
Gender       
χ2 = 
16.653*** 
Female 80 57.1 105 36.3 185 43.1 
Male 60 42.9 184 63.7 244 56.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Age       
χ2 = 
41.625*** 
18 – 25 15 10.7 10 3.5 25 5.8 
26 – 35 51 36.4 52 18.0 103 24.0 
36 – 45 32 22.9 109 37.7 141 32.9 
46 – 55 17 12.1 83 28.7 100.0 23.3 
56 – 65 20 14.3 27 9.3 47 11.0 
Over 66 5 3.6 8 2.8 13 3.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Marital status       
χ2 = 
10.041** 
Single 12 8.6 8 2.8 20 4.7 
Married 123 87.9 276 95.5 399 93.0 
De facto relationship 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.2 
Divorced/Separated 5 3.6 4 1.4 9 2.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Religion       
χ2 = 1.313 
Islam 137 97.9 285 98.6 422 98.4 
Protestant 3 2.1 3 1.0 6 1.4 
Roman Catholic 0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.2 
Hindu 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Buddhist 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Education level       
χ2 = 5.949 
No education 2 1.4 8 2.8 10 2.3 
Primary school 33 23.6 57 19.7 90 21.0 
Middle school 29 20.7 79 27.3 108 25.2 
High school 55 39.3 117 40.5 172 40.1 
Three-year college 7 5.0 7 2.4 14 3.3 
Bachelor degree 13 9.3 20 6.9 33 7.7 
Postgraduate 1 0.7 1 0.3 2 0.5 
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Occupation       
χ2 = 
33.824*** 
Crop farming 29 20.7 79 27.3 108 25.2 
Livestock raising 1 0.7 20 6.9 21 4.9 
Fishery 1 0.7 1 0.3 2 0.5 
Produce processing 0 0.0 3 1.0 3 0.7 
Daily wage labourer 14 10.0 24 8.3 38 8.9 
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Table 5.1 Demographic profile of the surveyed respondents (cont.). 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Demographic        
Small entrepreneur 42 30.0 109 37.7 151 35.2 
 
Government worker 6 4.3 16 5.5 22 5.1 
Retired 2 1.4 2 0.7 4 0.9 
Unemployed 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other 45 32.1 35 12.1 80 18.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Work experience       
χ2 = 
21.084*** 
Less than 1 year 3 2.1 2 0.7 5 1.2 
1 to 5 years 38 27.1 38 13.1 76 17.7 
5 to 10 years 27 19.3 105 36.3 132 30.8 
10 years and above 72 51.4 144 49.8 216 50.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Structure of household       
χ2 = 
46.366*** 
Single adult living alone 1 0.7 1 0.3 2 0.5 
Couple, with child (or 
children) 
77 55.0 246 85.1 323 75.3 
Couple, without child 6 4.3 3 1.0 9 2.1 
Single parent, with child (or 
children) 
16 11.4 11 3.8 27 6.3 
Immediate and extended 
family members 
9 6.4 7 2.4 16 3.7 
Other 31 22.1 21 7.3 52 12.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of children       
χ2 = 
32.630*** 
None 19 13.6 9 3.1 28 6.5 
1 41 29.3 48 16.6 89 20.7 
2 46 32.9 110 38.1 156 36.4 
3 20 14.3 77 26.6 97 22.6 
4 13 9.3 39 13.5 52 12.1 
More than 4 1 0.7 6 2.1 7 1.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of male 
children 
      
χ2 = 5.964 
None 49 35.0 85 29.4 134 31.2 
1 53 37.9 127 43.9 180 42.0 
2 30 21.4 57 19.7 87 20.3 
3 7 5.0 16 5.5 23 5.4 
4 0 0.0 4 1.4 4 0.9 
More than 4 1 0.7 0 0.0 1 0.2 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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The survey data (Table 5.1) also show the respondents’ household structure; most respondents are in 
the group “couple with child” (75.3%). This is true for the client (85.1%) and non-client (55%) groups. 
The Chi-square test indicates there is a significant difference at the 1% level between the client and 
non-client groups for this demographic characteristic. In terms of the number of children in the 
household, the dominant category for the respondents is two children (36.4%). It is the same for the 
client (38.1%) and non-client (32.9%) groups. The Chi-square test for the number of children is also 
significant at the 1% level between the two groups. This means that the distribution of clients and 
non-clients is associated with household structure and number of children. The number of male 
children in the family is also shown in Table 5.1; the dominant category is one male child (42%), 
followed with none (31.2%) and two male children (20.3%). A similar pattern is evident in the client 
group (43.9%, 29.4%, and 19.7%) and non-client group (37.9%, 35%, and 21.4%). The Chi-square test 
suggests no significant difference between the client and non-client groups. Therefore, the number 
of male children in the family is not associated with the distribution of clients and non-clients  
The average household size of the respondents is three or four family members, only fewer than 5% 
have six or more members. Table 5.2 shows the client (51.6%) and non-client (50%) groups have the 
same number in the family, three to four family members. The t-test does not indicate a significant 
difference between the two groups. The number of income earners is divided into four groups. Based 
on the data, the majority of the total respondents are in the one to two income earners group 
(93.9%). There is a slight difference for the client and non-client groups. In the client group, 95.2% of 
the respondents are in the one to two income earners, but in the non-client group 91.4% are in the 
same income earner group. Only 0.5% of the total respondents have over six income earners in their 
household. The t-test does not suggest a significant difference between the client and non-client 
groups. This implies that there is no association between income earners in the household and the 
distribution of clients and non-clients.  
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Table 5.2 Socio-economic profile of the survey respondents. 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Socio-Economic        
Household size       
t = 1.542 
1 – 2 14 10.0 13 4.5 27 6.3 
3 – 4 70 50.0 149 51.6 219 51.0 
5 – 6 50 35.7 113 39.1 163 38.0 
Over 6 6 4.3 14 4.8 20 4.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mean 4.19  4.42     
Income earners in 
household 
      
t = -1.842 
1 – 2 128 91.4 275 95.2 403 93.9 
3 – 4 12 8.6 12 4.2 24 5.6 
5 – 6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Over 6 0 0.0 2 0.7 2 0.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Mean 1.64  1.52     
Expenditure       
χ2 = 
21.415*** 
 
Less than  
Rp. 12,000,000 
39 27.9 44 15.2 83 19.3 
Between  
Rp. 12,000,001 and Rp. 
15,000,000 
28 20.0 33 11.4 61 14.2 
Between  
Rp. 15,000,001 and Rp. 
20,000,000 
30 21.4 65 22.5 95 22.1 
Between  
Rp. 20,000,001 and Rp. 
25,000,000 
10 7.1 36 12.5 46 10.7 
Between  
Rp. 25,000,001 and Rp. 
30,000,000 
13 9.3 46 15.9 59 13.8 
Over  
Rp. 30,000,000 
20 14.3 65 22.5 85 19.8 
 
Total   100.0  100.0  100.0  
Any person working as a 
government official 
      
χ2 = 0.234 No 128 91.4 260 90.0 388 90.4 
Yes 12 8.6 29 10.0 41 9.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Decision making       
χ2 = 
23.004*** 
Husband 37 26.4 134 46.4 171 39.9 
Wife 20 14.3 13 4.5 33 7.7 
Both 83 59.3 142 49.1 225 52.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 5.2 Socio-economic profile of the survey respondents (cont.). 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Socio-Economic        
Food expenditure       
χ2 = 
23.492*** 
20%-30% 12 8.6 12 4.2 24 5.6 
30%-40% 17 12.1 42 14.5 59 13.8 
40%-50% 32 22.9 82 28.4 114 26.6 
50%-60% 30 21.4 91 31.5 121 28.2 
60%-70% 22 15.7 44 15.2 66 15.4 
Over 70% 27 19.3 18 6.2 45 10.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Health expenditure       
χ2 = 
15.468*** 
Less than Rp. 1,000,000 121 86.4 213 73.7 334 77.9 
Between Rp. 1,000,001 and 
Rp. 2,000,000 
7 5.0 45 15.6 52 12.1 
Between Rp. 2,000,001 and 
Rp. 3,000,000 
4 2.9 18 6.2 22 5.1 
Between Rp. 3,000,001 and 
Rp. 4,000,000 
2 1.4 6 2.1 8 1.9 
Between Rp. 4,000,001 and 
Rp. 5,000,000 
1 0.7 0 0.0 1 0.2 
Over Rp. 5,000,000 5 3.6 7 2.4 12 2.8  
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Farm size       
χ2 = 6.025 
Less than 0.1 hectare 22 15.7 42 14.5 64 14.9 
Between 0.1 – 0.5 hectare 28 20.0 87 30.1 115 26.8 
Over 0.5 hectare 8 5.7 21 7.3 29 6.8 
Other(s) 82 58.6 139 48.1 221 51.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
The rural household annual income is divided into six levels, less than 12 million IDR, between 12 and 
15 million IDR, between 15 and 20 million IDR, between 20 and 25 million IDR, between 25 and 30 
million IDR, and over 30 million IDR (see Table 5.2). Most of the client group (52.6%) fall into the 
highest income level, over 30 million IDR per year compared with the non-client group (40%). 
Further, 1.4% of the client group is in the lowest income level (less than 12 million IDR), compared 
with 10% of the non-client group, which is significant at the 1% level. This implies that rural 
household annual income contributed significantly to the distribution of clients and non-clients.  
Annual expenditure is also divided into six levels (see Table 5.2); the average annual expenditure of 
the total respondents is 15 to 20 million IDR (22.1%). There are two equal expenditure level 
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categories in the client group, between 15 and 20 million IDR (22.5%) and over 30 million IDR 
(22.5%). The largest non-client annual expenditure category is less than 12 million IDR level (27.9%). 
The difference is significant at the 1% level between the client and non-client groups. This means that 
household annual expenditure also influences the distribution of clients and non-clients.       
In general, most of the surveyed respondents (>90%) are not government officers; only a small 
proportion (9.6%) of the total respondents are government officers. Based on the Chi-square test, 
there is no significant difference between the two groups. Table 5.1 also shows the decision making 
of the household. In the client group, in 49.1% of households, both the husband and wife discuss 
together before making their household decisions compared with 59.3% in the non-client group. 
Only a small proportion (4.5%) of the household decisions is made by the wife in the client group 
compared with 14.3% in the non-client group. The test results show the difference is significant at 
the 1% level between the client and non-client groups. This implies that this variable is associated 
with the distribution of clients and non-clients.    
The food expenditure divided into six categories (in percentage) out of the respondents’ total 
expenditure. The largest category of the total respondents spent 50-60% of their total annual 
expenditure on food (28.2%); only 5.6% spent 20-30% of their expenditure on food. The greatest 
proportion spent on food in the client group is in the 50-60% category and in the non-client group 
the greatest proportion is in the 40% - 50% category. In terms of health expenditure, over two thirds 
of the respondents (both the client or non-client groups) spent less than one million IDR per year, 
which is significantly different at the 1% level between the client and non-client groups. This implies 
that there is an influence on the food and health expenditure of respondents who become Islamic 
MFI clients.    
In terms of farm size and holding status, most of the respondents did not own their own farm 
(51.5%), followed with farm size between 0.1 and 0.5 hectare (26.8%) and 14.9% less than 0.1 
hectare. An identical pattern is also evident in the client and non-client groups. In the client group, 
those who did not own a farm accounted for 48,1%, those who owned a farm between 0.1 and 0.5 
hectare (30.1% ) and less than 0.1 hectare (14.5%). In the non-client group, 58.6% did not own a 
farm, 20% owned a farm between 0.1 and 0.5 hectare and 15.7% owned less than 0.1 hectare. Only 
7.3% of the respondents in the client group had a farm over 0.5 hectare compared with 5.7% in the 
non-client group. There is no significant difference between the two groups based on the Chi-square 
test. This implies farm size is not associated with the distribution of clients and non-clients.    
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Table 5.3 Other characteristics of surveyed respondents. 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Knowing of Islamic MFIs in 
their area 
      
χ2 = 
71.382*** 
No 32 22.9 0 0.0 32 7.5 
Yes 108 77.1 289 100.0 397 92.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Type of Islamic MFI       
- 
(a) Islamic financial services 
cooperatives (KJKS) 
44 40.4 98 33.7 142 35.5 
(b) Islamic financial services 
unit (UJKS) 
0 0.0 1 0.3 1 0.3 
(c) Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil 
(BMT) 
65 59.6 192 66.0 257 64.3 
(d) Others (specify) 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sub Total 109 100.0 291 100.0 400 100.0 
Reason didn't know 
Islamic MFI 
      
- 
(a) Islamic MFIs in my 
township do not promote 
themselves  
10 27.0 - - 10 27.0 
(b) I thought all financial 
institutions are the same 
including Islamic MFIs 
4 10.8 - - 4 10.8 
(c) I do not know if any 
Islamic MFIs exist in my 
township 
20 54.1 - - 20 54.1 
(d) It is not really important 
for me  
3 8.1 - - 3 8.1 
(e) Other (specify) 0 0.0 - - 0 0.0 
Sub Total 37 100.0 - - 37 100.0 
Kind of asset       
- 
(a) Farm land 54 31.2 142 36.1 196 34.6 
(b) Cow/buffalo 9 5.2 22 5.6 31 5.5 
(c) Agricultural tools 24 13.9 94 23.9 118 20.8 
(d) Tractor, machinery 8 4.6 28 7.1 36 6.4 
(e) Fishing net, boat for 
fishing 1 0.6 1 0.3 2 0.4 
(f) Other (specify) 77 44.5 106 27.0 183 32.3 
Sub Total 173 100.0 393 100.0 566 100.0 
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Table 5.3 Other characteristics of surveyed respondents (cont.). 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Own a house       
χ2 = 0.367 
No 1 0.7 4 1.4 5 1.2 
Yes 139 99.3 285 98.6 424 98.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Kind of house       
χ2 = 0.973 
Brick house 140 100.0 287 99.3 427 99.5 
Wooden house 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Makeshift house 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other 0 0.0 2 0.7 2 0.5 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Household assets       
- 
(a) Savings 106 14.4 208 15.9 314 15.4 
(b) Motorcycle 131 17.8 271 20.8 402 19.7 
(c) Bicycle 116 15.7 142 10.9 258 12.6 
(d) Telephone 17 2.3 79 6.0 96 4.7 
(e) Household appliances  137 18.6 278 21.3 415 20.3 
(f) Furniture 135 18.3 261 20.0 396 19.4 
(g) Other (specify) 96 13.0 67 5.1 163 8.0 
Sub Total 738 100.0 1306 100.0 2044 100.0 
Assistance from the 
government 
      
χ2 = 2.013 No 111 79.3 245 84.8 356 83.0 
Yes 29 20.7 44 15.2 73 17.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Kind of assist       
- 
(a) Cash subsidies 12 36.4 18 35.3 30 35.7 
(b) Inputs of agricultural 
production 5 15.2 14 27.5 19 22.6 
(c) Subsistence support 11 33.3 11 21.6 22 26.2 
(d) Interest-subsidised 
financing for poverty 
alleviation  1 3.0 6 11.8 7 8.3 
(e) Subsidized housing   0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(f) Other (specify) 4 12.1 2 3.9 6 7.1 
Sub Total 33 100.0 51 100.0 84 100.0 
Kind of agriculture       
- 
(a) Crop farming 65 43.0 120 50.8 185 47.8 
(b) Livestock raising 13 8.6 34 14.4 47 12.1 
(c) Processing produce 1 0.7 12 5.1 13 3.4 
(d) Fishing 3 2.0 3 1.3 6 1.6 
(e) Other (specify) 69 45.7 67 28.4 136 35.1 
Sub Total 151 100.0 236 100.0 387 100.0 
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Table 5.3 Other characteristics of surveyed respondents (cont.). 
 
Non-Clients 
(N1=140) 
Clients 
(N2=289) 
All respondents 
(N=429) 
Statistical 
Test 
Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n=n1+n2) 
% of 
N 
Income source       
- 
(a) Crop farming 45 27.4 105 31.5 150 30.2 
(b) Livestock raising 5 3.0 25 7.5 30 6.0 
(c) Processing produce 1 0.6 15 4.5 16 3.2 
(d) Fishing 2 1.2 3 0.9 5 1.0 
(e) Government worker 6 3.7 10 3.0 16 3.2 
(f) Self-owned enterprise 26 15.9 96 28.8 122 24.5 
(g) Small-scale project 6 3.7 35 10.5 41 8.2 
(h) Migrant worker’s wages 11 6.7 8 2.4 19 3.8 
(i) Other (specify) 62 37.8 36 10.8 98 19.7 
Sub Total 164 100.0 333 100.0 497 100.0 
Subsidiary income       
χ2 = 0.855 
No 74 52.9 139 48.1 213 49.7 
Yes 66 47.1 150 51.9 216 50.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source of subsidiary 
income 
      
- 
(a) Rental of house/land 2 2.9 30 17.9 32 13.4 
(b) Teaching 4 5.7 9 5.4 13 5.5 
(c) Street selling 24 34.3 79 47.0 103 43.3 
(d) Handicrafts 5 7.1 3 1.8 8 3.4 
(e) Collecting recycled 
materials 1 1.4 0 0.0 1 0.4 
(f) Poultry/fish processing  1 1.4 1 0.6 2 0.8 
(g) Rice/corn milling 2 2.9 1 0.6 3 1.3 
(h) Relief payment from 
government  1 1.4 3 1.8 4 1.7 
(i) Remittance from other 
family member  3 4.3 7 4.2 10 4.2 
(j) Other (specify) 27 38.6 35 20.8 62 26.1 
Sub Total 70 100.0 168 100.0 238 100.0 
A major loss       
χ2 = 
9.467*** 
No 120 85.7 209 72.3 329 76.7 
Yes 20 14.3 80 27.7 100.0 23.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Kinds of loss       
- 
(a) Bankruptcy 1 5.0 15 18.8 16 16.0 
(b) Natural disaster 9 45.0 22 27.5 31 31.0 
(c) Crop failure 9 45.0 33 41.3 42 42.0 
(d) Other (specify) 1 5.0 10 12.5 11 11.0 
Sub Total 20 100.0 80 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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The respondents’ awareness of Islamic MFIs in their area is significantly (significant at the 1% level) 
associated with being classified as clients or non-clients. Table 5.3 shows that, in the client group, 
100% of respondents were aware of the existence of Islamic MFIs in their area compared with the 
non-client group with only 77.1% being aware of the availability of Islamic MFIs.  
Respondents who were aware of the availability of Islamic MFIs were asked further about what type 
of Islamic MFIs are available in their area. The most common is Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil (BMT) 
(64.3%), followed by Islamic financial services cooperatives (KJKS) (35.5%) and Islamic financial 
services units (UJKS) (0.3%). Respondents who were not aware of the availability of Islamic MFIs were 
asked the reason they did not know of the existence of Islamic MFIs. Most respondents answered 
that they did not know if any Islamic MFIs existed in their area (54.1%), followed by there is no 
promotion or socialization from Islamic MFIs (27%) and some thought that Islamic and conventional 
MFIs were the same (10.8%).  
With regard to rural household assets, the largest category was ‘owned farm land’ (34.6%), next was 
‘other asset’ (32.3%), which refers to a small shop or fish pond. The third category was agricultural 
tools (20.8%) such as a reaping hook, plough, sprayer, etc. An identical pattern was evident in both 
the client and non-client groups. The survey data also showed that the great majority of the 
respondents (98.8%) owned their house. In the non-client group, the proportion owning their own 
house was slightly higher (99.3%) than the client group (98.6%). The difference between the client 
group and non-client group is not statistically significant. Based on the survey results, most 
respondents had a brick house (99.5%) (client (99.3%) and non-client groups (100.0%)). The 
differences in this variable are not statistically significant. This implies the respondents’ house 
holding status and type of house are not associated with the composition of clients and non-clients. 
Household appliances such as a television and radio, are popular household assets owned by a fifth 
of respondents (20.3%), followed by motorcycles (19.7%) and furniture (19.4%).  
In terms of government assistance, most of the respondents received government assistance (83%). 
In the client group, 84.8% received assistance from the government compared with the non-client 
group (79.3%). The difference is not statistically significant, which means that there is no relationship 
between government assistance and the composition of clients and non-clients. The respondents 
were asked further about the kind of assistance received and over a third received cash subsidies 
(35.7%), followed by subsistence support such as grain, vegetables, chicken, and goats (26.2%) and, 
inputs for agricultural production such as fertilizer, pesticide and seeds (22.6%). The pattern is similar 
for the non-client group, but the client group received cash support (35.3%), followed by agricultural 
inputs (e.g., fertiliser, pesticide, seeds) (27.5%), and subsistence support (21.6%).  
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In terms of the respondents’ types of farming, nearly half of the client group were crop farmers 
(47.8%) compared with the non-client group (43%). This activity was followed by raising livestock, 
which accounted for 14.4% in the client group and only 8.6% in the non-client group. The proportion 
of respondents with no farming activity was higher in the non-client group (45.7%) than in the client 
group (28.4%).  
In terms of household primary income, the largest proportion of respondents’ answered crop 
farming as their primary income source (30.2%). A similar proportion was also evident in the client 
group (31.5%) but in the non-client group, a higher proportion of respondents’ primary income was 
from various sources (37.8%), mostly salary. When asked whether they had subsidiary/secondary 
income in their household, most clients (51.9%) answered that they had subsidiary income, but most 
non-clients (52.9%) did not have secondary income. The respondents were asked further about the 
source of their subsidiary income; street selling was the most popular source among the respondents 
(43.3%). Selling newspapers, fruits and cold drinks are examples of street selling.  
Table 5.3 also shows that some of the respondents had experienced a major loss in the past two 
years. In the client group, 27.7% had been exposed to a major loss compared with the non-client 
group (14.3%). This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, which means that suffering a 
major loss influences the composition of clients and non-clients. In addition, when the respondents 
were asked about the kind of losses, crop failure was the major loss in both the client (41.3%) and 
non-client groups (45%). This was followed by ‘natural disaster’, which accounted for 27.5% in the 
client group and 45% in the non-client group.  
5.1.2 Characteristics of clients  
Table 5.4 provides general information about Islamic MFIs’ clients and their financing characteristics. 
Based on the survey, there are three groups of clients. First, clients who received profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) financing schemes, followed by clients who received non-PLS schemes and clients who 
received both PLS and non-PLS schemes. The total number of clients was 289, which consisted of 112 
clients with PLS schemes, 162 clients with non-PLS schemes, and 15 clients in both schemes. In terms 
of the types of Islamic MFIs from which clients received maximum financing, most clients received 
financing from BMTs (over 60%).The Chi-square tests of the differences in both financing amounts is 
significant between the three groups. This is means that the maximum financing amount influenced 
the composition of client group (PLS, non-PLS, and mixed schemes).   
The survey also investigated the total amount of financing applied for by the clients. The pattern was 
similar for the three groups of clients. For the PLS group, amounts between three and five million IDR 
dominated (30.3%) whereas in the non-PLS group, amounts between one and three million IDR were 
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most popular (28.8%). For clients with mixed schemes, finance amounts between seven and 15 
million were the top choice (53.3%). In addition, clients were also asked about the amount of finance 
that they received; most clients received the amount for which they applied, the PLS group 29.4%, 
the non-PLS group 26.9% and the mixed group 40%. The PLS group had slightly higher amount of 
finance because clients with PLS schemes are usually more trusted by the Islamic MFIs. In summary, 
clients received the amount of finance that they wanted. The Chi-square test for amount of finance 
applied for is significant at the 1% level, but the amount of finance approved is significant at the 5% 
level for the clients with PLS, non-PLS, and with both schemes. This implies that these two variables 
are associated with the composition of clients in the three groups. 
In order to understand the clients’ purposes for borrowing, we divided their reasons into two groups. 
The first is for agricultural activities and the second is for non-agricultural activities. In the 
agricultural activities category, most borrowed money from Islamic MFIs for farm cropping activity 
(53.2%), followed by livestock raising (29.1%) and purchasing farm machinery (10.1%). In the non-
agricultural activities, the largest group of clients applied for finance to pay off other debts (21.8%), 
followed by financing a small scale project (21.4%) and to start a self-run enterprise (12%).  
Regarding financing duration, for most clients with a PLS scheme it was between three and six 
months (53.5%). For clients with a non-PLS scheme, it was between seven and 12 months (39%) and 
for clients in both schemes, between seven and 12 months (38.5%) and between one and two years 
(38.5%). These results are statistically significant at the 1% level between the three groups. This 
implies that financing duration contributes significantly to the clients’ type of scheme. In terms of 
payment, most of the respondents chose monthly as their mode of payment (above 85%). 
Most of clients in the three groups answered that their financing requires collateral (above 95%). In 
the clients with PLS schemes only 0.9% did not provide collateral, it was 4.9% for clients with non-PLS 
schemes and for clients with mixed schemes all provided collateral for their finance.  
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Table 5.4 General profile of the Islamic MFIs’ clients. 
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS 
and non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n3) 
% of 
N3 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
 
General         
Largest finance 
amount 
        
χ2 = 
13.215*** 
Islamic financial 
services 
cooperatives 
(KJKS) 
45 40.2 54 33.3 0 0.0 99 34.3 
Islamic financial 
services unit 
(UJKS) 
2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7 
Baitul Maal Wa 
Tamwil (BMT) 
65 58.0 108 66.7 15 100.0 188 65.1 
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Total  
amount of 
finance 
applied for 
        
 
Less than Rp. 
1,000,000 
2 1.8 5 3.2 0 0.0% 7 2.5% 
χ2 = 
23.255*** 
Between Rp. 
1,000,001 and 
Rp. 3,000,000 
29 26.6 45 28.8 2 13.3% 76 27.1% 
Between Rp. 
3,000,001 and 
Rp. 5,000,000 
33 30.3 31 19.9 1 6.7 65 23.2 
Between Rp. 
5,000,001 and 
Rp. 7,000,000 
17 15.6 15 9.6 1 6.7 33 11.8 
Between Rp. 
7,000,001 and 
Rp. 15,000,000 
19 17.4 30 19.2 8 53.3 57 20.4 
More than Rp. 
15,000,000 
9 8.3 30 19.2 3 20.0 42 15.0 
 
Sub Total 109 100.0 156 100.0 15 100.0 280 100.0  
Total 
amount of 
finance 
approved 
        
χ2 = 
22.019** 
Less than Rp. 
1,000,000 
6 5.5 6 3.8 0 0.0 12 4.3 
Between Rp. 
1,000,001 and 
Rp. 3,000,000 
28 25.7 42 26.9 2 13.3 72 25.7 
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Table 5.4 General profile of the Islamic MFIs’ clients (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS 
and non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n3) 
% of 
N3 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
 
General         
Between Rp. 
3,000,001 and 
Rp. 5,000,000 
32 29.4 35 22.4 1 6.7 68 24.3 
χ2 = 
22.019** 
Between Rp. 
5,000,001 and 
Rp. 7,000,000 
18 16.5 14 9.0 1 6.7 33 11.8 
Between Rp. 
7,000,001 and 
Rp. 15,000,000 
15 13.8 26 16.7 6 40.0 47 16.8 
More than Rp. 
15,000,000 
10 9.2 33 21.2 5 33.3 48 17.1 
Sub Total 109 100.0 156 100.0 15 100.0 280 100.0 
Total 
amount of 
applied for 
finance 
approved 
        
χ2 = 
2.995 
No 22 20.2 38 24.4 6 40.0 66 23.6 
Yes 87 79.8 118 75.6 9 60.0 214 76.4 
Sub Total 109 100.0 156 100.0 15 100.0 280 100.0 
Purpose for 
agricultural 
activities         
 
(a) Farm 
cropping 
22 61.1 20 50.0 0 0.0 42 53.1 
- 
(b) Livestock 
raising 
10 27.8 11 27.5 2 66.7 23 29.1 
(c) Produce 
processing 
1 2.8 3 7.5 0 0.0 4 5.1 
(d) Purchase of 
farming 
machinery 
2 5.6 5 12.5 1 33.3 8 10.2 
(e) Other 
(specify) 
1 2.8 1 2.5 0 0.0 2 2.5 
Sub Total 36 100.0 40 100.0 3 100.0 79 100.0 
Purpose for 
non-agricultural 
activities         
 
(a) To start a self-
run enterprise 
13 14.8 14 10.1 1 12.5 28 12.0 
- 
(b) To finance an 
existing 
enterprise 
2 2.3 9 6.5 2 25.0 13 5.6  
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Table 5.4 General profile of the Islamic MFIs’ clients (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS 
and non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n3) 
% of 
N3 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
 
General         
(c) To finance a 
small-scale project 
16 18.2 32 23.2 2 25.0 50 21.4  
(d) Basic 
household needs 
13 14.8 11 8.0 1 12.5 25 10.7  
(e) To pay for 
children’s 
education 
7 8.0 13 9.4 0 0.0 20 8.5  
(f) Emergency 7 8.0 10 7.2 0 0.0 17 7.3  
(g) Housing 5 5.7 12 8.7 0 0.0 17 7.3  
(h) Paying off 
other debts 
23 26.1 27 19.6 1 12.5 51 21.8  
(i) Other (specify) 2 2.3 10 7.2 1 12.5 13 5.6  
Sub Total 88 100.0 138 100.0 8 100.0 234 100.0  
Duration 
financing 
         
3 to 6 months 53 53.5 43 29.5 3 23.1 99 38.4 
χ2 = 
21.142*** 
7 to 12 months 26 26.3 57 39.0 5 38.5 88 34.1 
1 to 2 years 18 18.2 33 22.6 5 38.5 56 21.7 
2 to 3 years 2 2.0 8 5.5 0 0.0 10 3.9 
More than 3 years 0 0.0 5 3.4 0 0.0 5 1.9 
Sub Total 99 100.0 146 100.0 13 100.0 258 100.0  
Financing 
payment 
frequency 
         
Weekly 4 4.0 8 5.5 0 0.0 12 4.7 
χ2 = 
6.668 
Monthly 92 92.9 126 86.3 12 92.3 230 89.1 
Semi-annually 1 1.0 8 5.5 1 7.7 10 3.9 
Annually 0 0.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 2 0.8 
Other 2 2.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 4 1.6 
Sub Total 99 100.0 146 100.0 13 100.0 258 100.0  
Require 
collateral 
         
No 1 0.9 8 4.9 0 0.0 9 3.1 χ2 = 
4.100 
 
Yes 111 99.1 154 95.1 15 100.0 280 96.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 5.4 General profile of the Islamic MFIs’ clients (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS 
and non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n3) 
% of 
N3 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
 
General         
Kind of 
collateral 
         
(a) Mortgage 
property 
30 27.0 12 7.8 1 7.7 43 15.5 
- 
(b) Chattels 
mortgage 
76 68.5 121 78.6 12 92.3 209 75.2 
(c) Promissory 
note 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(d) Co-signer/co-
guarantor 
0 0.0 2 1.3 0 0.0 2 0.7 
(e) Deposits 1 0.9 17 11.0 0 0.0 18 6.5 
(f) Others (specify) 4 3.6 2 1.3 0 0.0 6 2.2 
Sub Total 111 100.0 154 100.0 13 100.0 278 100.0 
Status of 
payment         
 
Fully paid 14 14.3 19 13.1 1 7.7 34 13.3 
χ2 = 
0.653 
Current 83 84.7 125 86.2 12 92.3 220 85.9 
Past due 1 1.0 1 0.7 0 0.0 2 0.8 
Restructured 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0  
Sub Total 98 100.0 145 100.0 13 100.0 256 100.0  
Take of 
process 
         
Less than a week 102 91.1 123 76.9 9 60.0 234 81.5 
χ2 = 
24.975*** 
1 week 5 4.5 17 10.6 5 33.3 27 9.4 
2 weeks 2 1.8 17 10.6 0 0.0 19 6.6 
3 weeks 3 2.7 3 1.9 1 6.7 7 2.4 
1 Month 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0  
More than a 
month 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0  
Sub Total 112 100.0 160 100.0 15 100.0 287 100.0  
Having 
savings in 
Islamic MFI 
         
No 32 28.8 25 15.4 0 0.0 57 19.8 
χ2 = 
11.351*** 
Yes 79 71.2 137 84.6 15 100.0 231 80.2 
Sub Total 111 100.0 162 100.0 15 100.0 288 100.0 
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Table 5.4 General profile of the Islamic MFIs’ clients (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS 
and non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of 
N2 
Count 
(n3) 
% of 
N3 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
 
General         
Distance to 
the nearest 
Islamic MFI 
        
 
1 - 5 kilometres 72 64.3 97 60.2 7 46.7 176 61.1 
χ2 = 
12.521* 
6 - 10 kilometres 39 34.8 61 37.9 7 46.7 107 37.2 
11 - 15 
kilometres 
0 0.0 3 1.9 0 0.0 3 1.0 
16 - 20 
kilometres 
1 0.9 0 0.0 1 6.7 2 0.7 
Over 20 
kilometres 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sub Total 112 100.0 161 100.0 15 100.0 288 100.0 
Any charge(s) 
for financing 
        
 
No 2 1.8 1 0.6 0 0.0 3 1.0 
χ2 = 1.046 Yes 110 98.2 161 99.4 15 100.0 286 99.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Kind of 
charge 
         
(a) Admin or 
service fee  110 100.0 161 98.8 15 100.0 286 99.3 
- 
(b) Insurance fee 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(c) Guarantee fee 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
(d) Legal fee 0 0.0 2 1.2 0 0.0 2 0.7 
(e) Other 
(specify) 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Sub Total 110 100.0 163 100.0 15 100.0 288 100.0 
Informal Cost          
No 112 100.0 162 100.0 15 100.0 289 100.0 
- Yes 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
With regard to the type of collateral provided by the clients, over 60% of the three groups of clients 
used chattel mortgages, especially motorcycles, as their collateral. Similarly, over 80% of the three 
group of clients’ payment status was still current and 0.8% status was past due.  
Table 5.4 also compares the processing time for financing between clients with PLS, non-PLS, and 
mixed schemes. The results show that 91.1% of clients with PLS schemes obtained financing from an 
Islamic MFI in less than a week after submitting their application compared with 76.9% of clients with 
non-PLS schemes and 60% for clients with mixed schemes. This shows that, on average, Islamic MFIs 
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take a short time to process the clients’ loan applications. There is a statistically significant difference 
for this variable between the three groups (significant at the 1% level). This implies that the finance 
application process time is associated with the type of scheme.  
In terms of saving with an Islamic MFI, about 71.2% of the clients in the PLS schemes have been 
saving with Islamic MFIs. This is slightly lower than clients with non-PLS schemes (84.6%). All clients 
in both schemes group have been saving with an Islamic MFI. The differences are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that saving with an Islamic MFI influences the type of finance 
scheme in Islamic MFIs.   
Table 5.4 also summarises the distance of clients’ residence from an Islamic MFI in their area. There 
were five distance levels: one to five kilometres, six to 10 kilometres, 11 to 15 kilometres, 16 to 20 
kilometres, and over 20 kilometres. The clients in PLS (64.3%) and non-PLS (60.2%) schemes 
exhibited similar results; their distance was between one and five kilometres from the nearest 
Islamic MFI. However, there are two levels of distance that have equally high proportions of clients in 
both schemes: one to five kilometres (46.7%) and six to 10 kilometres (46.7%). The differences are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies that the distance to the nearest Islamic MFI 
influences the distribution of the type of scheme.   
In terms of additional charge(s) by Islamic MFIs for clients’ financing applications, almost all clients 
(over 95%) in the three groups experienced additional charges for their financing. The additional 
charge on clients in the three groups was mostly an administration or service fee (>98%). 
Furthermore, when clients were asked about the existence of any informal cost when they applied 
for finance, all clients in three groups replied that there was no informal fee for Islamic MFIs’ officers 
when they submitted their applications.   
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Table 5.5 Government assistance to Islamic MFIs’ clients. 
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS and 
non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of N2 Count 
(n3) 
% of N3 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
Government Assistance 
Assistance 
from the gov. 
after finance 
        
χ2 = 1.450 
 No 101 90.2 141 87.6 12 80.0 254 88.2 
Yes 11 9.8 20 12.4 3 20.0 34 11.8 
Sub Total 112 100.0 161 100.0 15 100.0 288 100.0 
Kind of 
assistance 
        
 
(a) Financial 
support 6 46.2 13 61.9 1 25.0 20 52.6 
 
(b) Skill/ 
technical 
support 3 23.1 5 23.8 0 0.0 8 21.1 
 
(c) Religious 
support 2 15.4 1 4.8 1 25.0 4 10.5 
- 
(d) Other 
(specify) 2 15.4 2 9.5 2 50.0 6 15.8 
 
Sub Total 13 100.0 21 100.0 4 100.0.0 38 100.0  
Frequency of 
assistance 
        
 
Once 9 81.8 13 65.0 1 33.3 23 67.6  
Twice 2 18.2 5 25.0 2 66.7 9 26.5  
Three times 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 χ2 = 4.402 
Over three 
times 
0 0.0 2 10.0 0 0.0 2 5.9 
 
Sub Total 11 100.0 20 100.0 3 100.0 34 100.0  
Assistance 
beneficial 
        
 
No 1 9.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.9 
χ2 = 2.154 
 
Yes 10 90.9 20 100.0.0 3 100.0.0 33 97.1 
Sub Total 11 100.0 20 100.0 3 100.0 34 100.0 
Benefit          
(a) I improved 
my financial 
skills. 0 0.0 5 18.5 0 0.0 5 11.6 
 
(b) I improved 
my business 
knowledge. 5 38.5 7 25.9 1 33.3 13 30.2 
- 
(c) I improved 
my 
spiritual/moral 
knowledge 2 15.4 1 3.7 0 0.0 3 7.0 
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Table 5.5 Government assistance to Islamic MFIs’ clients (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
(N1=112) 
Clients with 
non-PLS 
(N2=162) 
Mixed PLS and 
non-PLS 
(N3=15) 
All Clients 
(N=289) 
Statistical 
Test Count 
(n1) 
% of 
N1 
 
Count 
(n2) 
% of N2 Count 
(n3) 
% of N3 
 
Count 
(n=n1+n2+n3) 
% of 
N 
Government Assistance 
Benefit          
(d) There is a 
chance to get a 
future grant. 4 30.8 8 29.6 2 66.7 14 32.6 
 
(e) I have a 
bigger network 
(more friends). 0 0.0 1 3.7 0 0.0 1 2.3 
 
(f) Other 
(specify) 2 15.4 5 18.5 0 0.0 7 16.3 
 
Sub Total 13 100.0 27 100.0 3 100.0 43 100.0  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
This study also investigated the Indonesian government’s support for Islamic MFIs’ clients during 
their financing period. The survey results show that only 34 (11.8%) of the clients received assistance 
and support from the government. This includes 20% of clients in both schemes, followed by clients 
in non-PLS schemes (12.4%) and PLS schemes (9.8%). Most government assistance was financial 
(52.6%), followed by skill/technical support (21.1%); only 10.5% of clients received religious support 
(see Table 5.5). 
With regard to the frequency of government assistance that clients received, over half of the clients 
in both schemes received help twice (66.7%) followed by the clients in the PLS (81.8%); non-PLS 
(65%) scheme clients received help only once. In addition, when respondents were asked whether 
the assistance brought benefit to them, most (97.1%) replied that the support helped their 
household. Moreover, they also believed that once they received assistance or support from the 
government, it meant that they will have a better chance to get future assistance (32.6%). Another 
benefit was that the clients felt that the support could increase their business knowledge (30.2%).  
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Table 5.6 General information about non-clients. 
Variable Non-Clients Count % 
Any intention to 
borrow 
in the future 
No 86 61.4 
Yes 54 38.6 
Total 140 100.0 
Intend to borrow from Formal financial institution 51 94.4 
Informal financial institution 0 0.0 
Both Sources 3 5.6 
Total 54 100.0 
Any intention to 
borrow  
from an Islamic MFI 
No 53 54.1 
Yes 45 45.9 
Total 98 100.0 
Reasons for not 
borrowing 
from an Islamic MFI 
 
 
Insufficient income/assets 6 11.8 
Incurred previous financing(s) or bad financing record 2 3.9 
Have no collateral 2 3.9 
Have difficulty in completing the required documents 1 2.0 
Islamic MFIs’ financing application process takes too 
much time 
0 0.0 
I could access informal institutions much more easily 2 3.9 
Islamic MFIs charge higher costs 2 3.9 
Other(s), please specify 36 70.6 
Total 51 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
Table 5.6 provides general information about non-clients. When non-clients were asked about their 
future borrowing intentions, about 61.4% did not have any intention to borrow money in the future; 
only 54 (38.6%) had any intention to borrow money in the future. Of the 54 respondents in non-
client rural households, 51 intended to borrow from formal financial institutions (94.4%) and three 
intended to borrow from both formal and informal financial institutions.   
The non-clients were also asked about any possibility of their borrowing from Islamic MFIs in the 
future. The survey result shows 54.1% of the respondents replied they did not intend to borrow from 
Islamic MFIs and 45 (45.9%) intend to borrow money from Islamic MFIs. When we asked the reason 
why they did not want to borrow from Islamic MFIs, most stated reasons other than those already 
listed on the questionnaire; most replied that they did not really understand the borrowing 
mechanism for Islamic MFIs (70.6%).   
5.2 Impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing on rural household welfare 
The indicator of rural households’ welfare in this research used two parameters, income and 
expenditure. Using the difference-in-difference (DID) method, this study assessed the impact of 
financing from Islamic MFIs on rural households’ welfare in Indonesia. The empirical results are 
discussed in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. There are two groups in standard DID estimation: (1) clients 
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who indicated that they received financing from an Islamic MFI; and (2) non-clients who did not 
receive financing from an Islamic MFI.  
5.2.1 Welfare estimation with the standard difference-in-difference approach 
In the standard DID analysis, the treatment variable ( )itM  is a binary variable that indicates a rural 
household’s membership as a client and who received financing from an Islamic MFI (1 = yes, 0 = 
otherwise). Because the estimated model is a logarithmic function where the dependent variable is a 
natural logarithm of the clients’ welfare indicator (income and expenditure), the coefficient ( )  of 
the treatment variable, when multiplied by 100.0, measures the approximate average percentage 
change in the indicator with respect to the treatment variable (Li et al., 2011b). 
The results of the standard DID show that rural household welfare measured by rural household 
annual income (RHAI) and rural household annual expenditure (RHAE) significantly improved when 
they borrowed from Islamic MFIs (see column 3, Table 5.7). The average RHAI for clients (borrowers) 
rose 12% over two years, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Positive and significant 
improvement is also evident in the RHAE of the borrowers in the same period. The average RHAE for 
the borrowers rose 10.2% over two years, which is also statistically significant at the 1% level.  
To measure the true impact of financing by Islamic MFIs, the average outcome difference for non-
clients (or non-borrowers) between 2012 and 2014 (see column 6, Table 5.7) is used to approximate 
the time trend suffered by the clients. After differencing the means of the standard DID between 
clients and non-clients, the average RHAI for the clients rose significantly by 2.8% as a direct impact 
of financing by Islamic MFIs (significant at the 1% level) (see column 7, Table 5.7). However, the 
results show that the average RHAE of clients decreased 1.4% but the result is insignificant. 
Based on the standard DID estimation (see column 7, Table 5.7), the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing 
on the clients’ annual income is positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the impact of 
financing on clients’ annual expenditure is negative but insignificant. The standard DID estimation 
assumes that only the treatment variables impact rural households’ outcomes ( )itY  between the 
clients and non-clients.  
Considering the differences and imbalance in the households’ characteristics of the two groups of 
respondents and the possible association with itY , the standard DID approach can lead to a biased 
impact estimated results. Therefore, it is important to estimate the DID equation with control 
variables.     
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Table 5.7 Standard DID estimates of Islamic MFIs’ financing impact of rural household welfare. 
 Clients (n1 = 289) Non-Clients (n2 = 140) DID 
impact 
estimator 
Outcome 
Variables 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D1) 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D0) 
Yc12 Yc14 D1 =  
Yc14 – Yc12 
Ync12 Ync14 D0 =  
Ync14 – 
Ync12 
DID1 = 
D1 – D0 
Log of  
annual 
income 
7.4326 
(0.01735) 
7.5531 
(0.01792) 
0.1205*** 
(0.00472) 
7.3434 
(0.02878) 
7.4355 
(0.02765) 
0.0920*** 
(0.01240) 
0.02846*** 
(0.01097) 
        
Log of 
 annual 
expenditure 
7.2250 
(0.01578) 
7.3273 
(0.01593) 
0.1023*** 
(0.00444) 
7.0904 
(0.02641) 
7.2069 
(0.02382) 
0.1164*** 
(0.01160) 
-0.01408 
(0.01028) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual expenditure 
for the client and non-client groups; 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
5.2.2 Welfare estimation with the adjusted difference-in-difference approach 
In order to minimize any biased impact estimation and to control for the households’ unobserved 
heterogeneities, this study evaluates the welfare impact using the adjusted DID method with fixed 
effect regression31 and robustness test. Table 5.8 presents the adjusted DID results with the 
treatment variable ( )itM  as a binary variable that indicates Islamic MFI clients. The fixed effect 
robustness test is used to further test the validity of the results.  
Table 5.8 shows that clients, on average, increased their annual income by 6.82% compared with 
non-clients, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the RHAE for clients decreased 
by 3.94% compared with non-clients which is significant at the 10% level. Major loss as a control 
variable also exhibited a positive significant relationship with rural households’ expenditure 
(significant at the 5% level).  
In addition, the robustness test shows that the impact of financing remained the same (6.82%), 
however, it is now significant at the 5% level. The result for RHAE becomes insignificant. The control 
variable shows the same result but it is now significant only at the 10% level. Overall, the explanatory 
power of the fixed effects model is adequate (see R2, Table 5.8). The F-statistics are also significant at 
the 1% level; therefore, this strongly rejects the null hypothesis of the fixed effects model in 
                                                          
31Hausman test for Clients vs Non Clients: (Prob>chi2) for income and expenditure models are 0. 0271 and 0.000, 
which is means that it is recommended to use the Fixed Effect. 
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minimizing the selection bias in impact estimation. This implies that rural households may increase 
their income after received financing from Islamic MFI, and this finding is parallel with the previous 
studies by Li et al. (2011b) and Kondo et al. (2008).       
Table 5.8 Fixed effect estimation of the impact of financing on rural household welfare. 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable RHAI Robust RHAI RHAE Robust RHAE 
Intercept 17.04735*** 
(0.0083831) 
17.04735*** 
(0.0059243) 
16.5351*** 
(0.0078278) 
16.5351*** 
(0.0055319) 
Year dummy ( 2 )td  0.214824*** 
(0.0211449) 
0.214824*** 
(0.0277365) 
0.2606674*** 
(0.0197442) 
0.2606674*** 
(0.0253253) 
Control Variables ( )itX      
Major Loss dummy  
(ML) 
-0.0199272 
(0.0283548) 
-0.0199272 
(0.0316963) 
0.0524685** 
(0.0264765) 
0.0524685* 
(0.0315925) 
Treatment Variables 
( )itM  
    
Clients (M) 0.0682121*** 
(0.0255689) 
0.0682121** 
(0.0317391) 
-0.0394621* 
(0.0238752) 
-0.0394621 
(0.029803) 
     
F Statistic 157.99*** 237.53*** 166.96*** 211.85*** 
Household Fixed Effect Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
R-squared 0.5266 0.5266 0.5404 0.5404 
Total Observation 858 858 858 858 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
5.3 Islamic values and shari’a compliance evaluation 
There are limited studies that investigate shari’a compliance in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) 
especially in Islamic MFIs. To date, no study has investigated shari’a compliance in Islamic MFIs. 
Vinnicombe (2010) investigated shari’a compliance from 26 full flagged Islamic banks licensed in 
Bahrain. The study evaluated shari’a compliance based on data derived from annual reports and 
compared with the standard set by AAOIFI. Using a benchmark index, the study found that 
compliance for murabahah contracts was very high but for zakah and the mudarabah contracts it 
was relatively low (Vinnicombe, 2010).  
With regard to previous studies on Islamic values’ evaluation, Rahman (2010b) study estimated the 
ethical and moral changes of clients in Islamic microfinance programme in Bangladesh based on their 
opinion. The study used a four-point Likert scale and 10 statements of religious activities to construct 
an index of acceptability to measure the influence of the programme on changes in clients’ religious 
activity. The author concluded that the Islamic microfinance programme in Bangladesh has a positive 
impact on the ethics and morality of clients.  
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The shari’a compliance indicator in this study uses shari’a standards from the literature for all 
schemes combined with the standards from Indonesia’s shari’a board. The Islamic values’ evaluation 
in this study covers values such as those that respondents believe and implement in their life and 
that they know about Islamic MFIs. The questions also asked the clients’ opinions on shari’a 
compliance and their financing experiences. 
Table 5.9 Islamic values evaluation. 
 Clients with PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS and 
Non-PLS 
All Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Islamic Values  
(1) My spiritual beliefs affect every aspect of my life including my financial activities 
1 Strongly disagree 12 10.7% 18 11.1% 1 6.7% 31 10.7% 
χ2 = 
25.807** 
2 Disagree 8 7.1% 10 6.2% 5 33.3% 23 8.0% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
15 13.4% 19 11.7% 3 20.0% 37 12.8% 
4 Neutral 10 8.9% 6 3.7% 0 0.0% 16 5.5% 
5 Somewhat agree 12 10.7% 22 13.6% 2 13.3% 36 12.5% 
6 Agree 28 25.0% 30 18.5% 0 0.0% 58 20.1% 
7 Strongly agree 27 24.1% 57 35.2% 4 26.7% 88 30.4% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(2) My spiritual beliefs play an important role before I decided to borrow 
1 Strongly disagree 5 4.5% 5 3.1% 1 6.7% 11 3.8% 
χ2 = 16.559 
2 Disagree 6 5.4% 18 11.1% 1 6.7% 25 8.7% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
17 15.2% 19 11.7% 4 26.7% 40 13.8% 
4 Neutral 21 18.8% 13 8.0% 0 0.0% 34 11.8% 
5 Somewhat agree 27 24.1% 37 22.8% 4 26.7% 68 23.5% 
6 Agree 24 21.4% 44 27.2% 3 20.0% 71 24.6% 
7 Strongly agree 12 10.7% 26 16.0% 2 13.3% 40 13.8% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(3) I always consider my spiritual beliefs before I make any decision on my financial activities 
1 Strongly disagree 2 1.8% 4 2.5% 2 13.3% 8 2.8% 
χ2 = 17.278 
2 Disagree 11 9.8% 16 9.9% 3 20.0% 30 10.4% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
21 18.8% 22 13.6% 1 6.7% 44 15.2% 
4 Neutral 16 14.3% 11 6.8% 0 0.0% 27 9.3% 
5 Somewhat agree 30 26.8% 42 25.9% 2 13.3% 74 25.6% 
6 Agree 18 16.1% 40 24.7% 5 33.3% 63 21.8% 
7 Strongly agree 14 12.5% 27 16.7% 2 13.3% 43 14.9% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(4) I always follow the guidance of the scholars of my spiritual beliefs in my financial activities 
1 Strongly disagree 8 7.1% 6 3.7% 3 20.0% 17 5.9% χ2 = 
20.168* 2 Disagree 3 2.7% 14 8.6% 2 13.3% 19 6.6% 
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Table 5.9 Islamic values evaluation (cont.). 
 
Clients with 
PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS 
and Non-PLS 
All Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Islamic Values  
(4) I always follow the guidance of the scholars of my spiritual beliefs in my financial activities 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
24 21.4% 19 11.7% 0 0.0% 43 14.9% 
χ2 = 
20.168* 
4 Neutral 20 17.9% 30 18.5% 1 6.7% 51 17.6% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
21 18.8% 33 20.4% 3 20.0% 57 19.7% 
6 Agree 26 23.2% 39 24.1% 4 26.7% 69 23.9% 
7 Strongly agree 10 8.9% 21 13.0% 2 13.3% 33 11.4% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(5) I always use financial products that parallel my spiritual beliefs even if they are more expensive or 
more sophisticated 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
6 5.4% 10 6.2% 1 6.7% 17 5.9% 
χ2 = 
6.454* 
2 Disagree 7 6.3% 14 8.6% 2 13.3% 23 8.0% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
19 17.0% 33 20.4% 2 13.3% 54 18.7% 
4 Neutral 10 8.9% 24 14.8% 1 6.7% 35 12.1% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
35 31.3% 39 24.1% 3 20.0% 77 26.6% 
6 Agree 26 23.2% 27 16.7% 4 26.7% 57 19.7% 
7 Strongly agree 9 8.0% 15 9.3% 2 13.3% 26 9.0% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(6) Most of Islamic MFIs’ schemes in Indonesia fulfil the Indonesia shari’ah supervisory board standards 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
6 5.4% 3 1.9% 2 13.3% 11 3.8% 
χ2 = 
26.881*** 
2 Disagree 3 2.7% 9 5.6% 3 20.0% 15 5.2% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
7 6.3% 17 10.5% 2 13.3% 26 9.0% 
4 Neutral 12 10.7% 25 15.4% 2 13.3% 39 13.5% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
36 32.1% 30 18.5% 1 6.7% 67 23.2% 
6 Agree 36 32.1% 52 32.1% 2 13.3% 90 31.1% 
7 Strongly agree 12 10.7% 26 16.0% 3 20.0% 41 14.2% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(7) I believe the Indonesian shari’ah supervisory board always monitors Islamic MFIs’ products and services 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
1 0.9% 4 2.5% 1 6.7% 6 2.1% 
χ2 = 
23.185** 
2 Disagree 8 7.1% 12 7.4% 5 33.3% 25 8.7% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
5 4.5% 16 9.9% 3 20.0% 24 8.3% 
4 Neutral 17 15.2% 23 14.2% 2 13.3% 42 14.5% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
22 19.6% 30 18.5% 2 13.3% 54 18.7% 
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Table 5.9 Islamic values evaluation (cont.). 
 
Clients with 
PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS 
and Non-PLS 
All Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Islamic Values  
(7) I believe the Indonesian shari’ah supervisory board always monitors Islamic MFIs’ products and services 
6 Agree 38 33.9% 50 30.9% 1 6.7% 89 30.8% 
χ2 = 
23.185** 
7 Strongly agree 21 18.8% 27 16.7% 1 6.7% 49 17.0% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(8) Islamic MFIs always clearly describe their products and services to their clients 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
2 1.8% 3 1.9% 1 6.7% 6 2.1% 
χ2 = 
16.365 
2 Disagree 5 4.5% 7 4.3% 1 6.7% 13 4.5% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
5 4.5% 21 13.0% 3 20.0% 29 10.0% 
4 Neutral 7 6.3% 8 4.9% 0 0.0% 15 5.2% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
29 25.9% 29 17.9% 4 26.7% 62 21.5% 
6 Agree 42 37.5% 48 29.6% 2 13.3% 92 31.8% 
7 Strongly agree 22 19.6% 46 28.4% 4 26.7% 72 24.9% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(9) If there is any dispute, I believe Islamic MFIs will take reasonable attempts that parallel Islamic values 
to resolve the problems 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
3 2.7% 5 3.1% 0 0.0% 8 2.7% 
χ2 = 
20.251* 
2 Disagree 3 2.7% 2 1.2% 2 13.3% 7 2.4% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
6 5.4% 13 8.0% 4 26.7% 23 8.0% 
4 Neutral 7 6.3% 12 7.4% 0 0.0% 19 6.6% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
26 23.2% 39 24.1% 1 6.6% 66 22.8% 
6 Agree 43 38.3% 55 34.0% 4 26.7% 102 35.3% 
7 Strongly agree 24 21.4% 36 22.2% 4 26.7% 64 22.2% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
(10) I believe the aim of Islamic MFIs is not only profit oriented but also to help people and spread Islamic 
values 
1 Strongly 
disagree 
3 2.7% 2 1.2% 0 0.0% 5 1.7% 
χ2 = 
19.377* 
2 Disagree 1 .9% 7 4.3% 3 20.0% 11 3.8% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree 
8 7.1% 8 4.9% 2 13.3% 18 6.2% 
4 Neutral 8 7.1% 10 6.2% 0 0.0% 18 6.2% 
5 Somewhat 
agree 
20 17.9% 33 20.4% 2 13.3% 55 19.0% 
6 Agree 39 34.8% 45 27.8% 4 26.7% 88 30.4% 
7 Strongly agree 33 29.5% 57 35.2% 4 26.7% 94 32.5% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 15 100.0% 289 100.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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Table 5.9 summarises the Islamic values of clients based on their financing mechanism: clients in PLS, 
clients in non-PLS, and clients in both schemes. The survey used a 7 point Likert scale (1= strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) for each Islamic values statement. The first statement asked whether 
the clients’ spiritual beliefs affected every aspect of their life including financial activities; most 
clients agreed with the statement (most chose 6 or above). The result for this first statement is 
statistically significant at the 5% level between the three groups of clients. The second statement 
asked about the relationship between spiritual beliefs and their decision to borrow money. Nearly a 
quarter of clients gave a score of 6 (24.6%), with 23.5% scoring 5 and 13.8% scoring 7. This means 
that clients have an understanding of Islamic values and that the values influenced their behaviour. 
The result differences for the second statement are not statistically significant between the three 
groups. 
With the third statement, just over a quarter of clients in the PLS (26.8%) and in non-PLS (25.9%) 
schemes gave a score of 5 to represent their behaviour. However, one third of clients in both 
schemes gave a score 6 (33.3%). The third statement investigates whether the clients always 
considered their spiritual beliefs before they make any decision on their financial activities. Based on 
the results, most clients did some self-reflection on their spiritual beliefs before taking any decision 
on their financial activities. The result is not statistically significant between the three groups.  
The fourth statement cross-checked the clients’ self-values with their behaviour. The statement was 
“I always follow the guidance of the scholars of my spiritual beliefs in my financial activities”; nearly a 
quarter of the clients gave a score of 6 (23.9%), which indicates they always listen and follow the 
guidance from their spiritual leader. The result is statistically significant at the 10% level between the 
three groups of clients. 
The fifth statement asked the clients’ financial choices related to their spiritual values. The statement 
was “I always use financial products that are parallel with my spiritual beliefs even if they are more 
expensive or more sophisticated”. For this, just over a quarter of the clients (26.6%) gave a score of 
5, which means that they practise their spiritual beliefs. The result is statistically significant at the 
10% level between the three groups. The next two statements asked about clients’ knowledge of 
shari’a compliance in Islamic MFIs. The statement asked whether most Islamic MFIs’ schemes in 
Indonesia fulfil the Indonesia’s shari’a supervisory board standards. Nearly a third of the clients 
(31.1%) agreed with this statement.  
This result implies that Islamic MFI’s clients felt satisfied with the shari’a compliance aspect of Islamic 
MFI’s products and services. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level between the three 
groups of clients. Further on shari’a compliance, the statement investigated the clients’ knowledge of 
the shari’a board and its duty to monitor Islamic MFIs’ products and services. The result shows that 
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nearly a third of the clients agreed with this statement (30.8% and a score of 6), which means that 
the clients believed in the performance of the shari’a supervisory board to ensure shari’a compliance 
in Islamic MFIs’ products and services. The result is statistically significant at the 5% level between 
the three groups of clients. 
Statements eight to ten focussed more on operational aspects of Islamic MFIs and the respondents’ 
experiences when using Islamic MFI products. Statement eight investigated the clients’ experiences 
with the Islamic MFIs’ officers regarding the terms and conditions and the clarity when they received 
finance from an Islamic MFI. Nearly a third of the clients (31.8%) gave a score of six which implies 
that they agree that Islamic MFIs’ officers always clearly describe the terms and conditions and the 
clarity of the products and services. The result is not statistically significant.  
The next statement questioned the clients’ confidence in Islamic MFIs, especially if a dispute 
occurred during the financing period. Interestingly, over a third of the clients (35.3%) gave a score of 
six which implied they believe if a dispute occurs, Islamic MFIs will make reasonable attempts that 
parallel with Islamic values to resolve the problem. The result is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
Finally, the tenth statement investigates the clients’ knowledge of Islamic MFIs. The statement 
focused on the aim of Islamic MFIs. Nearly a third of the clients (32.5%) strongly agreed that the aim 
of an Islamic MFI is not only profit but that it is also to help people (social) and to spread Islamic 
values. The result is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5.10 Summary of Islamic values evaluation (mean score). 
 
Islamic Values 
Mean score 
Clients 
PLS 
Clients 
Non-PLS 
Mixed 
PLS & 
Non-PLS 
All 
Clients 
1. My spiritual beliefs affect every aspect of my life 
including my financial activities. 
4.73 4.98 3.86 4.83 
2. My spiritual beliefs play an important role 
before I decided to borrow. 
4.59 4.82 4.46 4.71 
3. I always consider my spiritual beliefs before I 
make any decision on my financial activities. 
4.52 4.84 4.33 4.69 
4. I always follow the guidance of the scholars of 
my spiritual beliefs in my financial activities. 
4.43 4.67 4.26 4.56 
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Table 5.10 Summary of Islamic values evaluation (mean scores) (cont.). 
 
Islamic Values 
Mean score 
Clients 
PLS 
Clients 
Non-PLS 
Mixed 
PLS & 
Non-PLS 
All 
Clients 
5. I always use financial products that parallel my 
spiritual beliefs even if they are more expensive or 
more sophisticated. 
4.56 
 
4.29 4.53 4.40 
6. Most of the Islamic MFIs’ schemes in Indonesia 
fulfil the Indonesia shari’a supervisory board’s 
standards. 
5.00 5.03 4.00 4.97 
7. I believe the Indonesian shari’a supervisory board 
always monitors Islamic MFIs’ products and services 
5.22 4.98 3.40 4.99 
8. Islamic MFIs always clearly describe their products 
and services to their clients. 
5.41 5.35 4.80 5.34 
9. If there is any dispute, I believe Islamic MFIs will 
make reasonable attempts that parallel Islamic values 
to resolve the problems. 
5.45 
 
5.38 4.86 5.38 
10. I believe the aim of Islamic MFIs is not only profit 
oriented but also to help people and spread Islamic 
values. 
5.58 5.64 4.93 5.58 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
Table 5.10 shows the mean scores for clients’ Islamic values. The clients were asked about 10 Islamic 
values that they believe and implement in their life and about their knowledge of Islamic MFIs. 
Questions one to three in the Islamic values section asked the clients whether their spiritual beliefs 
influence their life particularly their financial decisions. Questions four and five asked about the 
implementation of the clients’ beliefs. Questions six and seven asked the clients’ opinions on shari’a 
compliance and questions eight, nine, and ten asked about the clients’ financing experiences. 
Table 5.10 divided the clients into three groups: clients in a PLS scheme; clients in a non-PLS scheme; 
and clients in both a PLS and a non-PLS scheme and used a 7 point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree). Based on the mean score results, for questions one to three, the clients in the 
non-PLS scheme were superior to the other two groups (4.98, 4.82 and 4.84). The group mean was 
also above the average for all the clients. This means that the clients in a non-PLS scheme have good 
Islamic values and their beliefs play an important role in their financial decisions. For question four, 
the mean score of the clients in a non-PLS scheme surpassed the two other groups (4.67) and also 
exceeded the average of all clients (4.56). This means that these clients followed guidance from 
Islamic scholars more than the other two groups.  
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However, when the clients were asked about their consistency in using Islamic financial products, 
interestingly, the clients in a non-PLS scheme had the lowest mean among the three groups (4.29); 
their score was even lower than the mean for all clients (4.40).  
Regarding shari’a compliance in Islamic MFIs’ products, the average mean score for all the clients 
shows that most Islamic MFIs’ schemes in Indonesia fulfil the shari’a supervisory board standards 
(4.97). The clients also believe that the shari’a supervisory board always monitors Islamic MFIs’ 
products and services (4.99). The mean scores for the clients in a PLS scheme in questions eight and 
nine show that they are superior among the three groups (5.41) and (5.45). This means the clients in 
a PLS scheme received a better explanation from Islamic MFI officers with regard to their financing 
compared with the other two groups. Finally, for the last question, the clients in a non-PLS scheme 
exhibited the highest mean score (5.64) which indicates that they believe the aim of Islamic MFIs is 
not only for profit but also to help people (social) and spread Islamic values.  
In summary, the mean scores in Table 5.10 for the clients in the PLS and non-PLS schemes are above 
4.00 except the mean scores in questions one, six, and seven for the clients in both schemes (PLS and 
non-PLS) are 4.00 or less. This indicates that Islamic MFIs’ clients in this study have good Islamic 
values in their daily life and their financial activities are influenced by their religious beliefs. Second, 
they practise their religious values in their financial activities and they believe Islamic MFIs give 
proper service to their clients. 
Table 5.11 Shari’a compliance evaluation. 
 
Clients with 
PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS 
and Non-
PLS 
Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Financing scheme 
Murabahah 0 0.0% 143 88.2% 15 50.0% 157 51.6% 
- 
Salam 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Ijarah Wa Iqtina’ 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Qard 0 0.9% 19 11.8% 0 0.0% 20 6.6% 
Mudarabah 112 100.0% 0 0.0% 15 50.0% 127 41.8% 
Musyarakah 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Muzara’ah 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Muzaqat 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total 112 100.0% 162 100.0% 30 100.0% 304 100.0% 
Non-PLS murabahah 
(1) 
        
 
1 Strongly disagree - - 3 2.1% 0 0.0% 3 1.9% 
χ2 = 3.801 
2 Disagree - - 2 1.4% 0 0.0% 2 1.3% 
3 Somewhat 
disagree - - 
24 16.8% 4 26.7% 28 17.7% 
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Table 5.11 Shari’a compliance evaluation (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS 
and Non-PLS 
Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Financing scheme 
Non-PLS murabahah 
(1) 
        
 
4 Neutral - - 33 23.1% 5 33.3% 38 24.1%  
5 Somewhat agree - - 22 15.4% 3 20.0% 25 15.8% χ2 = 3.801 
6 Agree - - 29 20.3% 2 13.3% 31 19.6%  
7 Strongly agree - - 30 21.0% 1 6.7% 31 19.6%  
Total - - 143 100.0% 15 100.0% 158 100.0%  
Non-PLS murabahah 
(2)   
      
 
1 Strongly disagree - - 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.6% 
χ2 = 9.260 
2 Disagree - - 1 0.7% 0 0.0% 1 0.6% 
3 Somewhat disagree - - 5 3.5% 0 0.0% 5 3.2% 
4 Neutral - - 7 4.9% 3 20.0% 10 6.3% 
5 Somewhat agree - - 35 24.5% 6 40.0% 41 25.9% 
6 Agree - - 39 27.3% 1 6.7% 40 25.3% 
7 Strongly agree - - 55 38.5% 5 33.3% 60 38.0% 
Total - - 143 100.0% 15 100.0% 158 100.0% 
Non-PLS qard (1)          
1 Strongly disagree - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
- 
2 Disagree - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
3 Somewhat disagree - - 1 5.6% - - 1 5.6% 
4 Neutral - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
5 Somewhat agree - - 5 27.8% - - 5 27.8% 
6 Agree - - 7 38.9% - - 7 38.9% 
7 Strongly agree - - 5 27.8% - - 5 27.8% 
Total - - 18 100.0% - - 18 100.0% 
Non-PLS qard (2)          
1 Strongly disagree - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
- 
2 Disagree - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
3 Somewhat disagree - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
4 Neutral - - 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 
5 Somewhat agree - - 4 22.2% - - 4 22.2% 
6 Agree - - 7 38.9% - - 7 38.9% 
7 Strongly agree - - 7 38.9% - - 7 38.9% 
Total - - 18 100.0% - - 18 100.0% 
PLS mudarabah (1)          
1 Strongly disagree 5 4.8% - - 0 0.0% 5 4.4% 
χ2 = 
11.866 
2 Disagree 0 0.0% - - 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
3 Somewhat disagree 11 10.6% - - 0 0.0% 11 9.8% 
4 Neutral 23 22.1% - - 1 12.5% 24 21.4% 
5 Somewhat agree 13 12.5% - - 0 0.0% 13 11.6% 
6 Agree 36 34.6% - - 3 37.5% 39 34.9% 
7 Strongly agree 16 15.4% - - 4 50.0% 20 17.9% 
Total 104 100.0% - - 8 100.0% 112 100.0% 
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Table 5.11 Shari’a compliance evaluation (cont.).  
 
Clients with 
PLS 
Clients with 
Non-PLS 
Mixed PLS 
and Non-
PLS 
Clients 
Statistical 
Test 
Financing scheme 
PLS mudarabah (2)          
1 Strongly disagree 1 1.0% - - 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 
χ2 = 
17.358 
2 Disagree 1 1.0% - - 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 
3 Somewhat disagree 10 9.6% - - 0 0.0% 10 8.8% 
4 Neutral 15 14.4% - - 4 50.0% 19 16.7% 
5 Somewhat agree 22 21.2% - - 1 12.5% 25 21.9% 
6 Agree 32 30.8% - - 0 0.0% 32 28.1% 
7 Strongly agree 23 22.1% - - 3 37.5% 26 22.8% 
Total 104 100.0% - - 8 100.0% 112 100.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
With regard to financing schemes, Table 5.11 shows that of eight financing schemes listed on the 
questionnaire, only three were found in this study: murabahah, qard, and mudarabah. This implies 
that Islamic MFIs in Indonesia do not use all the financing schemes that are available in Islamic 
finance. This phenomenon is general in Indonesia since, according to Saparie (2017), around 60% 
Islamic banks’ financing in Indonesia is dominated by the murabahah scheme and the rest is 
mudarabah. Murabahah (non-PLS) dominates (51.6%) followed by mudarabah (PLS) (41.8%) and 
qard (non-PLS) (6.6%). In terms of the evaluation of shari’a compliance in the three schemes in this 
study, the murabahah scheme shows that 24.1% of the clients answered neutrally for the first 
statement of murabahah (24.1%) (“Ownership of the goods or assets belongs to the Islamic MFI 
before the transaction”). The result implies that the clients in the murabahah scheme have no 
knowledge about the ownership of the goods before the transaction. Islamic MFI officers should 
explain clearly and follow the guidance of the shari’a standard that ownership of the goods or assets 
belongs to the Islamic MFI before the murabahah transaction. The results for this first statement are 
not statistically significant between the two groups. 
Regarding the second statement of shari’a compliance in the murabahah scheme, over a third of 
clients (38%) agreed with the statement, which means that Islamic MFIs always disclose the cost of 
goods and their margin in the murabahah scheme before entering the sale and purchase agreement 
with their client. Therefore, based on clients’ experiences, Islamic MFIs have followed the shari’a 
standard. There are also two statements about shari’a compliance for the qard scheme. The first 
investigated whether the Islamic MFIs charge any fee or take any benefit from their clients in qard 
financing. Over a third of the clients in qard financing exhibited a mean score of 6 (38.9%), which 
means that they agreed with this statement. The second statement regarding the qard scheme 
questioned the clients about whether Islamic MFIs consider rescheduling or writing off loans if the 
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borrower has difficulty with repayment. The results show that the clients that agreed and strongly 
agreed with this statement showed similar results (38.9%). In summary, clients in qard financing 
considered that this scheme parallels the shari’a standard. 
The last scheme in this study is mudarabah. There are two statements for shari’a compliance 
evaluation in this scheme. The first statement investigated the clients in the mudarabah scheme on 
the contribution of capital. The shari’a standard states that Islamic MFIs must contribute 100.0% of 
the capital and the clients contribute their effort. Based on the result, 34.9% of clients agreed with 
the statement. The second statement asked what happens if losses are incurred in the project. Based 
on the shari’a standard, losses should be borne by the Islamic MFI so long as there is no negligence 
by the client. Based on clients’ experiences, over a quarter (28.1%) agreed with this statement. In 
summary, evaluation of the mudarabah scheme indicates that the scheme parallels the shari’a 
standard.  
In summary, from the three schemes identified in this study (murabahah, qard, and mudarabah), 
most clients concluded that the schemes parallel the shari’a standard, which means that there is no 
serious shari’a compliance issues with the products and services offered by Islamic MFIs in Indonesia.  
Table 5.12 Mean score summary of shari’a compliance evaluation. 
Shari’a compliance Mean 
score  
Debt-based financing (non-PLS) 
Murabahah (cost plus mark up) 
1. Ownership of the goods or assets belongs to the Islamic MFI before the transaction 
(before the goods are sold to the clients). 
4.93 
2. Islamic MFIs always disclose the cost of goods and their margin before proceeding 
to a sale and purchase agreement. 
5.87 
Debt-based financing (non-PLS) 
Qard (benevolent loan) 
1. Islamic MFIs do not ask for any benefit from the loan. 5.83 
2. Islamic MFIs always consider rescheduling or writing off the loans if clients have 
difficulty in repaying the loan. 
6.16 
Equity financing (PLS) 
Mudarabah (profit-sharing) 
1. Islamic MFIs contribute 100.0% of the capital and clients contribute the effort. 5.02 
2. Losses are borne by the Islamic MFI as long as there is no fraud or negligence by the 
client. 
5.34 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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Table 5.12 summarises the clients’ opinions from their financing experience compared with the 
National Shari’a Board standards on a 7 point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
The minimum score implies that financing from Islamic MFIs is not compatible with the standards of 
the Indonesia’s shari’a board and the maximum score indicates that clients received financing that is 
compatible with the shari’a board of Indonesia standards. Table 5.12 shows the clients’ average 
score for shari’a standards in a murabahah contract is 4.93 for the first statement and 5.87 for the 
second statement. The clients’ average scores in a qard contract are 5.83 and 6.16, and the average 
score for clients with a mudarabah contract are 5.02 and 5.34 (see Table 5.12).  
In summary, the clients’ financing contracts are compatible with the standards of Indonesia’s shari’a 
board. If we consider each scheme, the average mean scores are: murabahah, 5.40; qard, 5.99; and 
mudarabah, 5.18. The highest mean is in the qard scheme; this is not surprising because this scheme 
is a social scheme (benevolent loan); Islamic MFIs do not get any benefit from this loan. The source 
of funds for this scheme is from a social fund. Interestingly, in the shari’a compliance evaluation, the 
clients rated the murabahah scheme (non-PLS) higher (5.40) than the mudarabah scheme (PLS) 
(5.18). One reason is probably because non-PLS financing dominates Islamic MFIs’ financing portfolio 
in Indonesia. Therefore, the focus of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia is on how to improve the murabahah 
scheme, including its shari’a compliance.   
5.4 Measuring the impact of two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs  
There are two financing forms in Islamic MFIs; profit and loss sharing (PLS) and non-PLS. This study 
includes clients in PLS and non-PLS schemes to identify the impact of each form on rural households’ 
welfare. Using the double standard DID method (Section 5.3.1), this study estimates the impact of 
the two financing forms and suggests which form has the greater impact on rural household welfare. 
Section 5.3.2 summarizes the impact of the two financing forms and Section 5.3.3 evaluates the 
impact using the adjusted DID.  
5.4.1 Impact estimation of two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs by the 
standard difference-in-difference approach 
In the standard DID analysis, the treatment variable ( )itM  is in a binary variable, indicating the rural 
household’s membership as a client (PLS or non-PLS) and that it receives financing from Islamic MFI 
(1 = yes, 0 = otherwise). Because the estimated model is a logarithmic function, the dependent 
variable is a natural logarithm of the clients’ welfare indicator (income and expenditure), then the 
coefficient ( ) of the treatment variable, when multiplied by 100.0, measures the approximate 
average percentage change in the indicator with respect to the treatment variable (Li et al., 2011b). 
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The results of the double standard DID show that rural household welfare measured by rural 
household annual income (RHAI) and rural household annual expenditure (RHAE) has significantly 
improved for Islamic MFIs’ clients. There is improvement between 2012 and 2014 for both groups, 
clients in PLS and clients in non-PLS mechanisms (see column 3, Tables 5.13 and 5.14). The average 
RHAI for clients in the PLS increased 12.4% over two years; for clients in the non-PLS the increase was 
slightly less (12.1%). A positive significant improvement is also evident in RHAE for both types of 
client in the same period. To measure the true impact of financing by Islamic MFIs, the average 
outcome difference for non-clients between 2012 and 2014 (see column 6, Tables 5.13 and 5.14) is 
used to approximate the time trend suffered by clients in both PLS and non-PLS mechanisms.  
After differencing the means of the double standard DID between the clients in PLS and clients in 
non-PLS, the average RHAI for the clients in the PLS increased significantly by 3.2% as a direct impact 
of financing by Islamic MFIs and this is significant at the 5% level (see column 7, Table 5.13). The 
average RHAI for clients in the non-PLS increased significantly by 2.9%, significant at the 5% level (see 
column 7, Table 5.14). However, the results also show that the average RHAE clients in the PLS 
decreased by 1.02% and the average RHAE for clients in the non-PLS decreased by 1.5%; both results 
are insignificant. 
Table 5.13 Standard difference-in-difference estimates of Islamic MFIs’ financing impact on 
clients in PLS financing. 
Outcome  
Variables 
Clients with PLS (n3 = 112) Non-Clients (n2 = 140) DID 
impact 
estimator 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D2) 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D0) 
Yc112 Yc114 
D2 =  
Yc114 – 
Yc112 Ync12 Ync14 
D0 =  
Ync14 – 
Ync12 
 
DID2 =  
D2 – D0 
Log of  
annual 
income 
7.4282 
(0.00767) 
7.5530 
(0.02465) 
0.12477*** 
(0.00767) 
7.3434 
(0.02878) 
7.4355 
(0.02765) 
0.09206*** 
(0.01240) 
0.03271** 
(0.01548) 
        
Log of  
annual 
expenditure 
7.1986 
(0.02254) 
7.3048 
(0.02310) 
0.10617*** 
(0.00821) 
7.0904 
(0.02641) 
7.2069 
(0.02382) 
0.11646*** 
(0.01160) 
-0.01028 
(0.01491) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual expenditure 
for the client with PLS and non-client groups; 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 
**, *** represent the 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test and means it is appropriate to use; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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Table 5.14 Standard difference-in-difference estimates of Islamic MFIs’ financing impact on 
clients in non-PLS financing. 
Outcome  
Variables 
Clients with Non-PLS (n4 = 162) Non-Clients (n2 = 140) DID 
impact 
estimator 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D3) 
Year 
2012 
Year 
2014 
Difference 
(D0) 
Yc212 Yc214 
D3 =  
Yc214 – 
Yc212 Ync12 Ync14 
D0 =  
Ync14 – 
Ync12 
 
DID3 =  
D3 – D0 
Log of  
annual 
income 
7.4376 
(0.02478) 
7.5590 
(0.02560) 
0.12136*** 
(0.00641) 
7.3434 
(0.02878) 
7.4355 
(0.02765) 
0.09206*** 
(0.01240) 
0.02930** 
(0.01343) 
        
Log of  
annual 
expenditure 
7.2360 
(0.02194) 
7.3366 
(0.02191) 
0.100.05*** 
(0.00529) 
7.0904 
(0.02641) 
7.2069 
(0.02382) 
0.11646*** 
(0.01160) 
-0.01589 
(0.01219) 
Note: Entries represent means of log household annual income and log household annual expenditure 
for the client with non-PLS and non-client groups; 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors;  
**, *** represent the 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test and means it is appropriate to use; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
5.4.2 Impact evaluation of two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs 
Based on the double standard DID estimation (see column 3, Table 5.15) the impact of financing by 
Islamic MFIs on all clients’ annual income is positive and significant. The clients who had PLS 
financing mechanisms exhibited a greater impact on income than clients with non-PLS financing 
mechanisms. However, the impact of financing on clients’ annual expenditure is negative but 
insignificant. These double standard DID estimations assume that only the treatment variables 
impact the rural households’ outcomes ( )itY between clients with PLS, clients with non-PLS, and non-
clients. 
Table 5.15 Impact estimates of Islamic MFIs’ financing impact on rural household welfare 
between clients PLS and non-PLS. 
Outcome 
Variables 
Clients Difference DID2 – DID3 
Log of annual 
Income 
PLS (DID2) 0.0327104** 
0.0034065 
Non-PLS (DID3) 0.0293039** 
Log of annual 
expenditure 
PLS (DID2) -0.0102839 
0.0056138 
Non-PLS (DID3) -0.0158977 
**represent 5% significance level and means it is appropriate to use; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
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Considering the differences and imbalance in the household characteristics of the three groups and 
the possible association with itY , the double standard DID can lead to biased impact estimation. 
Therefore, it is important to estimate the DID equation with control variables.       
5.4.3 Impact estimation of two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs by the 
adjusted difference-in-difference approach 
To minimize biased impact estimation and enhance the standard DID results, this section evaluates 
the welfare impact using the adjusted DID method with fixed effect regression. Tables 5.16 and 5.17 
present the adjusted DID results with the treatment variable ( )itM  as a binary variable indicating 
clients in the PLS and non-PLS financing mechanism. 
Table 5.16 shows the clients in the PLS, on average, increased their annual income by 8.1% compared 
with non-clients; this is positive and significant at the 5% level. However, the RHAE for clients in PLS 
decreased by 2.9% compared with non-clients, but the result is insignificant. Table 5.16 also shows 
the robust test of fixed effect estimation and the results for RHAI and RHAE are still the same, the 
only difference is in the standard errors.  
Table 5.17 presents the adjusted DID for clients in a non-PLS. The results show that clients in the non-
PLS increased their annual income by 6.8% compared with non-clients; this is significant at the 5% 
level. The RHAE for clients in the non-PLS decreased by 4.9% and is significant at the 10% level. 
However, when we test with the fixed effect robustness test the results remain the same for RHAI 
(the only difference is in the standard error) but for the RHAE the result become insignificant.  
Overall, the explanatory power of the fixed effects model is adequate (see R2, Tables 5.16 and 5.17). 
In both tables, the F-statistics are adequate and significant at the 1% level; this strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis of the fixed effects model in minimizing the selection bias in impact estimation.  
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Table 5.16 Fixed effect estimation of the impact of financing by Islamic MFIs on clients in PLS.  
 Dependent Variable 
Variable RHAI Robust RHAI RHAE Robust RHAE 
Intercept 16.9958*** 
(0.0125028) 
16.9958*** 
(0.0088319) 
16.43707*** 
(0.0120401) 
16.43707*** 
(0.0085051) 
Year dummy ( 2 )td  0.22100.036*** 
(0.0246064) 
0.22100.036*** 
(0.0273987) 
0.2591869*** 
(0.0236958) 
0.2591869*** 
(0.0247889) 
Control Variables ( )itX      
Major Loss dummy  
(ML) 
-0.0631844 
(0.0457544) 
-0.0631844 
(0.0555449) 
0.0628319 
(0.0440612) 
0.0628319 
(0.0575353) 
Treatment Variables 
( )itM  
    
Clients PLS  0.0815241** 
(0.0358662) 
0.0815241** 
(0.035100.02) 
-0.0298505 
(0.0345389) 
-0.0298505 
(0.0345354) 
     
F Statistic 66.36*** 112.04*** 77.15*** 91.70*** 
Household Fixed Effect Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
R-squared 0.4443 0.4443 0.4817 0.4817 
Total Observation 504 504 504 504 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
Table 5.17 Fixed effect estimation of the impact of financing by Islamic MFIs on clients in non- 
PLS. 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable RHAI Robust RHAI RHAE Robust RHAE 
Intercept 17.02535*** 
(0.0109277) 
17.02535*** 
(0.0077206) 
16.50624*** 
(0.0097873) 
16.50624*** 
(0.0069149) 
Year dummy ( 2 )td  0.2129289*** 
(0.0233418) 
0.2129289*** 
(0.0275456) 
0.2542484*** 
(0.0209059) 
0.2542484*** 
(0.0248224) 
Control Variables ( )itX      
Major Loss dummy  
(ML) 
-0.006661 
(0.038117) 
-0.006661 
(0.0442281) 
0.0974019*** 
(0.0341393) 
0.0974019* 
(0.0424112) 
Treatment Variables 
( )itM  
    
Clients non-PLS  0.0683734** 
(0.0314143) 
0.0683734** 
(0.0340736) 
-0.0497472* 
(0.0281361) 
-0.0497472 
(0.0311442) 
     
F Statistic 87.55*** 139.06*** 110.76*** 155.67*** 
Household Fixed Effect Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
Jointly 
significant 
R-squared 0.4676 0.4676 0.5264 0.5264 
Total Observation 604 604 604 604 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels for the t-test; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire.  
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Based on the summary of adjusted DID estimates (columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.18), the impact of 
financing on RHAI is better for both groups of clients compared with the standard DID estimation. In 
addition, the clients in the PLS financing mechanism experienced greater increase in RHAI than 
clients in the non-PLS financing mechanism. However, the impact of financing on RHAE is negative for 
both client groups; for clients in the PLS it is insignificant but for clients in the non-PLS it is significant 
at the 10% level. The robustness test confirms that the PLS mechanism is better; the results for non-
PLS remain the same except for the RHAE for non-PLS which becomes insignificant.    
Table 5.18 Summary of adjusted difference-in-difference estimation of two financing mechanisms 
in Islamic MFIs. 
Outcome  
variables 
Clients Estimation 
 
Robust  
RHAI 
PLS     0.081** (0.035)  0.081** (0.035)  
Non-PLS     0.068** (0.031)  0.068** (0.034)  
RHAE 
PLS  -0.029 (0.034)  -0.029 (0.034)  
Non-PLS   -0.049* (0.028)  -0.049 (0.031)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; 
*and ** represent 10% and 5% significance levels and means it is appropriate to use; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
5.5 Determining factors that influence rural household to become client of 
Islamic MFI 
Table 5.19 shows the estimated results of factors that influence rural households to become clients 
of Islamic MFIs. In general, the logistic model successfully predicted the possibility of rural 
households’ access to Islamic MFI at 70.63% (see Appendix B). The likelihood ratio test, which is the 
Chi-square statistic, is 65.74, significant at the 1 percent level with 10 degrees of freedom, which 
means rejecting the null hypothesis and that the logistic model can be used to explain the probability 
of rural households accessing Islamic MFIs. Based on the results, four of the ten variables have a 
significant influence on rural households becoming Islamic MFI clients. These are: Age, Age squared, 
Gender, and Income. Most variables have signs as hypothesised (Table 5.19). 
The positive and significant sign of Age indicates that rural households with higher ages have a higher 
probability of accessing finance from Islamic MFIs. The possible reason is that older rural households 
have more responsibility when they obtain financing from Islamic MFIs. Another reason is mature 
rural households usually have settled jobs compared with the youth. Conversely, the Age Squared is 
negative and significant which implies that rural households have certain or maximum ages to access 
Islamic MFIs. After the rural households have reached the maximum age set by Islamic MFIs, the 
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probability of accessing finance is low. The reason is that older clients have various risks such as 
retirement, getting diseases and being less productive.  
Gender shows a positive and significant sign, which indicates that male rural household members 
have a higher probability of accessing finance from Islamic MFIs. The reason is because most 
household heads in Indonesia are men and most household decisions including financial ones are 
influenced by men. This is why men have a higher probability of obtaining finance from Islamic MFIs 
than women. The rural households’ annual income exhibits a positive and significant sign which 
implies the higher income will lead to a higher probability of obtaining finance from Islamic MFIs. The 
possible reason is that rural households with high income have more capacity to repay the loans.  
Table 5.19 Factors influencing rural household to become client of Islamic MFI (logistic 
regression). 
Independent  
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Average 
Marginal 
Effect 
Age 2.060103*** 0.4749611 4.34 0.3850034 
Age Square -0.2758062*** 0.068518 -4.03 -0.0515442 
Gender 0.9167494*** 0.2304793 3.98 0.1713272 
Household Size 0.083492 0.0887255 0.94 0.0156035 
Education Level 0.1865408 0.2678583 0.70 0.0348618 
Official Status -0.2518213 0.3979556 -0.63 -0.0470618 
Additional Income 0.0680126 0.2271891 0.30 0.0127106 
Income 0.1708825* 0.0961412 1.78 0.0319355 
Expenditure 0.1194949 0.0878702 1.36 0.0223319 
Married 0.2706212 0.4381109 0.62    0.0505752 
Constant -5.057964*** 0.9238645 -5.47  
     
McFadden R-squared 0.1213    
Log likelihood -238.06987    
LR Statistics 65.74***    
Degrees of Freedom 10    
Total Observation 429    
 *, *** represent the 10%, and 1% significance levels and means it is appropriate to use; 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey questionnaire. 
 
Table 5.19 shows the average marginal effect for each variable of the logit model. The marginal 
effect provides an interpretation of the influence of variables on rural households’ access to Islamic 
MFIs (Phan, 2012). The marginal effect measures the change in probability of a certain choice made 
with respect to a unit change in an explanatory variable (Gao, 2011). For instance, the marginal effect 
of Age indicates that an increase in rural household age would increase by 38.5% the probability of a 
rural household becoming a client of an Islamic MFI. However, there is a certain maximum limit in 
age to becoming an Islamic MFI client, an additional increase in Age squared reduces the probability 
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of becoming a client by 5.1%. The probability of a rural household becoming an Islamic MFI client 
increases by 17.1% if the person is male. An increase in income of a rural household increases its 
probability by 3.1% of becoming an Islamic MFI client.   
In conclusion, the empirical results from the logistic regression show that rural households’ age, 
gender and income are three factors that influence a rural household to become an Islamic MFI 
client. This implies that Islamic MFIs consider age, gender and income of the rural household before 
disbursing finance.     
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed and described the characteristics of respondents, which include clients and 
non-clients of Islamic MFI. In this study, clients were categorised into three types: clients who 
received PLS financing; clients who received non-PLS financing; and clients who received both 
financing (PLS and non-PLS). The chapter also provided the welfare impact estimation with a 
standard DID method between clients and non-clients of Islamic MFIs. Following the DID estimation, 
the chapter provided the results of fixed effect regression estimation and fixed effect robustness 
tests for clients of Islamic MFIs. The standard DID, fixed effect regression, and fixed effect robustness 
test estimations show that financing from Islamic MFIs have positive and significant impacts on rural 
households’ incomes. This implies that rural households that received financing from Islamic MFIs 
will experience more increases in their incomes compared to non-clients.        
The Islamic values and shari’a compliance evaluation were also discussed in this chapter, the results 
show that financing from Islamic MFIs in this study parallels the standards set by the National 
Shari’ah Board of Indonesia. The Islamic values’ evaluation indicated that the financial activities of 
clients of Islamic MFIs in this study are influenced by their religious beliefs and they believe Islamic 
MFIs always give proper service to their clients according to Islamic values. The investigation of the 
two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs (PLS and non-PLS) show that PLS financing has more 
positive impacts on rural household incomes compared to non-PLS. Finally, Age, Age Squared, 
Gender, and Income are factors that influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFI.  
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the study of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia. Section 6.1 presents a summary of 
the study including the research objectives, data and methodology. Section 6.2 discusses the major 
findings of the study. Section 6.3 presents the implications of the research findings. Section 6.4 
discusses the research limitations and recommendations for future research are discussed in Section 
6.5.  
6.1 Summary 
Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia have undergone significant growth over the past two 
decades. This development started in early 1990 with the establishment of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia 
and these have played an important role in the development of Islamic banking and finance in 
Indonesia by acting as pioneers of Islamic financial institutions in the country. The main aim of this 
study is to investigate the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing on rural households’ welfare in Indonesia. 
There are four research objectives in this study: (i) to investigate the impact of Islamic MFIs’ financing 
on rural households’ welfare; (ii) to evaluate the Islamic values and shari’a compliance of MFIs; (iii) to 
investigate and evaluate the impact of two financing mechanisms (profit and loss sharing (PLS) and 
non-PLS) in Islamic MFIs; and to identify the factors that influence rural households to become 
Islamic MFIs’ clients.  
Chapter 1 defines the types of MFIs in the world. The chapter also provides an overview of Islamic 
MFIs especially their development in Indonesia. MFIs have the potential to provide financial access 
for poor people in rural areas and possess unique characteristics. The main feature of Islamic MFIs is 
that they are free from interest (riba) and all of products and services should parallel Islamic law 
(shari’a). A study of Islamic MFIs is important especially in a Muslim majority country like Indonesia. 
However, very few empirical studies focus on the impact of financing by Islamic MFIs, particularly in 
Indonesia.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of MFIs in Indonesia. An Islamic financial institution was first 
established in Indonesia in 1990. It started as an Islamic MFI (cooperative) in 1990, then became an 
Islamic rural bank in 1991 and an Islamic commercial bank in 1992. The first Islamic MFI in Indonesia 
was Ridho Gusti (a cooperative) that was established in 1990 in Bandung and most Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia follow the cooperative structure in their business. Indonesia also has Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI), which currently has around 39,000 offices in Indonesia. BRI plays an important role 
in helping to provide financial access for rural households in Indonesia and is the most successful MFI 
 123 
in Indonesia. It is a state-owned bank that focusses its business on micro lending. In 2014, BRI had 
over 50 million customers; around 31% of its lending was distributed to micro, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) via its micro-banking division. The micro-banking division alone covered around 7 
million clients in 2014. The types of MFIs in Indonesia include formal, semi-formal and informal MFIs. 
Formal MFIs are supervised by Indonesian financial authorities (e.g., Indonesia Financial Service 
Authority (OJK)). Semi-formal MFIs include various types of cooperatives and so-called village banks 
(bank desa); not all of these institutions are supervised by the financial authorities. Informal MFIs in 
Indonesia consist of a wide variety of self-help groups (SHG), channelling groups and rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAs), in Indonesia called “arisan”.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on Islamic MFIs’ impact on rural households’ welfare; shari’a 
compliance and Islamic values; the evaluation of two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs and 
factors that influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFIs. The review of Islamic MFI 
literature suggests that these institutions can play an important role to help poor Muslims access 
financial products and services. This is because the products and services from Islamic MFIs parallel 
Muslim beliefs. Moreover, Islamic MFIs located in rural areas have advantages in reaching rural 
households and providing shari’a financial products to them. The literature review shows that there 
is still a lack of a robust estimation technique on impact measurement of Islamic MFIs. The 
difference-in-difference (DID) method is a popular panel data technique to measure the impact of 
treatments in the absence of experimental data. The combination of the DID technique with the 
fixed effects method helps improve the estimation results of impact evaluation in Islamic MFIs’ 
financing. The Islamic MFIs are also required to follow shari’a standards which are set by Islamic 
scholars to ensure that their products and services parallel Islamic law. The shari’a compliance of 
products and services in Islamic MFIs is important because Muslims are prohibited from using 
financial products that do not conform to Islamic law. The review showed that sharia compliance 
issues possibly occur with Islamic financial products. Therefore, Islamic MFIs have a shari’a 
supervisory board to regularly monitor products and services.   
The literature review on two financing mechanisms in Islamic MFIs suggests that PLS is the ideal 
financing mechanism for Islamic financial institutions including Islamic MFIs; PLS financing makes 
Islamic MFIs different from conventional MFIs because PLS promotes sharing profits and losses 
between the institutions and their clients. However, financing today is still dominated by non-PLS 
financing mechanisms; for instance, according to Abdul-Rahman et al. (2014) PLS financing in the 
Malaysian Islamic bank comprises less than 3%; the majority is based on mark-up pricing and leasing 
which are included in the non-PLS financing mechanism. To date no empirical study has evaluated 
the two financing mechanisms and identified which mechanism has the better impact on clients. 
Most of the literature on impact evaluation did not separate the two financing mechanisms, 
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therefore it is difficult to identify which finance mode produces the greater impact for the clients. 
Finally, the chapter reviews the literature on the factors that determine if rural households become 
clients of Islamic MFIs. The review covers both theoretical and empirical models that focus on factors 
that influence rural households to become clients of Islamic MFIs.   
Chapter 4 discusses the research data collection and methodology. The conceptual and empirical 
framework for each objective is discussed in the chapter. The methods investigating the impact of 
microfinance on rural households’ welfare mostly used changes in income and expenditure. The 
review of shari’a compliance evaluation suggests that local shari’a standards is one mechanism used 
to identify whether there are violations of shari’a compliance. Previous studies evaluating the two 
financing mechanisms (PLS and non-PLS) in Islamic MFIs did not empirically evaluate the impact of 
the Islamic MFIs on the two financing mechanisms. Finally, a method to investigate the determining 
factors that influence rural households to become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs were 
also discussed in the chapter.  
Chapter 5 discusses the research results. The data description gives an overview of the data obtained 
to answer the four research objectives of the study. The findings of the study, the impact evaluation, 
shari’a compliance evaluation, the two financing mechanisms’ evaluation and factors that determine 
how rural households become clients are described. The DID estimation technique and fixed effect 
regressions in this study show that financing by Islamic MFIs has a positive impact on rural 
households’ welfare in terms of increased in income. The evaluation of the two Islamic MFI financing 
mechanisms (PLS and non-PLS) shows that PLS financing has a greater welfare impact than non-PLS. 
The assessment of shari’a compliance on Islamic financing contracts shows that most schemes 
parallel Indonesia’s shari’a board standards, which implies that Islamic MFIs follow the guidance and 
standards from Indonesia’s shari’a board.     
6.2 Major findings 
This study focuses on financing provided by Islamic MFIs in Indonesia. Primary and secondary data 
were used in this study. The primary data were collected using a structured questionnaire. Using 
convenience sampling, 429 usable surveys were returned from three areas of four Islamic MFIs in 
East Java Province. The sample was then divided into clients and non-clients and clients were further 
divided into clients with PLS and clients with non-PLS financing mechanisms. The survey 
questionnaire was personally administered to rural households from November 2014 to February 
2015. Secondary data were obtained from four Islamic MFIs to support the primary data. The 
evaluation of the two financing mechanisms and the impact measurement of financing by Islamic 
MFIs was based on a two-year rural households’ panel dataset. This study used cross-sectional data 
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to analyse shari’a compliance, Islamic values and the factors that determine how rural households 
become Islamic MFIs’ clients.  
This study used the double difference-in-difference (DID) approach to evaluate the impact of the two 
financing mechanisms (i.e., clients with PLS and clients with non-PLS) in Islamic MFIs. First, based on 
the DID method, this study identified which financing mechanism exhibits a more positive impact on 
rural household welfare. Next, a fixed effect regression and a fixed effect robustness test were used 
to minimize bias. Shari’a compliance and Islamic values’ evaluation were examined using mean 
scores through Likert-scale questions in the questionnaire. The examination was based on clients’ 
financing experiences; shari’a compliance is based on Indonesia’s shari’a board standards. Finally, 
factors that determine how rural households become Islamic MFIs’ clients were analysed using 
logistic regression.            
The financing impact evaluation results are summarised in Table 6.1. The shari’a compliance results 
and Islamic values’ evaluation are summarised in Table 6.2 and the logistic regression results for the 
determining factors in Table 6.3. For research objective one, the impact results show that financing 
by Islamic MFIs has a positive, significant impact on rural households’ welfare in terms of annual 
income (RHAI) (see Table 6.1). Financing from Islamic MFIs increased RHAI by 2.8% (significant at the 
1% level) in the standard DID analysis (see Table 5.7). The fixed effect regression (see Table 6.1) 
further confirms that financing by Islamic MFIs has a positive and significant impact on RHAI and 
helped increase RHAI by 6.8% (see Table 5.8).  
However, the impact on RHAE is negative and significant in the adjusted DID estimate (see Table 6.1), 
which implies that financing by Islamic MFIs decreases RHAE by 3.9% (significant at the 10% level) 
(see Table 5.8). The robustness test on the adjusted DID estimate shows that financing by Islamic 
MFIs has a positive impact on RHAI (see Table 6.1) and increases RHAI by 6.8%; this result is 
significant at the 5% level (see Table 5.9). The control variable, major loss (ML), is positive and 
significant on RHAE (at the 10% level) and implies ML experienced by rural households will affect 
their expenditures (increase their expenditure by 5.2%) (see Table 5.9).    
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Table 6.1 Islamic MFIs clients’ welfare estimates compared with non-clients. 
Dependent variables 
 Clients  
All PLS Non-PLS 
Standard DID Analysis    
Income (+) (+) (+) 
Expenditure (0) (0) (0) 
Adjusted DID Analysis    
Income (+) (+) (+) 
Expenditure (-) (0) (-) 
Adjusted DID Analysis (Robust)    
Income (+) (+) (+) 
Expenditure (0) (0) (0) 
 
To answer research objective three, evaluation by standard DID analysis of the two Islamic MFIs 
financing mechanisms shows that clients with PLS financing can increase their income more than 
clients with non-PLS financing. Clients with PLS financing can increase their income by 3.2% but only 
2.9% for clients with non-PLS financing; both results are significant at the 1% level (see Table 5.16). 
The adjusted DID estimates consistently support the standard DID analysis, whereas PLS financing 
increases RHAI by 8.1% and non-PLS financing increases RHAI by 6.8%; both are significant at the 5% 
level (see Table 5.19).  
However, the impact on RHAE is negative and significant at the 10% level for non-PLS financing in the 
adjusted DID estimate (see Table 6.1), which implies that financing by Islamic MFIs decreases the 
RHAE of clients with non-PLS financing by 4.9% (see Table 5.19). The robustness test in fixed effect 
estimation shows consistent results for RHAI; PLS financing exhibited greater impact on RHAI than 
non-PLS financing (see Table 5.21). Clients with PLS financing show RHAI increased by 8.1% but for 
clients with non-PLS financing RHAI increased only 6.8%; both are significant at the 5% level (see 
Table 5.21). The control variable, major loss (ML), has a positive, significant effect on RHAE for non-
PLS clients. This implies that rural households that experienced ML increased their expenditure by 
9.7% (significant at the 10% level) (see Tables 5.18 and 5.20).       
To answer research objective two, summaries of the shari’a compliance evaluation show that 
financing received by rural households paralleled the standards of Indonesia’s shari’a board (see 
Table 6.2). Using a 7-point Likert scale with a minimum score implies that financing by Islamic MFIs is 
not compatible with the shari’a board’s standards, the maximum score indicates otherwise. Three 
schemes were observed in this study: mudarabah, murabahah, and qard. Each scheme was 
evaluated by two criteria that are required by Indonesia’s shari’a board standards; most schemes 
received by rural households are compatible with the standards (see Table 5.13). The average mean 
score for the mudarabah scheme is 5.18, murabahah is 5.40 and qard is 5.99 (see Table 6.2). The 
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results show that non-PLS financing exhibited a higher score than PLS financing in shari’a compliance 
evaluation.    
Table 6.2 Clients’ shari’a compliance and Islamic values evaluation. 
Schemes/Mechanism                                                                     Average Mean Score 
Shari’a Compliance Evaluation 
PLS 
Mudarabah (profit-sharing) 5.18 
Non-PLS 
Murabahah (cost plus mark-up) 5.40 
Qard (benevolent loan) 5.99 
Islamic Values Evaluation 
PLS 4.94 
Non-PLS 4.99 
Mixed PLS & Non-PLS 4.34 
All clients 4.94 
  
To answer research objective two, the Islamic values evaluation is summarised in Table 6.2. The 
evaluation is based on 10 values and evaluated only for Islamic MFI clients. The Islamic values 
evaluated in this study are highly correlated with the clients’ financial decisions, financing experience 
and their knowledge of Islamic MFIs. We used a 7-point Likert scale for each statement of Islamic 
values. The maximum score implies that Islamic MFIs’ clients exhibit good Islamic values and a 
minimum score indicates otherwise. The average score for clients with PLS financing is 4.94, clients 
with non-PLS financing 4.99, clients with mixed financing is 4.34 and for all clients 4.94 (see Table 
6.2). Overall, the average mean scores imply that most clients refer to the Islamic values before they 
make their financial decisions; Islamic values influence their daily life, clients have ample knowledge 
of Islamic MFIs and, finally, the results also indicate that Islamic MFIs give clear information about 
their products and services to the clients.   
Addressing the final research objective (four) regarding the factors that determine rural households 
becoming clients and receiving financing from Islamic MFIs, the results show that four of the 10 
factors investigated in this study are significant. The factors are Age, Age squared, Gender, and 
Income. Age has a positive, significant impact (at the 1% level) on influencing rural households to 
become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs. The results indicate that an increase in age 
parallels an increase in respondents’ likelihood to become Islamic MFIs’ clients (see Table 5.22 and 
6.3). The second factor, Age squared has a negative and significant impact (at the 1% level) on rural 
households. This implies that Islamic MFIs have a maximum age limit in giving finance to rural 
households in Indonesia (see Tables 5.22 and 6.3). Gender also influences rural households to 
become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs. The result shows males have a greater 
likelihood to become an Islamic MFI client than females (see Tables 5.22 and 6.3).  
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Finally, Income has positive, significant impact (at the 10% level) in influencing rural households to 
become Islamic MFI clients. The result indicates that rural households with a greater income have a 
greater likelihood of becoming clients and receiving finance from Islamic MFIs (see Tables 5.22 and 
6.3).                      
Table 6.3 Determining factors affecting rural household to become client of Islamic MFI. 
Factor All Respondents 
Age (+) 
Age square (-) 
Gender (male) (+) 
Household size (0) 
Education level 
Official status 
(0) 
(0) 
Additional income (0) 
Income (+) 
Expenditure (0) 
Marital status (married) (0) 
 
6.3 Implication of the research findings 
The findings of this study have several implications for academics, rural households, the Islamic MFI 
Industry association, and policy makers in Indonesia.   
6.3.1 Academic implications 
The study findings contribute to academia by filling the gap in the literature on the evaluation of the 
two Islamic MFIs financing mechanisms (PLS and non-PLS). To date, no empirical study has evaluated 
these financing mechanisms. The results show that PLS financing has more impact on rural 
households than non-PLS financing. Previous studies such as Dusuki and Abdullah (2006), Asutay 
(2007), Azmat et al. (2015), Chong and Liu (2009), and Ibrahim and Mirakhor (2014) argued that PLS 
financing is the ideal financing mechanism in Islamic finance, and that this mechanism makes Islamic 
finance different from conventional finance.. The use of DID, adjusted DID and the robustness test in 
the impact evaluation is also a major contribution to the Islamic finance literature.     
In addition, the results show that no issues of shari’a compliance exist. This implies that financing by 
Islamic MFIs is already compatible with Indonesia’s shari’a board standards. The Islamic values’ 
evaluation results reveal that Islamic MFIs’ clients have a good knowledge of Islamic MFIs and the 
Islamic values embedded in their daily life. This study also identified Age, Age squared, Gender and 
Income as factors that influence rural households to become Islamic MFIs’ clients.   
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6.3.2 Rural household implications 
The findings also have some implications for rural households. This study found that Islamic MFIs 
helped to increase RHAI by 6.8%. Clients with PLS financing scheme can increase their income by 
8.1% during the financing period. Based on these results, rural households may consider Islamic MFIs 
as important institutions to help increase family welfare. In addition, the results show that financing 
by Islamic MFIs parallels the shari’a standards based on the National Shari’a Board of Indonesia. This 
implies the products and services from Islamic MFIs are already parallel with the Muslim households’ 
beliefs. Therefore, if Muslim rural households seek shari’a compliance financing, they may seek 
Islamic MFIs as their finance source. Factors that determine how rural households become clients of 
Islamic MFIs are a source of information for rural households before applying for finance with Islamic 
MFIs.      
6.3.3 Islamic MFI industry implications 
The Islamic MFI industry may benefit from this study’s findings. First, the results reveal that clients’ 
perceptions of Islamic MFIs are good. Based on the Islamic values’ evaluation, clients agreed that 
most Islamic MFIs in Indonesia fulfil the requirements of Indonesia’s shari’a board. Moreover, based 
on the clients’ experience, Islamic MFIs in Indonesia clearly describe their products and services and, 
the orientation of Islamic MFIs is not only for profit but also for social purposes. In addition, the 
Islamic MFI industry may discover rural households’ lack of awareness of Islamic MFIs based on this 
study. The results show that about 22.9% of non-clients are not aware that Islamic MFIs exist in their 
area and around 27% of them answered that a lack of marketing and promotion is a major reason 
(see Table 5.3).    
6.3.4 Association implications 
The associations such as the Centre for Micro Enterprise Incubation or Pusat Inkubasi Bisnis dan 
Usaha Kecil (PINBUK), BMT Centre, Dompet Dhuafa, and Induk Koperasi Syariah BMT (Inkopsyah 
BMT) that are concerned with the development of Islamic MFIs in Indonesia may use the study’s 
findings for their reference. The research results, i.e., impact evaluation, shari’a compliance and 
Islamic values assessment, and identifying the determining factors that influence rural households to 
receive finance may motivate the associations to continue to develop Islamic MFIs in Indonesia.   
6.3.5 Implications for policy makers 
The findings show a positive and significant impact of financing by Islamic MFIs on rural households’ 
welfare (income). PLS financing can help improve RHAI by 8.1% within two years. The results also 
reveal that Islamic MFIs’ financing is already compatible with Indonesia’s shari’a board standards. 
Factors that determine how rural households become clients and receive finance from Islamic MFIs 
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were also identified in this study. According to Karim et al. (2008) the development of Islamic MFIs is 
influenced by government regulation. In Indonesia, Islamic MFIs suffer from prudential regulations, 
monitoring and supervision by the relevant financial authority (Seibel & Dwi Agung, 2006). Therefore, 
the Indonesian government needs to strengthen the regulations especially to support the 
development of Islamic MFIs. In addition, the government should improve the monitoring and 
supervisory systems in Indonesia, especially setting up a reliable database of Islamic MFIs in 
Indonesia. This research, hopefully, may enlighten policy makers in Indonesia about the potential of 
Islamic MFIs as one solution in poverty alleviation.     
6.4 Research limitations 
There are several limitations in this study especially associated with the sample selection, data 
collection and assessment approach. The limitations are: 
• This research covers only clients from four Islamic MFIs in East Java, Indonesia. In addition, the 
study area was restricted to three regencies in East Java. Therefore, the findings may not be 
representative of Indonesia. With regard to financing schemes, only three schemes were 
discovered in this research: mudarabah (PLS); murabahah (non-PLS); and qard (non-PLS). Hence, 
the results may not represent the characteristics of all schemes from Islamic MFIs.    
• This study captured only current data and information on Islamic MFIs’ clients and non-clients. 
No data are available on non-clients who might have borrowed and dropped out during this 
study (survey). In addition, there are no previous data of Islamic MFIs’ clients who might borrow 
from conventional financial institutions.   
• This study used rural household outcomes (such as income and expenditure) to investigate the 
impact of financing by Islamic MFIs. Since there is no reliable and proper database of Islamic 
MFIs and their clients in Indonesia, the data in this study rely heavily on primary data collected 
through a survey questionnaire; if rural households did not provide accurate data, this would 
impact on the reliability of the estimates.     
• There is only one control variable (major loss) used in the adjusted DID estimation and 
robustness test in this study because of the unavailability of a data panel for other control 
variables. However, the control variable in this study significantly affected rural households’ 
expenditure. Other control variables such as household size and income earner may be 
considered for inclusion in future study, because the variables might have influence on rural 
household income and expenditure.    
• The shari’a compliance evaluation in this research compares only the perceptions and experience 
of clients and Indonesia’s shari’a board standards. This research does not use any other standard 
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such as standards set by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI). 
6.5 Recommendations for future research 
Future research should expand the scope of this study to include more areas/provinces in Indonesia. 
Further the household sample size should be expanded in order to better represent the population. 
Future research should also consider different techniques to obtain the study sample. A probability 
sampling technique is recommended in order to generalise the findings. At the moment, there is no 
reliable database of Islamic MFIs or Islamic MFIs’ clients in Indonesia.   
To provide a comprehensive study of the impact evaluation of the two financing mechanisms, more 
Islamic finance schemes such as musyarakah or ijarah should be included in future research. Future 
research should also enlarge the sample for each Islamic finance scheme to get better estimates of 
their impact. Future research should also consider other impacts of Islamic MFIs such as on business 
knowledge, skill and religious activities.   
With regard to Islamic values evaluation, future research can include panel data for before and after 
financing to identify any change of clients’ religious activities. These data can enrich the study about 
Islamic values evaluation and the research can estimate the impact of financing from Islamic MFIs on 
changes in clients’ Islamic values. Future research can also measure the impact of the two Islamic 
MFIs’ financing mechanisms on the clients’ Islamic values and identify which financing mechanism 
has the greater impact on clients’ Islamic values.  
Regarding the factors that determine rural households becoming clients of Islamic MFIs, future 
research should include variables not discussed in this study (e.g., ethnographies and demographics) 
in order to expand other possible factors that may influence the accessibility of Islamic MFI financing. 
Future research can also survey the Islamic MFIs’ perspective in order to get a comprehensive study 
rather than from only the clients’ perspective.  
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Appendix A 
Description of Variables Used in Welfare Impact Estimation 
A.1 Description of variables used for general clients 
Variables  Type of variable Description of variables 
RHAI Continuous Log of rural household annual income 
RHAE Continuous Log of rural household annual expenditure 
ML Dummy Major loss indicator equal to “1” if yes and “0” otherwise 
Year Dummy Year indicator equal to “1” for 2014 and “0” otherwise  
Clients of 
Islamic MFI  
Dummy Clients of Islamic MFI equal to “1” if yes and “0’ otherwise 
A.2 Description of variables used for clients with PLS financing 
Variables  Type of variable Description of variables 
RHAI Continuous Log of rural household annual income 
RHAE Continuous Log of rural household annual expenditure 
ML Dummy Major loss indicator equal to “1” if yes and “0” otherwise 
Year Dummy Year indicator equal to “1” for 2014 and “0” otherwise  
Clients with 
PLS financing 
Dummy Clients with PLS financing equal to “1” if yes and “0’ 
otherwise 
A.3 Description of variables used for clients with non-PLS financing 
Variables  Type of variable Description of variables 
RHAI Continuous Log of rural household annual income 
RHAE Continuous Log of rural household annual expenditure 
ML Dummy Major loss indicator equal to “1” if yes and “0” otherwise 
Year Dummy Year indicator equal to “1” for 2014 and “0” otherwise  
Clients with 
non-PLS 
financing 
Dummy Clients with non-PLS financing equal to “1” if yes and “0’ 
otherwise 
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Appendix B 
Actual and Predicted Outcomes of Logit 
 
Actual Respondents 
Client Non-Client Total 
Number of correct predictions 259 96 355 
% of correct predictions 89.62 31.43 82.7 
Number of incorrect predictions 30 44 74 
% of incorrect predictions 72.96 59.46 17.24 
Predicted probability 70.63 
Note: Numbers obtained from logit model. 
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Appendix C 
Pairwise Correlation of the Independent Variables for Logit  
 Age Age Square Gender 
Household 
Size 
Education 
Level 
Official 
Status 
Additional 
Income 
Income Expenditure Married 
Age 1          
Age Square 0.9771* 1         
Gender 0.1581* 0.1719* 1        
Household Size -0.0119 -0.0428 0.0519 1       
Education Level -0.1048* -0.1009* -0.0459 -0.0749 1      
Official Status 0.1440* 0.1369* -0.0531 -0.0891 0.1605* 1     
Additional 
Income 
0.0782 0.0615 -0.0269 0.0340 0.1031* 0.0532 1    
Income 0.0045 -0.0167 0.0473 -0.0363 0.1374* 0.1551* 0.0301 1   
Expenditure 0.1129 0.0851 0.0419 -0.0094 0.1358* 0.2082* 0.0586 0.6774* 1  
Married 0.1523* 0.0818 0.0196 0.0850* 0.0002 0.0580 0.1116 0.0653 0.1205* 1 
Note: *indicates significance level at least 5%. 
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Appendix D 
Survey Questionnaire 
Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce 
 
T 64 3 325 2811 
F 64 3 325 3847 
PO Box 84, Lincoln University 
Lincoln 7647, Christchurch 
New Zealand 
 
www.lincoln.ac.nz 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
If you are aged 18 years or above and head of a household, you are invited to participate in a survey that 
constitutes part of my PhD thesis at Lincoln University, New Zealand.  This study investigates the financing 
of Islamic MFIs to the rural households in Indonesia. This study also examines the shari’a compliance in 
Islamic MFIs products and services and current government support programmes to Islamic MFIs’ clients. 
This survey is completely voluntary in nature and you are free not to participate. However, if you 
complete the questionnaire and return it to me, it will be understood that you are 18 years of age or 
older, head of a household and have consented to participate in this survey and consent to publication of 
the results of this research with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  
Your participation is of great assistance to this research. This survey will take a maximum of 45 minutes to 
complete. I would be grateful if you would complete the questionnaire and return it to me once you have 
finished. Your contact details were obtained from the Islamic MFI. As the questionnaire is anonymous, no 
questions are asked that would identify you as an individual. All responses will be aggregated for analysis 
and no personal details will be reported in the thesis, any resulting future academic publications or to any 
third parties. The identity of any participant will not be made known to any person other than the 
researcher, his or her supervisors and the Human Ethics Committee of Lincoln University, without the 
participant’s consent.  
If you have any question about this survey, feel free to contact me on +62354 686191 or by email at 
BayuArie.Fianto@lincolnuni.ac.nz. You may also contact my supervisors Prof Christopher Gan, Dr Baiding 
Hu and Dr Jamal Roudaki. Prof Christopher Gan can be contacted at +64 3 4230227 or 
Christopher.Gan@lincoln.ac.nz; Dr Baiding Hu can be contacted at +64 3 4230231 or 
Baiding.Hu@lincoln.ac.nz and Dr Jamal Roudaki can be contacted at +64 3 4230234 or 
Jamal.Roudaki@lincoln.ac.nz. 
 
Thank you for your kind co-operation and assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Bayu Arie Fianto 
PhD Candidate, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce 
 Research Supervisors: 
Prof  Christopher Gan 
Professor 
Faculty of Agribusiness and 
& Commerce 
Lincoln University 
 Dr Baiding Hu 
Senior Lecturer 
Faculty of Agribusiness & Commerce 
Lincoln University 
Dr Jamal Roudaki 
Senior Lecturer 
Faculty of Agribusiness & Commerce 
Lincoln University 
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Islamic Microfinance Institutions Financing’ Survey 
 
Instructions: For each question with brackets provided, please tick your answer(s); otherwise, please 
follow the instructions given to answer the questions. Your participation is voluntary and your answers 
will be kept confidential.  
 
Section 1. Accessibility and Impact of Islamic Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)  
  
1.  Did you need to borrow money at any time in the last 2 years? 
a.  YES   [  ]  b.   NO   [  ] 
(If YES, please go to Q2; if NO, please skip to Q5) 
 
2.  Were you able to get the financing? 
a.  YES   [  ]  b.   NO   [  ] 
(If YES, go to Q3; if NO, please go to Q6 and then proceed to section 2) 
 
3.  What was your main source of financing? 
a.  Formal financial institution        [ ] 
b.  Informal financial institution         [ ] 
c. Both sources        [ ] 
 
4.  Which source(s) of financing did you obtain?  
(You can tick more than one) 
1. Formal sources 2. Informal sources 
a. Commercial bank s(e.g., Bank 
Mandiri) 
b. Islamic commercial bank (e.g., 
Bank Syariah Mandiri) 
c. Islamic business unit  
(e.g., BPD Jawa Timur) 
d.    Islamic rural bank   
       (e.g., BPRS Bhakti Makmur 
Indah) 
d. Pawnshop  
(e.g., PT. Pegadaian) 
e. Islamic pawnshop  
(e.g., PT. Pegadaian syariah)                                                        
f. Others (specify)______             
 
[      ]  
        
[      ]        
   
[      ]        
    
[      ]        
 
[      ] 
[      ] 
a. Private money lender  
(e.g., usurers) 
b. Trade financing, 
wholesaler or retailer            
c. Input supplier/dealer  
d. Friends/Relatives  
e. Rural aid society  
f. Others (specify)______              
 
[      ]  
 
[      ]        
 
[      ]    
[      ]    
[      ]    
[      ] 
        
 
5.  If No, why didn’t you borrow?  
 (You can tick more than one) 
a. Had enough savings/earnings from other sources [ ] 
b.  Received financial assistance from the government  [ ] 
c.  Do not qualify for financing [ ] 
d.  Did not like to incur debt  [ ] 
e.  Interest rates were not affordable  [ ] 
 f.  Too many required documents to submit  [ ] 
 g.  Uncertainty in repaying the financing  [ ] 
 h.  Other(s), please specify ________________ 
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6. Do you know about Islamic MFIs in your township? 
a. YES  [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Q8) 
  
7.  If YES, which type(s) of Islamic MFI(s) is available in your township?  
 (You can tick more than one) 
a. Islamic financial services cooperatives (KJKS) [ ] 
b. Islamic financial services unit (UJKS) [  ] 
c.  Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil (BMT) [ ] 
d. Other(s), please specify ________________ 
  
8. What were the reasons you do not know about Islamic MFIs in your township? 
 (You can tick more than one) 
a. Islamic MFIs in my township do not promote themselves.   [ ] 
b. I thought all financial institutions are the same including Islamic MFIs    [ ] 
c. I do not know if any Islamic MFIs exist in my township.   [ ] 
d. It is not really important for me       [ ] 
e. Other reason(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
 
Section 2. Clients of Islamic MFIs  
 
1. Did you borrow from any Islamic MFI over the last 2 years? 
a. YES [ ]   b. NO [ ] 
(If NO, please proceed to section 3) 
 
2.  Based on your largest financing amount, which Islamic MFI did you borrow from over the last 
2 years? 
a. Islamic financial services cooperatives (KJKS) [ ] 
b. Islamic financial services unit (UJKS) [  ] 
c.  Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil (BMT) [ ] 
d. Other(s), please specify ________________  
 
3.  How many times did you borrow from Islamic MFIs in the last 2 years? 
a. Once [ ] 
b. Twice [  ] 
c. Three times  [ ] 
d.   More than three times  [ ] 
 
4. What was the total amount of financing you applied from Islamic MFIs? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
f.  More than Rp. 15,000,000  [ ] 
 
5. What was the total amount of financing approved by the Islamic MFI in your application? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
f.  More than Rp. 15,000,000  [ ] 
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6. Was the amount of financing approved adequate? 
a.  YES      [            ]                                      b. NO        [             ] 
 
7.  If inadequate, did you borrow from other financial institution(s)? 
a.  YES      [            ]                                      b. NO        [             ] 
 
8. If YES, where did you obtain your additional financing? (You can tick more than one source) 
1. Formal sources 2. Informal sources  
a. Commercial banks (e.g., Bank 
Mandiri) 
b. Islamic commercial bank  
(e.g., Bank Syariah Mandiri) 
c. Islamic business unit  
      (e.g., BPD Jawa Timur) 
d.   Islamic rural bank  
      (e.g., BPRS Bhakti Makmur 
       Indah) 
d. Pawnshop  
      (e.g., PT. Pegadaian) 
e. Islamic pawnshop  
      (e.g., PT. Pegadaian syariah)                                                        
f. Others (specify)______             
 
[      ]  
        
[      ]        
   
[      ]        
    
[      ]        
 
[      ] 
[      ] 
a. a.   Private money lender  
(e.g., usurers) 
b. b.   Trade, wholesaler or 
retailer            
c. Input supplier/dealer  
d. Friends/Relatives  
e. Rural aid society  
f. Others (specify)______              
 
[      ]  
 
[      ]        
 
[      ]    
[      ]    
[      ]    
[   ] 
        
 
9.  What was the purpose of your borrowing? (You can tick more than one reason) 
Agricultural activities 
a.  Farm cropping  [ ] 
b.  Livestock raising  [ ] 
c. Produce processing  [ ] 
d.  Purchase of farming machinery  [ ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify _____________________________ 
 
Non-agricultural activities 
a.  To start a self-run enterprise  [ ] 
b.  To finance an existing enterprise  [ ] 
c.  To finance a small-scale project  [ ] 
d.  Basic household needs  [ ] 
e.  To pay for children’s education  [ ] 
f.  Emergency (e.g., hospitalisation)  [ ] 
g.  Housing (e.g., repair, construction)  [ ] 
h.  Paying off other debts  [ ] 
i.  Other(s), please specify_______________________ 
 
10.  What was the duration of your financing?  
a.  3 to 6 months  [ ] 
b.  7 to 12 months  [ ] 
c.  1 to 2 years [ ] 
d.  2 to 3 years  [ ] 
e.  More than 3 years  [ ] 
 
11.  What was the mode of your financing payment? 
a.  Weekly  [  ] 
b.  Monthly  [ ] 
c.  Semi-annually  [ ] 
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d.  Annually  [ ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify ____________________ 
 
12.  Did your borrowing require collateral? 
a. YES [ ] b.  NO  [ ] 
 
13.  If YES, what kind of collateral was required? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Mortgage property  [ ] 
b.  Chattels mortgage (i.e., vehicles, farm equipment)  [ ] 
c.  Promissory note  [ ] 
d.  Co-signer/co-guarantor  [ ] 
e.  Deposits  [ ] 
f.  Other(s), please specify _______________ 
 
14.  What is the status of your most recent financing? 
a.  Fully paid  [ ] 
b.  Current  [ ] 
c.  Past due  [ ] 
d.  Restructured  [ ] 
 
15.  How long did the Islamic MFI take to process your financing application? 
a.  Less than a week  [ ] 
b.  1 week  [ ] 
c.  2 weeks  [ ] 
d.  3 weeks  [ ] 
e.  1 month  [ ] 
f.  More than a month  [ ] 
  
16.  Did any village committee member refer you to an Islamic MFI? 
a. YES  [ ]  b.     NO  [ ] 
 
17.  If YES, which types (s) of Islamic MFI did they recommend to you?  
(You can tick more than one) 
a.  Islamic financial services cooperatives (KJKS) [ ] 
b. Islamic financial services unit (UJKS) [  ] 
c.  Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil [ ] 
d. Other(s), please specify ________________  
 
18.  How long have you been a client of an Islamic MFI? 
a.  Less than 1 year                                                                                    [  ] 
b.  1 to 2 years  [  ] 
c.  2 to 3 years  [  ] 
d.  3 to 4 years  [  ] 
e. More than 5 years [  ] 
 
19. Do you have savings with an Islamic MFI? 
a. YES  [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
20. What is the distance of the nearest Islamic MFI in your area? 
a.   1 - 5 kilometres        [ ] 
b.   6 - 10 kilometres        [ ] 
c.   11 - 15 kilometres        [ ] 
d.   16 - 20 kilometres        [ ] 
e.   Over 20 kilometres        [ ] 
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21. Was there any charge(s) on your financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
22. If YES, what were these charge(s)? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Administrative or service fee      [ ] 
b. Insurance fee        [ ] 
c. Guarantee fee        [ ] 
d. Legal fee         [ ] 
e. Other(s), please specify ________________      
 
23. Did you have to make any informal payment (such as gifts or money for financing officials, etc) 
to get the financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
 
Section 3. Non-Clients of Islamic MFIs  
 
1.  Do you have any intention to borrow in the future? 
a.  YES  [ ]  b.    NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please proceed to section 4) 
 
2.  If YES, where do you intend to borrow from?   
a.  Formal financial institution        [ ] 
b.  Informal financial institution         [ ] 
c. Both sources        [ ] 
 
3.  Would you borrow from an Islamic MFI if available in your area? 
a.  YES [ ]  b.   NO   [ ] 
 
4.  If NO, what are your reasons for not borrowing from an Islamic MFI? 
 (You can tick more than one reason) 
a.  Insufficient income/assets  [ ] 
b.  Incurred previous financing(s) or bad financing record  [ ] 
c.  Have no collateral  [ ] 
d.  Have difficulty in completing the required documents  [ ] 
e.  Islamic MFIs financing application process takes too much time  [ ] 
f.  I could access informal institutions much more easily  [ ] 
g. Islamic MFIs charge higher costs  [ ] 
h.  Other(s), please specify ___________________ 
 
 
Section 4. Welfare Impact of Islamic MFIs’ Financing — All Respondents 
(This section is for all respondents (clients or non-clients of Islamic MFIs)) 
 
1.  What kind of production assets do you owned? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Farm land  [ ] 
b.  Cow/buffalo  [ ] 
c.  Agricultural tools (reaping hook, plough, sprayer, etc.)  [ ] 
d.  Tractor, machinery  [  ] 
e.  Fishing net, boat for fishing  [  ] 
f.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
2.  Do you own a house? 
a.  YES [ ]  b.     No, I rent it  [  ] 
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3.  If YES, what kind of house do you owned? 
a.  Brick house  [  ] 
b.  Wooden house  [  ] 
c.  Makeshift house  [  ] 
d.  Other(s), please specify __________________ 
 
4.  What kind of household assets do you own? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Savings [  ] 
b.  Motorcycle  [  ] 
c.  Bicycle  [  ] 
d.  Telephone  [  ] 
e.  Household appliances (TV, radio, etc.)  [  ] 
f.  Furniture  [  ] 
g. Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
5.  Did you receive any assistance from the government in the last 2 years? 
a.  YES  [  ]  b.      NO  [  ] 
(If NO, please go to Q7). 
 
6.  What kind of assistance did you receive? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Cash subsidies  [  ] 
b.  Inputs of agricultural production (e.g., fertiliser, pesticide, seeds)  [  ] 
c.  Subsistence support (e.g., grain, vegetables, chicken, goat)  [  ] 
d.  Interest-subsidised financing for poverty alleviation (not micro financing)  [  ] 
e.  Subsidized housing  [  ] 
f.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
7. What is/are your type of farming activities? (You can tick more than one)  
a.  Crop farming  [  ] 
b.  Livestock raising  [  ] 
c.  Processing produce (poultry, fish, rice, corn, etc.)  [  ] 
d.  Fishing  [  ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
8.  What is/are your primary source of household income? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Crop farming  [  ] 
b.  Livestock raising  [  ] 
c.  Processing produce (poultry, fish, rice, corn, etc.)  [  ] 
d.  Fishing  [  ] 
e.  Government worker  [  ] 
f.  Self-owned enterprise  [  ] 
g.  Small-scale project  [  ] 
h.  Migrant worker’s wages  [  ] 
i.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
9.  Does your household have any subsidiary income? 
a.  YES  [  ]  b.      NO  [  ] 
 
10.  If YES, what is the source(s) of your household subsidiary income?                                    
(You can tick more than one) 
a.  Rental of house/land  [  ] 
b.  Teaching  [  ] 
c.  Street selling (e.g., newspapers, fruits, cold drinks, etc.)  [  ] 
d.  Handicrafts  [  ] 
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e.  Collecting recycles materials (e.g., bottles, boxes, etc.)  [  ] 
f.  Poultry/fish processing  [  ] 
g. Rice/corn milling  [  ] 
h.  Relief payment from government  [  ] 
i.  Remittance from other family member  [  ] 
j.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
11.  Have you experienced a major loss over the past two years? 
a.  YES  [  ]  b.      NO  [  ] 
 
12.  If YES, what kinds of loss (es) have you experienced? 
(You can tick more than one) 
a.  Bankruptcy  [  ] 
b.  Natural disaster  [  ] 
c.  Crop failure  [  ] 
d.  Other(s), please specify _____________________ 
 
 
Section 5. Islamic Values and Schemes of Islamic MFIs for Rural Households  
 
Below there is a series of statements pertaining to your attitude toward Islamic financing. Please 
CIRCLE how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on a scale of 1 to 7. 
1- strongly disagree (SD), 7- strongly agree (SA).  
(This section is only for Islamic MFIs clients.) 
 
 SD   Neutral   SA 
1. My spiritual beliefs affect every aspect of 
my life including my financial activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My spiritual beliefs play an important 
role before I decided to borrow 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I always consider my spiritual beliefs 
before I make any decision on my financial 
activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I always follow the guidance of the 
scholars of my spiritual beliefs in my 
financial activities  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I always use financial products that 
parallel my spiritual beliefs even if they are 
more expensive or more sophisticated  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Most of Islamic MFIs’ schemes in 
Indonesia fulfil the Indonesia shari’ah 
supervisory board standards 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I believe the Indonesian shari’ah 
supervisory board always monitors Islamic 
MFIs’ products and services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Islamic MFIs always clearly describe their 
products and services to their clients 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. If there is any dispute, I believe Islamic 
MFIs will take reasonable attempts that 
parallel Islamic values to resolve the 
problems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I believe the aim of Islamic MFIs is not 
only profit oriented but also to help people 
and spread Islamic values 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Islamic MFIs’ Schemes 
1.  What is the type of your Islamic MFI financing? 
a. Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS)       [ ]  
b.     Non-Profit and Loss Sharing (Non-PLS)      [ ] 
 
2.  What is your financing scheme? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Murabahah        [  ] 
b. Salam         [  ] 
c. Ijarah Wa Iqtina’        [  ] 
d. Qard         [  ] 
e. Mudharabah        [  ] 
f. Musyarakah  [  ] 
g. Muzara’ah         [  ]  
h. Muzaqat         [  ] 
 
 
3. Shari’ah compliance  
Below is a series of statements about shari’ah compliance standards from Indonesia’s shari’ah board 
(DSN). Based on your experience, please CIRCLE how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 7. 1- strongly disagree (SD), 7-strongly agree (SA). (Please 
answer only the section that is approriate to your financing schemes)  
 
 SD   Neutral   SA 
Non-PLS 
Murabahah (cost plus mark up) 
1. Ownership of the goods or assets 
belongs to the Islamic MFI before the 
transaction (before goods are sold to the 
clients) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Islamic MFIs always disclose the cost of 
goods and their margin before proceeding 
to a sale and purchase agreement  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bai’ Salam (forward contract) 
1. Before the transaction, Islamic MFIs and 
clients always discuss and agree  on the 
quality, quantity, and delivery time of the 
goods 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Payment from Islamic MFIs is made at 
the time the contract was agreed, delivery 
of the goods from clients is later 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ijarah Wa Iqtina’ (lease and sale) 
1. Clients of Islamic MFIs have to take an 
Ijarah (leasing) contract first before 
proceeding to an Ijarah wa iqtina’ contract 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. There is no requirement from Islamic 
MFIs to buy the goods at the end of the 
Ijarah (leasing) period   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Qard (benevolent loan/financing) 
1. Islamic MFIs do not ask for any benefit 
from the loan/financing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Islamic MFIs always consider 
rescheduling or writing off of the 
loan/financing if clients have difficulty in 
repaying the loan/financing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PLS 
Mudharabah  (trustee financing) 
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1. Islamic MFIs contribute 100% of the 
capital and clients contribute the effort 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Losses are borne by the Islamic MFI as 
long as there is no fraud or negligence by 
the client  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Musharakah  (equity participation) 
1. A guarantee is not compulsory in this 
scheme 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Any loss is borne by both parties (Islamic 
MFI and client) based on the capital 
contributon 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Muzaqat  (orchard financing) 
1. The Islamic MFI and client contribute 
equity in the orchard sector  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The harvest is shared based on the 
equity participation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Muzara’ah  (share of harvest) 
1. The Islamic MFI provides the land or 
funds to use in an agricultural business 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Any benefits are shared based on the 
agreement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Section 6. PLS and Non-PLS Mechanism 
 
Clients with PLS (Financing Behaviour) 
 
1. What is your PLS financing scheme? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Mudharabah        [  ] 
b. Musyarakah  [  ] 
c. Muzara’ah         [  ] 
d. Muzaqat         [  ] 
 
2.  How many times have you borrowed PLS financing from an Islamic MFI in the last 2 years? 
a. Once [ ] 
b. Twice [  ] 
c. 3 times  [ ] 
d.   More than 3 times  [ ] 
 
3. What was the total amount of PLS financing you applied for from an Islamic MFI? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
f.  More than Rp. 15,000,000  [ ] 
 
4. What was the total amount of PLS financing approved by the Islamic MFI in your application? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
f.      More than Rp. 15,000,000  
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5. Was the amount of PLS financing approved adequate? 
a.  YES      [            ]                                      b. NO        [             ] 
 
6.  What was the purpose of your PLS financing? (You can tick more than one) 
Agricultural activities 
a.  Farm cropping  [ ] 
b.  Livestock raising  [ ] 
c. Produce processing  [ ] 
d.  Purchase of farming machinery  [ ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify _____________________________ 
 
Non-agricultural activities 
a.  To start a self-run enterprise  [ ] 
b.  To finance an existing enterprise  [ ] 
c.  To finance a small-scale project  [ ] 
d.  Basic household needs  [ ] 
e.  To pay for children’s education  [ ] 
f.  Emergency (e.g., hospitalisation)  [ ] 
g.  Housing (e.g., repair, construction)  [ ] 
h.  Paying off other debts  [ ] 
i.  Other(s), please specify_______________________ 
 
7.  What was the duration of your PLS financing? 
a.  3 to 6 months  [ ] 
b.  7 to 12 months  [ ] 
c.  1 to 2 years [ ] 
d.  2 to 3 years  [ ] 
e.  More than 3 years  [ ] 
 
8.  What was the mode of your PLS financing payment? 
a.  Weekly  [  ] 
b.  Monthly  [ ] 
c.  Semi-annually  [ ] 
d.  Annually   [ ] 
e.  Other(s) please specify ____________________ 
 
9.  Did your PLS financing require collateral? 
a. YES [ ] b.  NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Q11) 
 
10.  If YES, what kind of collateral was required? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Mortgage property  [ ] 
b.  Chattel mortgage (i.e., vehicles, farm equipment)  [ ] 
c.  Promissory note  [ ] 
d.  Co-signor/co-guarantor  [ ] 
e.  Deposits  [ ] 
f.  Other(s), please specify _______________ 
 
11.  What is the current status of your PLS financing? 
a.  Fully paid  [ ] 
b.  Current  [ ] 
c.  Past due  [ ] 
d.  Restructured  [ ] 
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12.  How long did the Islamic MFI take to process your PLS financing application? 
a.  Less than a week  [ ] 
b.  1 week  [ ] 
c.  2 weeks  [ ] 
d.  3 weeks  [ ] 
e.  1 month  [ ] 
f.  More than a month  [ ] 
 
13. Was there any charge(s) on your PLS financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Q15) 
 
14. If YES, what were these charge(s)? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Administrative or service fee      [ ] 
b. Insurance fee        [ ] 
c. Guarantee fee        [ ] 
d. Legal fee         [ ] 
e. Other(s), please specify ________________      
 
15. Did you have to make any informal payment (such as gifts or money for financing officials, etc) 
to get the PLS financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
Clients with Non-PLS (Financing Behaviour) 
 
1. What is your non-PLS financing scheme? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Murabahah         [  ] 
b. Salam [  ] 
c. Ijarah Wa Iqtina’        [  ] 
d. Qard         [  ] 
 
2.  How many times have you borrowed non-PLS financing from Islamic MFI in the last 2 years? 
a. Once [ ] 
b. Twice [  ] 
c. 3 times  [ ] 
d.   More than 3 times  [ ] 
 
3.  What was the total amount of non-PLS financing you applied from Islamic MFI? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
f.  More than Rp. 15,000,000  [ ] 
 
4. What was the total amount of non-PLS financing approved by the Islamic MFI in your 
application? 
a.  Less than Rp. 1,000,000 [ ] 
b.  Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000 [ ] 
c.  Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000 [ ] 
d.  Between Rp. 5,000,001 and Rp. 7,000,000 [ ] 
e.  Between Rp. 7,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000 [ ] 
 f.  More than Rp. 15,000,000 [ ]   
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5. Was the amount of non-PLS financing approved adequate? 
a.  YES      [            ]                                      b. NO        [             ] 
 
6.  What was the purpose of your non-PLS financing? (You can tick more than one) 
Agricultural activities 
a.  Farm cropping  [ ] 
b.  Livestock raising  [ ] 
c. Produce processing  [ ] 
d.  Purchase of farming machinery  [ ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify _____________________________ 
 
Non-agricultural activities 
a.  To start a self-run enterprise  [ ] 
b.  To finance an existing enterprise  [ ] 
c.  To finance a small-scale project  [ ] 
d.  Basic household needs  [ ] 
e.  To pay for children’s education  [ ] 
f.  Emergency (e.g., hospitalisation)  [ ] 
g.  Housing (e.g., repair, construction)  [ ] 
h.  Paying off other debts  [ ] 
i.  Other(s), please specify_______________________ 
 
7.  What was the duration of your non-PLS financing? 
a.  3 to 6 months  [ ] 
b.  7 to 12 months  [ ] 
c.  1 to 2 years [ ] 
d.  2 to 3 years  [ ] 
e.  More than 3 years  [ ] 
 
8.  What was the mode of your non-PLS financing payment? 
a.  Weekly  [  ] 
b.  Monthly  [ ] 
c.  Semi-annually  [ ] 
d.  Annually  [ ] 
e.  Other(s), please specify ____________________ 
 
9.  Did your non-PLS financing require collateral? 
a. YES [ ] b.  NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Q11) 
 
10.  If YES, what kind of collateral was required? (You can tick more than one) 
a.  Mortgage property  [ ] 
b.  Chattel mortgage (i.e., vehicles, farm equipment)  [ ] 
c.  Promissory note  [ ] 
d.  Co-signor/co-guarantor  [ ] 
e.  Deposits  [ ] 
f.  Other(s), please specify _______________ 
 
11.  What is the current status of your non-PLS financing? 
a.  Fully paid  [ ] 
b.  Current  [ ] 
c.  Past due  [ ] 
d.  Restructured  [ ] 
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12.  How long did the Islamic MFI take to process your non-PLS financing application? 
a.  Less than a week  [ ] 
b.  1 week  [ ] 
c.  2 weeks  [ ] 
d.  3 weeks  [ ] 
e.  1 month  [ ] 
f.  More than a month  [ ] 
 
13. Was there any charge(s) on your non-PLS financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Q15) 
 
14. If YES, what were these charge(s)? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Administrative or service fee      [ ] 
b. Insurance fee        [ ] 
c. Guarantee fee        [ ] 
d. Legal fee         [ ] 
e. Other(s), please specify ________________      
 
15. Did you have to make any informal payment (such as gifts or money for financing officials, etc) 
to get the non-PLS financing? 
a. YES   [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
 
Section 7.  Assistance and Support for Rural Households  
(This section is only for Clients who have received financing from Islamic MFIs) 
 
1. Did you receive any assistance/support from the government after you obtained your 
financing? 
a. YES  [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
(If NO, please go to Section 8) 
 
2. If YES, what kind of assistance/support did you receive? (You can tick more than one) 
 a.    Financial support        [ ] 
b. Skill/technical support       [ ] 
c. Religious support        [ ] 
d. Other(s), please specify ______________________  
 
3.  How many times did you get assistance/support from the government during your financing 
period? 
a. Once [ ] 
b. Twice [  ] 
c. Three times  [ ] 
d.   More than three times  [ ] 
 
4.  Did you find the assistance/support beneficial? 
a. YES  [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
 
5. If YES, what was the benefit(s)? (You can tick more than one) 
 a.     I improved my financial skills      [ ] 
b. I improved my business knowledge      [ ] 
c. I improved my spiritual/moral knowledge     [ ] 
d. There is a chance to get a future grant     [ ] 
e. I got a bigger network (more friends)     [ ] 
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f. Other(s), please specify ______________________  
 
 
Section 8.  Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of Respondents 
(for All Respondents) 
 
1.  What is your gender? 
a. Male [ ] b.   Female  [ ] 
  
2. Which age group do you belong to? 
a. 18 – 25 years         [ ] 
b. 26 – 35 years         [ ] 
c. 36 – 45 years         [ ] 
d. 46 – 55 years         [ ] 
e. 56 – 65 years         [ ] 
f. Over 66 years         [ ] 
 
3. What is your marital status? 
a. Single/Never Married       [ ] 
b. Married         [ ] 
c. De facto relationship       [ ] 
d. Divorced/Separated        [ ] 
 
4. Which religious group do you belong to? 
a. Islam          [ ] 
b. Protestant         [ ] 
c. Roman catholic        [ ] 
d. Hindu         [ ] 
e. Buddhist         [ ] 
f. Other(s), please specify ______________________  
 
5. How many children do you have? 
a. None         [ ] 
b. 1          [ ] 
c. 2          [ ] 
d. 3          [ ] 
e. 4          [ ] 
f. More than 4        [ ] 
 
6. How many male children do you have? 
a. None         [ ] 
b. 1          [ ] 
c. 2          [ ] 
d. 3          [ ] 
e. 4          [ ] 
f. More than 4        [ ] 
   
7. What is your highest educational or professional qualification? 
a. No education        [ ] 
b. Primary school        [ ] 
c. Middle school        [ ] 
d. High school        [ ] 
e. Three-year college        [ ] 
f. Bachelor degree        [ ] 
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g. Postgraduate (Postgraduate Diploma, Masters or PhD degree)  [ ] 
h.  Other(s), please specify         
 
8. What is your occupation? 
a. Crop farming        [ ] 
b. Livestock raising        [ ] 
c. Fishery         [ ]
 d. Produce processing       [ ] 
e. Daily wage labour        [ ] 
f. Small entrepreneur       [ ] 
g. Government workers       [ ]
 h. Retired         [ ] 
i. Unemployed        [ ]                                        
j. Other (please specify) _______________________ 
   
9. How long have you been working (the total working period in the past plus current job)?  
a. Less than 1 year        [ ] 
b. 1 to 5 years        [ ] 
c. 5 to 10 years        [ ] 
d. 10 years and above       [ ] 
 
10. Which of the following best describes the structure of your household? 
a. Single adult living alone       [ ] 
b. Couple, with child (or children)      [ ] 
c. Couple, without child       [ ] 
d. Single parent, with child (or children)     [ ] 
e. Immediate and extended family members     [ ] 
f. Other(s), please specify        __ 
 
11. The number of people living in your household is (please state): 
______________ persons 
 
12. The number of income earners in your household is (please state): 
______________ persons 
 
13. What is your annual household income? 
a. Less than Rp. 12,000,000       [ ] 
b. Between Rp. 12,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000    [ ] 
c. Between Rp. 15,000,001 and Rp. 20,000,000    [ ] 
d. Between Rp. 20,000,001 and Rp. 25,000,000    [ ] 
e. Between Rp. 25,000,001 and Rp. 30,000,000    [ ] 
f. More than Rp. 30,000,000       [ ] 
 
14. What is the average total annual expenditure (on food and non-food) of your household? 
a. Less than Rp. 12,000,000       [ ] 
b. Between Rp. 12,000,001 and Rp. 15,000,000    [ ] 
c. Between Rp. 15,000,001 and Rp. 20,000,000    [ ] 
d. Between Rp. 20,000,001 and Rp. 25,000,000    [ ] 
e. Between Rp. 25,000,001 and Rp. 30,000,000    [ ] 
f. More than Rp. 30,000,000       [ ] 
 
15. Is any person in your household working as a government official (e.g., on the village 
committee)? 
a. YES  [ ] b.   NO  [ ] 
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16. Who makes the important family decisions in your household? 
a. Husband [ ] b.   Wife [ ]  c.   Both [ ] 
 
17. What percentage of your total annual expenditure is on food?  
a. 20%-30%         [ ] 
b. 30%-40%         [ ] 
c. 40%-50%         [ ] 
d. 50%-60%         [ ] 
e. 60%-70%         [ ] 
f. Over 70%         [ ] 
 
18. What is the average annual health care expenditure of your household? 
a. Less than Rp. 1,000,000       [ ] 
b. Between Rp. 1,000,001 and Rp. 2,000,000     [ ] 
c. Between Rp. 2,000,001 and Rp. 3,000,000     [ ] 
d. Between Rp. 3,000,001 and Rp. 4,000,000     [ ] 
e. Between Rp. 4,000,001 and Rp. 5,000,000     [ ] 
f. More than Rp. 5,000,000       [ ] 
 
19. What is the size of your household farm land? 
a. Less than 0.1 hectare       [ ] 
b. Between 0.1 – 0.5 hectare       [ ] 
c. More than 0.5 hectare        [ ] 
d. Other(s) please specify ______________________  
 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated; thank you for your time. If you have further 
comments about financing cards, please feel free to comment in the space provided below. Once again, 
we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
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 152 
References 
 
Abadie, A. (2005). Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 72(1), 1-19. 
 
Abdouli, A. (1991). Access to finance and collaterals: Islamic versus western banking. Islamic 
Economics, 3(1). 
 
Abdul-Rahman, A., Latif, R. A., Muda, R., & Abdullah, M. A. (2014). Failure and potential of profit-loss 
sharing contracts: A perspective of New Institutional, Economic (NIE) Theory. Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 28, 136-151. 
 
Aditiasari, D. (2016, March 15, ). Begini Cara Kerja OJK-Proksi [Online]. Detik. Retrieved from 
http://finance.detik.com/read/2016/03/15/175704/3165493/5/begini-cara-kerja-ojk-proksi 
 
Adnan, M. A., & Ajija, S. R. (2015). The effectiveness of Baitul Maal wat Tamwil in reducing poverty. 
Humanomics, 31(2), 160-182. 
 
Aggarwal, R. K., & Yousef, T. (2000). Islamic banks and investment financing. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 93-120. 
 
Ahmad, A. U. F., & Ahmad, A. B. R. (2009). Islamic microfinance: the evidence from Australia. 
Humanomics, 25(3), 217-235. doi:10.1108/08288660910986946 
 
Ahmad, A. U. F., & Hassan, M. K. (2007). Riba and Islamic banking. Journal of Islamic Economics, 
Banking and Finance, 3(1), 1-33. 
 
Ahmad, H. (2002). Financing micro enterprises: an analytical study of Islamic microfinance 
institutions. Islamic Economic Studies, 9(2), 27-64. 
 
Ahmed, H. (2007). Waqf-based microfinance: Realizing the social role of Islamic Finance. World Bank. 
 
Aichbichler, E. (2009). Islamic banking in Germany and Switzerland. uniwien. 
 
Ainley, M., Mashayekhi, A., Hicks, R., Rahman, A., & Ravalia, A. (2007a). Islamic finance in the UK: 
Regulation and challenges (Vol. 9): Financial Services Authority London. 
 
Ainley, M., Mashayekhi, A., Hicks, R., Rahman, A., & Ravalia, A. (2007b). Islamic finance in the UK: 
Regulation and challenges: Financial Services Authority London. 
 
Akhter, W., Akhtar, N., & Jaffri, S. K. A. (2009). Islamic Micro-Finance And Poverty Alleviation: A Case 
of Pakistan. 2nd CBRC. Lahore, Pakistan. 
 
Al-Shami, S. S. A., Majid, I. B. A., Rashid, N. A., & Hamid, M. S. R. B. A. (2013). Conceptual framework: 
The role of microfinance on the wellbeing of poor people cases studies from Malaysia and 
Yemen. Asian Social Science, 10(1), p230. 
 
Amin, A. (2004). Pedoman Pendirian BMT (Baitul Maal Wat Tamwil). Jakarta. 
 
Asutay, M. (2007). Conceptualisation of the second best solution in overcoming the social failure of 
Islamic banking and finance: examining the overpowering of homoislamicus by 
homoeconomicus. International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 15(2). 
 153 
Athey, S., & Imbens, G. W. (2006). Identification and inference in nonlinear difference‐in‐differences 
models. Econometrica, 74(2), 431-497. 
 
Azmat, S., Skully, M., & Brown, K. (2014). The Shariah compliance challenge in Islamic bond markets. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 28, 47-57. 
 
Azmat, S., Skully, M., & Brown, K. (2015). Can Islamic banking ever become Islamic? Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal. 
 
Badan Amil Zakat Nasional. (2016). Visi dan Misi. Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://pusat.baznas.go.id/visi-misi/ 
 
Badan Wakaf Indonesia. (2012). Sekilas Badan Wakaf Indonesia. Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://bwi.or.id/index.php/in/tentang-bwi/sekilas-bwi 
 
Baker, J. L. (2000). Evaluating the impact of development projects on poverty: A handbook for 
practitioners: World Bank Publications. 
 
Bank BPR Jatim. (2015). Sejarah Singkat. Retrieved  March 31,, 2016,from 
http://bprjatim.co.id/profil/sejarah-singkat/ 
 
Bank BRI Agro. (2014). Annual Report. Jakarta, Indonesia: Bank BRI Agro. 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2016). Shariah Advisory Council. Retrieved  March, 18, 2017,from 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=en_about&pg=en_thebank&ac=439&lang=en 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia. (2014). Annual Report. Jakarta, Indonesia: Bank Rakyat Indonesia. 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia. (2015a). BRI, Menuju Bank Terbesar di Indonesia.  Retrieved July 23, 2015 
http://www.bumn.go.id/bri/berita/98/BRI.,.Menuju.Bank.Terbesar.di.Indonesia 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia. (2015b). Sejarah BRI.  Retrieved August 12, 2015 
http://www.bri.co.id/articles/9 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia. (2016). Corporate Profile. Retrieved  January 04, 2016,from 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=148820&p=irol-homeProfile 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Syariah. (2014). Annual Report. Jakarta, Indonesia: Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Syariah. 
 
Becker, S. O., & Ichino, A. (2002). Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity 
scores. The stata journal, 2(4), 358-377. 
 
Ben-Akiva, M. E., & Lerman, S. R. (1985). Discrete choice analysis: theory and application to travel 
demand (Vol. 9): MIT press. 
 
Bergemann, A., Fitzenberger, B., & Speckesser, S. (2005). Evaluating the dynamic employment effects 
of training programs in East Germany using conditional difference-in-differences. 
 
Berhane, G., & Gardebroek, C. (2011). Does microfinance reduce rural poverty? Evidence based on 
household panel data from northern Ethiopia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
93(1), 43-55. 
 154 
Bloomberg. (2015). Company Overview of BRI Remittance Company Limited Bloomberg Business. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=227936401 
 
Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1990). A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial 
contracting. The American Economic Review, 93-106. 
 
Boomgard, J. J., & Angell, K. J. (1990). Developing Financial Services for Microenterprises: An 
Evaluation of USAID Assistance to the BRI Unit Desa System in Indonesia  Development 
Alternatives Inc. 
 
BRI Remittance. (2013). BRI Remittance Services.  Retrieved October 22,, from BRI Remittance 
http://briremittance.com/en/services/ 
 
Central Bank of Indonesia. (2015). Indonesia Banking Statistics. Jakarta: Central Bank of Indonesia. 
Retrieved from http://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/perbankan/indonesia/Default.aspx 
 
Chapra, M. U. (2006). The nature of riba in Islam. The Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance, 2, 7-
25. 
 
Chong, B. S., & Liu, M.-H. (2009). Islamic banking: interest-free or interest-based? Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 17(1), 125-144. 
 
Chowdhry, S. (2006). Creating an Islamic Microfinance Model-The Missing Dimension. Retrieved from 
http://www.sa-dhan.net 
 
Coleman, B. E. (1999). The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand. Journal of Development 
Economics, 60(1), 105-141. 
 
Conroy, J. D. (2003). The challenges of microfinancing in Southeast Asia: Foundation for Development 
Cooperation. 
 
Copestake, J., Bhalotra, S., & Johnson, S. (2001). Assessing the impact of microcredit: A Zambian case 
study. Journal of Development Studies, 37(4), 81-100. 
 
DeLoach, S. B., & Lamanna, E. (2011). Measuring the impact of microfinance on child health 
outcomes in Indonesia. World Development, 39(10), 1808-1819. 
 
Dhumale, R., & Sapcanin, A. (1999). An application of Islamic banking principles to microfinance. 
Technical Note, A study bt yhe Regional Bureau for Arab States, UNDP, in cooperation with 
the Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank. 
 
Diagne, A., & Zeller, M. (2001). Access to credit and its impact on welfare in Malawi (Vol. 116): Intl 
Food Policy Res Inst. 
 
Dompet Dhuafa. (2016). BMT Centre. Retrieved  June, 13, 2016,from 
http://www.dompetdhuafa.org/ekonomi/lkms/bmt-centre 
 
DSN MUI. (2013). Sekilas Tentang DSN MUI. Retrieved  March, 18, 2017,from 
http://www.dsnmui.or.id/index.php?page=sekilas 
 
Dusuki, A. W. (2006). Empowering Islamic Microfinance: Lesson from Group-Based Lending Scheme 
and Ibn Khaldun’s Concept of ‘Asabiyah Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Monash 
University 4th International Islamic Banking and Finance Conference. Kuala Lumpur 
 155 
Dusuki, A. W. (2008). Banking for the poor: the role of Islamic banking in microfinance initiatives. 
Humanomics, 24(1), 49-66. 
 
Dusuki, W., & Abdullah, I. (2006). The ideal of Islamic banking: chasing a mirage Symposium 
conducted at the meeting of the INCEIF Islamic Banking and Finance Educational Colloquium, 
Kuala Lumpur, 3rd-5th April. 
 
Dwiantika, N. (2014, November, 6). Bank Indonesia ingin Pangsa Pasar Perbankan Syariah Tembus 
30%. Tribunnews.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.tribunnews.com/bisnis/2014/11/06/bank-indonesia-ingin-pangsa-pasar-
perbankan-syariah-tembus-30 
 
Dzadze, P., Aidoo, R., & Nurah, G. (2012). Factors determining access to formal credit in Ghana: A 
case study of smallholder farmers in the Abura-Asebu Kwamankese district of central region 
of Ghana. Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics, 4(14), 416-423. 
 
El-Komi, M., & Croson, R. (2013). Experiments in Islamic microfinance. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 95(0), 252-269. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.08.009 
 
Ezemenari, K., Rudqvist, A., & Subbarao, K. (1999). Impact evaluation: A note on concepts and 
methods. World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, procesado. 
Washington, DC: Banco Mundial. 
 
Fahlevi, F. (2015, April 23,). BRI Jadi Contoh BUMN Go Public yang Sukses [online]. Trbunnews. 
Retrieved from http://www.tribunnews.com/bisnis/2015/04/23/bri-jadi-contoh-bumn-go-
public-yang-sukses 
 
Farooq, M. O. (2007). Partnership, Equity-Financing and Islamic Finance: Whither Profit-Loss Sharing? 
Review of Islamic Economics, 11(Special), 67-88. 
 
Fauzia, A. (2013). Faith and the State: a History of Islamic Philantrophy in Indonesia. Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV. 
 
Firpo, S. (2007). Efficient semiparametric estimation of quantile treatment effects. Econometrica, 
75(1), 259-276. 
 
Gallardo, J. (2001). A Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions: The Experience in Ghana 
and the Philippines: The World Bank. 
 
Gao, X. (2011). Accessibility of Housing Loan Affect on Homeownership in Urban China: A Case Study 
of Nanjing. Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
Gera, I. (2013). OJK Resmi Ambil Alih Tugas Pengawasan Perbankan dari BI.  Retrieved January 16, 
from Voice of America http://www.voaindonesia.com/content/ojk-resmi-ambil-alih-tugas-
pengawasan-perbankan-dari-bi/1820703.html 
 
Global Islamic Finance Report. (2014). Islamic Finance Country Index 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.gifr.net/publications/gifr2014/ifci.pdf 
 
Grameen Bank. (2015). About Us. Retrieved  June 9, 2015,from http://www.grameen-info.org/about-
us/ 
 
Hadi, I. A. (2011). Kedudukan dan Wewenang Lembaga Fatwa (DSN-MUI) pada Bank Syariah Jurnal 
Ekonomi dan Hukum Islam 01(2). 
 156 
Hadi, R., Wahyudin, U., Ardiwinata, J. S., & Abdu, W. J. (2015). Education and microfinance: an 
alternative approach to the empowerment of the poor people in Indonesia. SpringerPlus, 
4(1), 244. 
 
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1997). Default and renegotiation: A dynamic model of debt: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Hasbi, H. (2015). Islamic Microfinance Institution: The Capital Structure, Growth, Performance and 
Value of Firm in Indonesia. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 211, 1073-1080. 
 
Hassan, M. K. (2010). An integrated poverty alleviation model combining zakat, awqaf and 
microfinance Symposium conducted at the meeting of the Seventh International Conference-
The Tawhidi Epistemology: Zakat and Waqf Economy, Bangi, Malaysia. 
 
Hassan, M. K., & Lewis, M. K. (2004). Islamic financing: an introduction. Munawar Iqbal Islamic 
Banking in Practice 10 Said M. Elfakhani, Yusuf M. Sidani and Omar A. Fahel An Assessment 
of the Performance of Islamic Mutual Funds 39 Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha Value Preservation 
through Risk Management A Shariah Compliant Proposal for Equity Risk, 1. 
 
Heckman, J. J. (1997). Instrumental variables: A study of implicit behavioral assumptions in one 
widely used estimator. Journal of Human Resources, 32(3). 
 
Heckman, J. J., & Smith, J. A. (1995). Assessing the case for social experiments. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 85-110. 
 
Heckman, J. J., & Smith, J. A. (1999). The Pre‐programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of 
Participation in a Social Programme. Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation 
Strategies. The Economic Journal, 109(457), 313-348. 
 
Hermes, N., & Lensink, R. (2011). Microfinance: Its Impact, Outreach, and Sustainability. World 
Development, 39(6), 875-881. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.10.021. 
 
Hiatt, S. R., & Woodworth, W. P. (2006). Alleviating poverty through microfinance: Village banking 
outcomes in Central America. The Social Science Journal, 43(3), 471-477. 
 
Hirano, K., Imbens, G. W., & Ridder, G. (2003). Efficient estimation of average treatment effects using 
the estimated propensity score. Econometrica, 71(4), 1161-1189. 
 
Honohan, P. (2008). Cross-country variation in household access to financial services. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 32(11), 2493-2500. 
 
Huda, A. N. (2012). The Development of Islamic Financing Scheme for SMEs in a Developing Country: 
The Indonesian Case. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 52, 179-186. 
 
Hulme, D. (1997). Impact assessment methodologies for microfinance: A review: AIMS, USAID. 
 
Hulme, D. (2000). Impact assessment methodologies for microfinance: theory, experience and better 
practice. World development, 28(1), 79-98. 
 
Ibrahim, M. H. (2015). Issues in Islamic banking and finance: Islamic banks, Shari’ah-compliant 
investment and sukuk. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 34, 185-191. 
 
Ibrahim, M. H., & Mirakhor, A. (2014). Islamic finance: An overview. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 28, 
2-6. 
 157 
Icanenede. (2010, July 25). Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) Syariah.  Retrieved from 
https://acankende.wordpress.com/2010/11/28/bank-perkreditan-rakyat-bpr-syariah/ 
 
Ikatan Ahli Ekonomi Islam Indonesia. (2013). Profil. Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://www.iaei-pusat.org/id/page/profil 
 
Imady, O., & Seibel, H. D. (2006). Principles and products of Islamic finance. University of Cologne 
Development Research Center, 2, 2006-2001. 
 
Imai, K. S., Arun, T., & Annim, S. K. (2010). Microfinance and household poverty reduction: new 
evidence from India. World Development, 38(12), 1760-1774. 
 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2013). Duties and Function. Retrieved  May 08, 2015,from 
http://www.ojk.go.id/en/duty-and-function 
 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2014a). Indonesia Banking Statistics.  Retrieved July 23, 2015 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2014b). Other Financial Services Institutions. Retrieved  
January 16, 2016,from http://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/iknb/Pages/Lembaga-Keuangan-
Micro.aspx 
 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2015a). The History of Islamic Bank. Retrieved  January 14, 
2016,from http://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/syariah/tentang-syariah/Pages/Sejarah-
Perbankan-Syariah.aspx 
 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2015b). Regulation of Microfinance Institutions. Retrieved  
June 19, 2015,from http://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/iknb/regulasi/lembaga-keuangan-
mikro/undang-undang/Default.aspx 
 
Indonesia Financial Services Authority. (2016). OJK Proksi Diharapkan Dapat Mengentaskan 
Kemiskinan. Retrieved  March 20,, 2016,from http://www.ojk.go.id/id/berita-dan-
kegiatan/publikasi/Pages/OJK-Proksi-Diharapkan-Dapat-Mengentaskan-Kemiskinan.aspx 
 
Inkopsyah BMT. (2016). Visi & Misi. Retrieved  June, 13, 2016,from http://indukbmt.co.id/visi-misi/ 
 
Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (1987). Islamic banking (Vol. 49): International Monetary Fund. 
 
Islam, A., & Harris, M. N. (2008). Medium and long-term participation in microfinance: an evaluation 
using a large panel data set from Bangladesh. http://nzae. org. nz/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/nr1215136111. pdf. Last accessed on, 22(3), 11. 
 
Israel, G. D. (1992). Determining sample size: University of Florida Cooperative Extension Service, 
Institute of Food and Agriculture Sciences, EDIS. 
 
Jawa Timur Population, &. (2013).  Surabaya: BPS-Statistics Jawa Timur. 
 
Kabbani, S. M. H. (2017). What is Fatwa? Retrieved  March, 18, 2017,from 
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/44-what-is-a-
fatwa.html 
 
Kaleem, A., & Ahmed, S. (2009). The Quran and Poverty Alleviation: A Theoretical Model for Charity-
Based Islamic Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 
39(3), 409-428. doi:10.1177/0899764009332466 
 
 158 
Karim, N., Tarazi, M., & Reille, X. (2008). Islamic microfinance: an emerging market niche. 
Washington DC USA: CGAP. 
 
Kazarian, E. G. (1993). Islamic versus Traditional Banking: Financial Innovations in Egypt: Westview 
press Boulder, CO. 
 
Khoi, P. D., Gan, C., Nartea, G. V., & Cohen, D. A. (2013). Formal and informal rural credit in the 
Mekong River Delta of Vietnam: Interaction and accessibility. Journal of Asian Economics, 26, 
1-13. 
 
Kondo, T., Orbeta, A., Dingcong, C., & Infantado, C. (2008). Impact of microfinance on rural 
households in the Philippines. IDS Bulletin, 39(1), 51-70. 
 
Lapenu, C., & Pierret, D. (2006). Handbook for the Analysis of the Governance of Microfinance 
Institutions. 
 
Lawrence, J. (2014). Islamic Finance in Indonesia: Past, Present, and Future. Retrieved  November, 25, 
2015,from http://www.klgates.com/islamic_finance_in_indonesia/ 
 
Lee, M.-j. (2016). Generalized Difference in Differences With Panel Data and Least Squares Estimator. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 45(1), 134-157. 
 
Li, X. (2010). An Empirical Analysis of Microcredit on China Rural Household. Lincoln University, New 
Zealand. 
 
Li, X., Gan, C., & Hu, B. (2011a). Accessibility to microcredit by Chinese rural households. Journal of 
Asian Economics, 22(3), 235-246. doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2011.01.004 
 
Li, X., Gan, C., & Hu, B. (2011b). The welfare impact of microcredit on rural households in China. The 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 40(4), 404-411. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.012 
 
Littlefield, E., Morduch, J., & Hashemi, S. (2003). Is microfinance an effective strategy to reach the 
Millennium Development Goals? Focus Note, 24(2003), 1-11. 
 
Marhiansyah. (2012). Pinbuk Aceh: LKMS BI-nya Baitul Qiradh. Harian Aceh. Co. Retrieved from 
http://www.harianaceh.co/read/2012/02/01/27163/pinbuk-aceh-lkms-bi-nya-baitul-qiradh 
 
Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah. (2008). Sejarah. Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://www.ekonomisyariah.org/sejarah 
 
Masyita, D., & Ahmed, H. (2011). Why is Growth of Islamic Microfinance Lower than Conventional? A 
Comparative Study of the Preferences and Perceptions of the Clients of Islamic and 
Conventional Microfinance Institutions’ in Indonesia Symposium conducted at the meeting of 
the Eighth International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Doha, Qatar. 
 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia. (2005). Cooperation Data.  
Retrieved July 23, 2015. 
 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia. (2013). Cooperation Data.   
 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs' of Republic of Indonesia. (2015). Sejarah Kementerian 
Koperasi dan UKM.  Retrieved July 25, 2015 
http://www.depkop.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=34 
 159 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and SMEs of Republic of Indonesia. (2007). Standard Operating 
Procedure KJKS and UJKS: Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro and Small, and Medium 
Enterprise of Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Ministry of Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia. (2011). Forestry Profile of 33 Province in Indonesia. 
Jakarta: Forestry Ministry. 
 
Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. (2013). The Annual Report of Religious Life 
in Indonesia. Jakarta, Indonesia: Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Mollaha, S., & Zaman, M. (2015). Shari’Ah Supervision, Corporate Governance and Performance: 
Conventional vs. Islamic Banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming. 
 
Mukherjee, J. (1997). State-Owned Development Banks in Microfinance. Retrieved from 
http://www.cgap.org/publications/state-owned-development-banks-microfinance 
 
Naqvi, S. N. H., & Qadir, A. (1997). The Dimensions of an Islamic Economic Model. Islamic Economic 
Studies, 4(2), 1-24. 
 
Nasdaq OMX. (2012). Global Islamic microfinance landscape.  Retrieved June 19, from Nasdaq OMX 
Sharia indexes http://www.gifr.net/gifr2012/ch_25.pdf 
 
Nasution, A. C. (2015). Efficiency Of Baitul Maal Wa Tamwil (Bmt): An Effort Towards Islamic Wealth 
Management In Microfinance Institution. 
 
Obaidullah, M. (2008). Introduction to Islamic microfinance: IBF Net Limited. 
 
Obaidullah, M., & Khan, T. (2008). Islamic microfinance development: Challenges and initiatives. 
Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank. 
 
Okurut, F. N. (2006). Access to credit by the poor in South Africa: Evidence from Household Survey 
Data 1995 and 2000. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch. 
 
Opportunity International. (2015). About Us. Retrieved  June 9, 2015,from 
http://opportunity.org.au/what-we-do/about-us/ 
 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (2015). OIC Economic Outlook. Ankara, Turkey: SESRIC. 
 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (2017). History. Retrieved  February, 17, 2017,from 
http://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en 
 
Paldi, C. (2014). Understanding Riba and Gharar in Islamic Finance. Journal of Islamic Banking and 
Finance, 2(1), 249-259. 
 
Paul, S., & Presley, J. R. (1999). Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice: Macmillan. 
 
Pegadaian Indonesia. (2014). Tentang Perusahaan.  Retrieved July 24, 2015 
http://bumn.go.id/pegadaian/halaman/41/tentang-perusahaan.html 
 
Perry, G., & Maloney, T. (2007). Evaluating active labour market programmes in New Zealand. 
International Journal of Manpower, 28(1), 7-29. 
 
Pew Research Center. (2015). The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-
2050. 
 160 
Phan, D. K. (2012). An Empirical Analysis of Accessibility and Impact of Microcredit: the Rural Credit 
Market in the Mekong River Delta, Vietnam   Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand. 
 
Phan, D. K., Gan, C., Nartea, G. V., & Cohen, D. A. (2014). The impact of microcredit on rural 
households in the Mekong River Delta of Vietnam. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 19(4), 
558-578. 
 
Pitt, M. M., & Khandker, S. R. (1998). The Impact of Group‐Based Credit Programs on Poor 
Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter? Journal of political 
economy, 106(5), 958-996. 
 
Praditya, I. I. (2013, January 16). Jumlah BPR Makin Menciut. Retrieved from 
http://bisnis.liputan6.com/read/674995/jumlah-bpr-makin-menciut 
 
PT BPR Indra Chandra. (2011). Mengenal Bank Perkreditan Rakyat.  Retrieved July 24, 2015 
http://bprindra.com/profil/mengenal-bank-perkreditan-rakyat 
 
Pusat komunikasi Ekonomi Syariah. (2013). Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://ekonomisyariah.info/blog/category/pkes/profil/ 
 
Quinlan, C. (2011). Business Research Methods. Cheriton House, North Way, Andover, Hampshire, 
SP10 5BE United Kingdom: Cengage Learning EMEA. 
 
Rahman, A. R. A. (2010a). Islamic microfinance: an ethical alternative to poverty alleviation. 
Humanomics, 26(4), 284-295. 
 
Rahman, A. R. A., & Rahim, A. (2007). Islamic microfinance: a missing component in Islamic banking. 
Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 1(2), 38-53. 
 
Rahman, M. M. (2010b). Islamic micro-finance programme and its impact on rural poverty 
alleviation. International Journal of Banking and Finance, 7(1), 7. 
 
Rahman, M. M., & Ahmad, F. (2010). Impact of microfinance of IBBL on the rural poor’s livelihood in 
Bangladesh: an empirical study. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance 
and Management, 3(2), 168-190. doi:10.1108/17538391011054390 
 
Riwajanti, N. I., & Asutay, M. (2015). The role of Islamic micro-finance institutions in economic 
development in Indonesia: A comparative analytical empirical study on pre-and post-
financing states. Access to Finance and Human Development—Essays on Zakah, Awqaf and 
Microfinance, 55. 
 
Robinson, M. S. (2002). The microfinance revolution: Lessons from Indonesia (Vol. 2): World Bank 
Publications. 
 
Samer, S., Majid, I., Rizal, S., Muhamad, M., & Rashid, N. (2015). The Impact of Microfinance on 
Poverty Reduction: Empirical Evidence from Malaysian Perspective. Procedia-Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 195, 721-728. 
 
Saparie, G. (2017). Dominasi Murabahah di Bank Syariah. Retrieved  January 16, 2018,from 
https://indonesiana.tempo.co/read/115875/2017/08/28/gunotosaparie/dominasi-
murabahah-di-bank-syariah 
 
Seibel, H. D. (2005a). The microbanking division of Bank Rakyat Indonesia: a flagship of rural 
microfinance in Asia: Working paper/University of Cologne, Development Research Center. 
 161 
Seibel, H. D. (2005b). What matters in rural and microfinance: Working paper/University of Cologne, 
Development Research Center. 
 
Seibel, H. D. (2008). Islamic microfinance in Indonesia: the challenge of institutional diversity, 
regulation, and supervision. SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 23(1), 86-
103. 
 
Seibel, H. D., & Dwi Agung, W. (2006). Islamic Microfinance in Indonesia: Working paper/University of 
Cologne, Development Research Center. 
 
Seibel, H. D., & Ozaki, M. (2009). Restructuring of State-owned Financial Institutions: Lessons from 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia. Philippines. 
 
SESRIC. (2015). Measurement of Poverty in OIC Member Countries. Ankara, Turkey. 
Shahinpoor, N. (2009). The link between Islamic banking and microfinancing. International Journal of 
Social Economics, 36(10), 996-1007. doi:10.1108/03068290910984777 
 
Shodiq, M. (2014, September 11, 2014). Next generation of microfinance: Leveraging Indonesian 
experience The Jakarta Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/11/next-generation-microfinance-
leveraging-indonesian-experience.html 
 
State Bank of Pakistan. (2016). Islamic Banking Department. Retrieved  March, 18, 2017,from 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/ibd.htm 
 
Statistics Indonesia. (2014). Monthly Report of Socio-Economic Data December 2014: Statistics 
Indonesia. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/11386648/Berita_Resmi_BPS_2015 
 
Sugianto. (2012). Denyut koperasi syariah. Retrieved from 
http://www.depkop.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=948:denyut-
koperasi-syariah&catid=54:bind-berita-kementerian&Itemid=98 
 
Sumarti, N., Fitriyani, V., & Damayanti, M. (2014). A Mathematical Model of the Profit-Loss Sharing 
(PLS) Scheme. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 115, 131-137. 
 
Tambunan, T. (2015). Financial inclusion, financial education, and financial regulation: A story from 
Indonesia: ADBI Working Paper Series. 
 
The Council of Indonesian Ulama. (2013). Fatwa DSN-MUI. Retrieved  January 15, 2016,from 
http://mui.or.id/ 
 
The World Bank. (2012). KUPEDES: Indonesia's Model Small Credit Program. Retrieved  October, 11, 
2015,from 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/7DBBAC3B63
6F7FDC852567F5005D8AD3 
 
The World Bank. (2013). Microfinance Development Project. Retrieved  June 11, 2015,from 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P095554/microfinance-development-project?lang=en 
 
The World Bank. (2015a). Indonesia Overview. Retrieved  May 4, 2015,from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview 
 
 162 
The World Bank. (2015b). World Development Indicator.  Retrieved July 22, 2015 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=IDN&series=&period
= 
 
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation: Cambridge university press. 
 
Umoh, G. S. (2006). Empirical investigation of access to micro-credit in an emerging economy: 
Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of African Business, 7(1-2), 89-117. 
 
Vaessen, J. (2001). Accessibility of Rural Credit in Northern Nicaragua: the Importance of Networks of 
Information and Recommendation. Savings and development, 5-32. 
 
Vatta, K. (2003). Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation. Economic and Political Weekly, 432-433. 
 
Vinnicombe, T. (2010). AAOIFI reporting standards: Measuring compliance. Advances in Accounting, 
26(1), 55-65. 
 
Widiarto, I., & Emrouznejad, A. (2015). Social and financial efficiency of Islamic microfinance 
institutions: A data envelopment analysis application. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 50, 
1-17. 
 
Wilson, R. (2007). Making development assistance sustainable through Islamic microfinance. 
International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 15(2). 
 
Zain, Y., Fattah, S., Djauhariah S, L., Siawadharma, B., Mustari, B., & Tadjibu, J. (2006). Skema 
Pembiayaan Perbankan Daerah Menurut Karakteristik UMKM pada Sektor Ekonomi 
Unggulan di Sulawesi Selatan: Bank Indonesia. Retrieved from 
http://www.bi.go.id/id/publikasi/perbankan-dan-
stabilitas/arsitektur/Documents/7709a1620def439da1081d6eece8d3b4SkemaPembiayaanP
erbankanDaerahMenurutKarakteristik.pdf 
 
